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ABSTRACT 
 
 
After the publication of groundbreaking texts such as “Silent Spring” (Rachel Carson, 
1962), “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Garrett Hardin, 1968), and “The Population 
Bomb” (Paul Ehrlich, 1970), environmental issues came to the forefront of society’s 
concern. In response, many governments began enacting strong environmental 
protection laws. South Africa is no exception, with the promulgation of the Environment 
Conservation Act (ECA), Act 73 of 1989, and subsequently the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA), Act 107 of 1998.  
 
Despite thorough environmental framework legislation, non-compliance with 
environmental law remains common in South Africa. The controversial Section 24G of 
NEMA, entitled “Consequences of unlawful commencement of activity” attempts to 
address environmental non-compliance. S 24G allows individuals and companies who 
illegally commenced with an environmental activity prior to obtaining the necessary 
environmental authorisations to apply for retrospective authorisation.  
 
The provision made for ex post facto (after the fact) environmental authorisation by 
s 24G is controversial, and a number of concerned individuals and environmental 
organisations have contested it. Concerns surrounding s 24G include the perception 
that s 24G leads to guaranteed environmental authorisation, and that s 24G can be 
used to save time by bypassing the traditional Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
process. S 24G has been misused by companies who simply budget for the 
administrative fine and commence with illegal activities. In addition, many have argued 
that the administrative fine associated with s 24G is too low to constitute an effective 
deterrent.  
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether s 24G is an effective deterrent to 
prevent non-compliance with environmental law. Past research, as well as information 
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obtained from the Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning (DEA&DP) is used to analyse trends in s 24G applications and make 
recommendations for improving the deterrence potential of this legislation.  
 
The findings of this research show that despite a consistent increase in the average 
administrative fine, the number of s 24G applications received by DEA&DP increases 
every year. However, it is argued that the number of s 24G applications received does 
not necessarily reflect an increase in environmental non-compliance, but an improved 
detection of environmental crimes. Most s 24G applications arise from ignorance. 
Therefore, although s 24G should be amended to increase its effectiveness as a 
deterrent, ignorance of environmental laws and regulations should be improved through 
compliance promotion.  
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OPSOMMING  
 
 
Nadat innoverende tekste soos “Silent Spring” (Rachel Carson, 1962), “The Tragedy of 
the Commons” (Garrett Hardin, 1968), en “The Population Bomb” (Paul Ehrlich, 1970) 
gepubliseer is, het omgewingskwessies na die voorpunt van die samelewing se aandag 
gekom. In reaksie hierop het baie regerings sterk omgewingswette begin toepass. Suid-
Afrika is geen uitsondering, met die promulgering van die Omgewingsbewaaringswet 
(OBW), Wet 73 van 1989, en daarna die Nasionale Omgewingsbestuurswet (NOBW), 
Wet 107 van 1998.  
 
Ten spyte van deeglike omgewings raamwerkwetgewing, bly nie-nakoming van die 
omgewingswet algemeen in Suid-Afrika. Die omstrede Artikel 24G van NOBW, getiteld 
“Consequences of unlawful commencement of activity” poog om omgewings nie-
nakoming aan te spreek. Volgens a 24G kan individue en maatskappye wat onwettig 
begin met 'n omgewings aktiwiteit voor die verkryging van die nodige 
omgewingsmagtigings aansoek doen vir terugwerkende magtiging. 
 
Die voorsiening wat gemaak is vir ex post facto (na die feit) omgewingsmagtiging deur 
a 24G is omstrede, en 'n aantal besorgde individue en omgewings organisasies het dit 
betwis. Bekommernisse omliggend a 24G sluit in die persepsie dat a 24G lei tot 
gewaarborgde omgewingsmagtiging, en dat a 24G gebruik kan word om tyd te spaar 
deur om die tradisionele Omgewingsimpakstudie (OIS) proses te vermy. A 24G was al 
misbruik deur maatskappye wat net begroot vir die administratiewe boete en dan begin 
met onwettige aktiwiteite. Baie mense het ook al aangevoer dat die administratiewe 
boete wat verband is met a 24G te laag is om 'n doeltreffende afskrikmiddel te wees. 
 
Die doel van hierdie navorsing is om te ondersoek of a 24G 'n doeltreffende 
afskrikmiddel vir nie-nakoming van die omgewings reg is. Vorige navorsing, sowel as 
inligting wat verkry is van die Wes-Kaapse Departement van Omgewingsake en 
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Ontwikkelingsbeplanning (DOS&OB) is gebruik om tendense in a 24G aansoeke te 
ontleed en aanbevelings te maak vir die verbetering van die afskrikking potensiaal van 
hierdie wetgewing.  
 
Die bevindinge van hierdie navorsing toon dat ten spyte van 'n konsekwente toename in 
die gemiddelde administratiewe boete, verhoog die aantal a 24G aansoeke wat deur die 
DOS&OB ontvang is elke jaar. Dit word egter aangevoer dat die getal a 24G aansoeke 
wat ontvang is nie noodwendig 'n toename in die omgewings nie-nakoming beteken nie, 
maar eerder 'n beter opsporing van omgewings misdade. Die meeste a 24G aansoeke 
kom van onkunde. Daarom, alhoewel a 24G gewysig moet word om ‘n meer 
doeltreffende  afskrikmiddel te wees, moet onkunde van omgewingswette en regulasies 
verbeter word deur voldoening bevordering. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
Before the existence of environmental law, businesses and individuals were free to exploit the 
environment for their own gain, with little consideration for sustainable development. 
Infrastructure could replace a well-functioning wetland or a pristine river, at the discretion of 
the developer. However, such practices changed when environmental management and 
environmental assessment were introduced into South Africa’s legislation. Businesses and 
individuals are now required to consider the environmental impacts of their actions, as well as 
identify measures to mitigate these impacts. Gone are the days when the environment was 
simply a resource for people to exploit as they please.  
 
The turning point for environmental legislation in South Africa was when the historic 1996 
Constitution included for the first time an environmental right. This environmental right states 
that every citizen has the right to an environment which does not negatively affect their health, 
and that the environment is protected for subsequent generations. South Africa’s framework 
environmental legislation, the National Environmental Management Act (Act 107 of 1998) 
(NEMA) was adopted in 1998 in order to give effect to the environmental right stated in the 
Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1998). NEMA contains certain principles designed to 
promote the responsible use of environmental resources and encourage sustainable 
development in South Africa. NEMA also contains a number of listed activities which require 
environmental authorisation from the competent authority before commencement.  
 
NEMA describes the widely used Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) tool, which is 
designed to inform decision makers of the possible environmental impacts of projects. EIA is 
intended to promote sustainable development by encouraging the mitigation of environmental 
impacts of activities, or where mitigation is not feasible, the rejection of environmentally 
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damaging activities (Wood, 1995:1). EIA is only one of the environmental management tools 
described within NEMA. 
 
In spite of South Africa’s progressive environmental framework legislation, the environment 
continues to be threatened by non-compliant individuals and businesses. According to Craigie 
et al. (2009:41): “governance and regulation are largely meaningless without compliance”, 
and environmental non-compliance is widespread in South Africa. Although sensational non-
compliance issues such as poaching tend to receive the most media attention, the 2010/11 
National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report (NECER) found that the illegal 
commencement of listed activities was the most common crime in every province excluding 
the Northern Cape (DEA, 2011).  
 
Section 24G of NEMA intends to address the unlawful commencement of listed activities. S 
24G is entitled “Rectification of unlawful commencement of activity” and was included by the 
National Environmental Management Amendment Act (Act 8 of 2004)(Republic of South 
Africa, 2004), with effect from January 7, 2005. S 24G allows an individual or business who 
commenced with a listed activity prior to obtaining environmental authorisation to apply to the 
Minister or MEC for retrospective authorisation, subject to an administrative fee.  
 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
S 24G of NEMA has become extremely controversial and is contended by individuals and 
interest groups alike. Although in many cases unlawful commencement of a listed activity is 
due to ignorance of environmental law, unlawful commencement can also be due to 
deliberate non-compliance. Deliberate non-compliance by individuals or businesses can be 
motivated by a desire to save time (the entire EIA process takes on average six months to a 
year), which in turn increases profits (September, 2012). Businesses have been observed to 
illegally commence with a listed activity in order to begin production, and simply budget for the 
s 24G administrative fine as an overhead cost (CER, 2011).  
 
Without adequate financial penalties, the practice of businesses and individuals budgeting for 
the s 24G administrative fine and illegally commencing with listed activities will continue. S 
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24G will eventually be considered an easier method of obtaining environmental authorisation, 
compared to the traditional EIA process, especially since approval rates of s 24G applications 
have been found to be similar to approval rates for traditional EIAs (September, 2012:55). A 
situation will arise whereby honest, law-abiding people are disadvantaged compared to 
environmental offenders (September, 2012:53). In fact, whether or not s 24G fines are a 
proper deterrent for possible offenders is a heavily contested issue which will be examined in 
this thesis.  
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The following research critically examines the effectiveness of s 24G in supporting and 
upholding South Africa’s environmental legislation by asking the question: is s 24G an 
effective deterrent for contravening environmental law in South Africa? 
 
A theoretical component will include an analysis of past research and writings on 
environmental law, NEMA s 24G, environmental compliance/enforcement, and the 
effectiveness of financial penalties in deterring non-compliance.  
 
Based on the theoretical background, as well as statistical information regarding s 24G 
records in the Western Cape, the value of s 24G in encouraging compliance with 
environmental law will be critically evaluated. This research aims to explore the opportunities 
as well as difficulties caused by s 24G with regards to compliance and enforcement, and 
whether s 24G may actually undermine the very environmental legislation it is intended to 
uphold.  
 
The research methodology is evaluative research, with a combination of secondary qualitative 
and quantitative data collected by others. Evaluative research design can be defined as 
research which aims to critically appraise or judge the effectiveness, value or worth of the 
subject (Miller-Keane Encyclopedia, 2003). Interviews with relevant government officials and 
stakeholders were not undertaken as part of this research, therefore information gathered 
from interviews during other studies (namely September, 2012 and the Centre for 
Environmental Rights, 2011) was used to inform the research.  
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1.4 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
An overview of National environmental management provides background on the evolution of, 
and objectives of, environmental law in South Africa. The overview  includes past research on 
s 24G, the prevailing arguments against this legislation, as well as theories surrounding 
environmental compliance and enforcement, how compliance with legislation can be 
improved, and the role of the s 24G administrative fee in deterring non-compliance (Chapter 
2). Chapter 2 provides the necessary context for exploring and interpreting the results of the 
research and interviews. Chapter 3 describes s 24G and the main arguments against this 
legislation, while Chapter 4 presents the main findings of this research and provides an 
analysis of results. Chapter 5 contains recommendations for the improvement of s 24G using 
the theory summarised in Chapter 2 as well as the findings presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 
6 consists of recommendations regarding compliance promotion, while Chapter 7 is a 
conclusion of the research.  
 
 
1.5 SUMMARY 
South Africa has thorough environmental legislation, including the framework environmental 
legislation, NEMA, which was adopted in 1998 in order to give effect to the environmental 
right stated in the Constitution. NEMA describes the important EIA process, which is designed 
to inform decision makers of the possible environmental impacts of projects and thus promote 
sustainable development by encouraging the mitigation of environmental impacts of activities 
(Wood, 1995:1). However, in spite of South Africa’s environmental legislation, the 
environment continues to be threatened by non-compliant individuals and businesses. 
Section 24G of NEMA, which intends to address the unlawful commencement of listed 
activities, allows an individual or business who commenced with a listed activity prior to 
obtaining environmental authorisation to apply to the Minister or MEC for retrospective 
authorisation. S 24G has been heavily criticised and opposed by many stakeholders.  The 
purpose of this research is to determine the effectiveness of s 24G in supporting and 
upholding South Africa’s environmental legislation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
To investigate the phenomenon of s 24G in South Africa’s environmental legislation, this 
Chapter considers the background of environmental law in South Africa, including sustainable 
development, NEMA and the EIA process, and compliance with environmental law and how 
compliance can be improved. With a specific focus on the purpose and effect of s 24G in the 
environmental legislation, this review examines criticism of s 24G retrospective environmental 
authorisation from a variety of sources, including concerned members of society, as well as 
environmental organisations. The s 24G administrative fine and its role as a deterrent for non-
compliance with environmental law is also discussed.  
 
 
2.2 THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS, ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS, AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
In 1968, Garrett Hardin published “The Tragedy of the Commons” in the journal, Science. In 
this famous essay, Hardin argues that individuals, whether consciously or subconsciously, 
pursue their own short-term interests, which are usually at a cost to the environment, to 
society in general, and ultimately to the individuals themselves. Hardin argues for 
environmental governance and a holistic, long-term outlook on decision-making to ensure that 
the earth’s resources are conserved (Gerber, 2012:12).  
 
Hardin depicts a “Tragedy of the Commons” by describing a scenario first explained by 
mathematician William Forster Lloyd in 1833. The scenario entails an open access pasture. 
Each herdsman utilising this pasture is likely to graze as many livestock on the pasture as he 
can. A rational person usually desires to maximise his own profit, and by grazing an additional 
unit of livestock, the herdsman benefits from selling one more animal. However, the impact of 
the extra unit of livestock on the quality of the pasture is borne by all the herdsmen using the 
commons. Therefore, it is in the selfish best interest of the individual herdsman to increase 
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the size of his herd, as the benefits of an additional animal are solely reaped by him, whereas 
the costs are shared amongst all the herdsmen. If each herdsman follows the same pattern, 
the commons will soon be overgrazed and depleted. Hardin concludes that this freedom in a 
commons leads to eventual ecological destruction.  
 
According to Gerber (2012:12), as a remedy for the above situation, Hardin calls for: “the 
proposed actions of individuals to be governed and measured against the long-term public 
interest.” Gerber (2012:12) believes that Hardin’s essay is essentially an argument in favour 
of sustainable development.  
 
Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” speaks to the unscrupulous misuse and exploitation of 
environmental resources by individuals, businesses and even entire countries observed in the 
present day. In fact, it is such unscrupulous individuals and businesses who eventually apply 
for ex post facto environmental authorisation under s 24G.  
 
In addition to Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons”, other revolutionary publications in the 
1960’s and 1970’s such as “Silent Spring” (Rachel Carson, 1962) and “The Population Bomb” 
(Paul Ehrlich, 1970) bought the issue of environmental degradation and sustainable 
development to the forefront of society during the 1980’s (Gerber, 2012:14).  
 
Sustainable development, as a new concept, was first thought to be a balance reached 
between economists, social scientists and ecologists, and the aim of sustainable development 
became the effective integration of development and environmental components. Thus the 
“Integration Model” (Figure 2.1 below) was the most used model of sustainable development 
(Gerber, 2012:14). However, Mebratu (1998:513) argues that the “Integration Model” falsely 
assumes that ecological, social and economic systems are completely separate systems, 
which do not rely on one another. In this model, the area where the three components overlap 
is referred to as the interactive zone, which is where sustainable development would occur 
(Mebratu, 1998:513). Sustainable development is therefore promoted by effective integration 
of the three systems (Gerber, 2012:15).  
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Figure 2.1: The “Integration Model” of Sustainable Development (from Mebratu, 1998:513). 
 
 
The “Integration Model” of sustainable development led to a concentration on reducing 
impacts on the environment while still developing socially and economically. Therefore, an 
attitude of “business-as-usual” was adopted, continuing with the same practices but making 
them slightly better. Mitigation of environmental impacts was considered to be sufficient to 
move into the zone of sustainable development (Gerber, 2012:15). Those who followed this 
model (also known as ecological modernisation) believed that capitalism and 
environmentalism were not necessarily in opposition, and that the use of ecologically friendly 
technology could improve development (King and McCarthy, 2005).   
 
The above model of sustainable development was applied until “Complexity Theory” and 
“Systems Thinking” prompted the idea that economic, social and ecological systems are not 
separate, but instead are interdependent and therefore are constantly interacting and 
influencing each other (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972; Clayton and Radcliffe, 1996; Mebratu, 
1998; Cilliers, 1998; Cilliers, 2000a; Cilliers 2000b; Noble, 2000; Jessop, 2001). This 
realisation led to the development of the “Interdependence Model of Sustainable 
Development” (or, the “Nested Systems Model”) (Figure 2.2 below). In this model, the 
dependence of the social and economic systems on the ecological system as the overall 
Economic System Social System 
Ecological System 
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resource base is depicted (Gerber, 2012:21). The “Interdependence Model of Sustainable 
Development” illustrates the dependence of the social system on the ecological system, and 
the dependence of the economic system on the social system (Gallopin, 2003; Blignaut and 
de Wit, 2004; Tisdell, 2004; DEA&DP and WCPDC, 2005). In order to achieve sustainable 
development, economic, social and environment sustainability must be simultaneously 
reached (“The Triple Bottom Line”) (Visser and Sunter, 2002:15; Elkington, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In recent times, the Embedded Model (Figure 2.3 above) has been developed in response to  
the idea that the three interdependent systems necessitate integrated governance (DEA&DP 
and WCPDC, 2005).  
 
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (also known as the 
Bruntland Commission) published a report called “Our Common Future”, which contained the 
now widely recognised definition of sustainable development as: “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (WCED, 1987).  
Ecological System 
Ecological System 
 
Social System 
Ecological System 
 
Economic System 
Ecological System 
 
Governance 
Ecological System 
 
Figure 2.3: The “Interdependence Model of 
Sustainable Development” (from Gerber, 
2012:21, adapted from Mebratu, 1998:513). 
 
Figure 2.2: The “Embedded Model” (from DEA&DP 
and WCPDC, 2005). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 10 
 
 
As a result of the need for integrated governance, tools promoting sustainable development, 
such as EIA and development planning have been developed in South Africa (Gerber, 
2012:22). According to Gerber (2012:22), the EIA process was designed for the government 
to be able to make informed decisions in the simultaneous pursuit of economic, social and 
ecological objectives, for the ultimate goal of sustainable development. 
 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE, SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, AND S 24G  
 
The EIA process in South Africa is a tool for the promotion of sustainable development, which 
is described in Section 2.2. The EIA process relies on effective and consistent compliance 
from those undertaking environmental activities. By providing a solution for those who have 
undertaken environmental activities which may not otherwise have been authorised, s 24G is 
not upholding or encouraging environmental compliance. In fact, s 24G offers a relatively 
easy way out for those who have been non-compliant, and this non-compliance was 
deliberate. In offering a way around the EIA process for potentially damaging environmental 
activities, s 24G is inhibiting the effective implementation of sustainable development in South 
Africa.  
 
 
2.3 BACKGROUND ON THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ACT 
(NEMA) 
According to Van der Linde (2009:193), a combination of three legislative mechanisms is 
used to protect the environment in South Africa. The first mechanism is the environmental 
right stipulated in the Constitution. The second mechanism is specific environmental laws 
addressing various environmental issues, such as the National Forest Act (Act 84 of 
1998)(Republic of South Africa, 1998). The third mechanism, which will be discussed in detail 
below, is the environmental framework legislation (Van der Linde, 2009:193).  
 
NEMA is the framework environmental legislation which enables the environmental 
preservation detailed in the Constitution. NEMA allows for the regulation of all spheres of the 
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environment, including waste management and air pollution. NEMA also allows for the 
adoption of complementary subsidiary laws to allow for more defined protection of specific 
environmental resources. Environmental framework legislation such as NEMA is designed to 
simplify co-operative environmental governance between different governmental spheres and 
different government departments (Van der Linde, 2009:194).  
 
Before NEMA was enacted, the framework environmental legislation in South Africa was the 
Environment Conservation Act (ECA), Act 73 of 1989 (Republic of South Africa, 1989). The 
ECA, like NEMA, contained a number of listed activities which may harm the environment. 
These listed activities had to be applied for through the EIA process as stipulated in the ECA 
(Gerber, 2012:40). Proceeding with a listed activity prior to obtaining environmental 
authorisation was a criminal offence under the ECA, although there were no stipulated 
remedies for such situations.  Authorities therefore applied methods such as those in s 28 of 
NEMA (eg. duty of care)(September, 2012:7). The ECA was replaced by new environmental 
framework legislation, NEMA, in 1998. In April 2006, new EIA regulations were promulgated 
under NEMA, replacing the EIA regulations of the ECA, as well as introducing new conditions 
with regards to EIAs (Gerber, 2012:52).  
 
On 4 December 2014, the new 2014 NEMA EIA Regulations were promulgated. According to 
the new regulations, the two EIA processes (Basic Assessment [BA] and Scoping and 
Environmental Impact Report [Scoping & EIR]) remain, although the timeframes for the steps 
in the EIA process changed. Under the 2010 EIA Regulations, only the steps of the authorities 
were subject to a timeframe. However, under the new 2014 Regulations, all the steps in the 
EIA process, including the EAP’s compilation of the report have a timeframe (Basic 
Assessment: 197 or 247 days, Scoping & EIR: 300 or 350 days).  
 
In addition to amending the EIA timeframes, the new EIA Regulations include provision for a 
Closure Plan to be included with the application for environmental authorisation. A Closure 
Plan is applicable to activities involving decommissioning and closure. In the 2014 NEMA EIA 
Listing Notices, the use of the term “construction” is replaced by development, in order to 
include the operational phase of the activity. Therefore, instead of an activity reading 
“construction of...” activities will now read “the development and related operations of...”. 
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According to Van der Linde (2009:197), NEMA deals with multiple weaknesses of past 
environmental legislation, and consists of “four distinct pillars”. The first pillar of NEMA is 
ensuring sound environmental decision making through the National Environmental 
Management Principles (described in more detail below), as well as various procedures 
described for increasing the quality of environmental decisions. These Environmental 
Management Principles provide guidelines for competent authorities when making decisions 
in terms of NEMA. The second pillar of NEMA encourages co-operative governance through 
various means such as Environmental Management Plans (EMPs). The third pillar of NEMA 
described by Van der Linde (2009:198) is the participation of the public in environmental 
governance through various forums and public participation processes. The last pillar of 
NEMA is giving effect to the environmental right as outlined in the Bill of Rights (Van der 
Linde, 2009:198).  
 
Within NEMA there are a number of “listed activities” which may have an impact on the 
environment and therefore may not commence without environmental authorisation from the 
competent authority.  Listed activities include, for example, construction within 32 meters of a 
watercourse outside an urban area, or the construction of activities for the concentration of 
animals for meat production.  In order to attain environmental authorisation for a listed activity, 
NEMA stipulates that an EIA process must be followed.  
 
 
2.4 THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES UNDER NEMA 
The National Environmental Management Principles found in Chapter 1 of NEMA are crucial 
to effective environmental management, as they assist in the environmental decision making 
process. All governmental spheres and departments are subject to these principles, and must 
consider the principles before making decisions in terms of NEMA or any other environmental 
legislation. According to Van Der Linde (2009:198), these principles: “…guide the 
interpretation, administration and implementation of NEMA and any other law concerned with 
the protection or management of the environment.” The 18 environmental management 
principles under NEMA contain the “Precautionary Principle”, the “Preventative Principle” and 
the “Polluter Pays Principle”, amongst others (Van der Linde, 2009:201).  
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2.5 THE DUTY OF CARE UNDER NEMA 
Section 28 of NEMA describes the “duty of care” bestowed upon environmental polluters. This 
duty of care states that:  
“Every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution or degradation of 
the environment must take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation 
from occurring, continuing, or recurring, or, in so far as such harm to the environment is 
authorised by law or cannot reasonably be avoided or stopped, to minimise and rectify such 
pollution or degradation of the environment.” 
 
The duty of care clearly applies to historic/past pollution (Van der Linde, 2009:211).  
According to Van der Linde (2009:212), reasonable measures as mentioned in the duty of 
care may include the following: 
1. Examining and evaluating the effect of activities on the environment; 
2. Changing or minimising processes or actions which lead to pollution; 
3. Preventing the spread of pollutants; and 
4. Fixing the impacts of the pollution 
If the individual or business does not comply with their duty of care, the competent authority 
may order them to do so. If they still fail to comply, the government may proceed with 
rectifying the situation themselves, at the cost of the person responsible for the damage (Van 
der Linde, 2009: 212).  
 
 
2.6 INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT UNDER NEMA 
Integrated Environmental Management (IEM), although not explicitly defined under NEMA, 
refers to: “an integrated approach to resource utilisation” (Van der Linde, 2009:203). IEM is 
designed to integrate the principles of NEMA mentioned above into every governmental 
decision which may affect the environment. The EIA process forms an important part of IEM 
(Van der Linde, 2009:203). 
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Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is made up of a variety of processes and procedures 
which anticipate and evaluate the environmental results of human actions (September, 
2012:5). EIA is a crucial component of environmental management and represents a 
significant effort to promote environmentally sustainable development (Kidd and Retief, 
2009:971). According to Wood (1995:1): “EIA should lead to informed decisions about 
potentially significant actions, and to positive benefits to both proponents and to the 
population at large.” EIA is not intended to prevent activities with significant environmental 
consequences from occurring, rather, EIA is intended to provide decision makers with 
complete knowledge of the environmental impacts of a proposed action before the action 
takes place (Wood, 1995:2). 
 
EIA is arguably the most important tool available for environmental planning, and is a crucial 
component of the environmental law. In South Africa alone, thousands of EIAs are conducted 
annually (Kidd and Retief, 2009) (refer to Figure 2.4 below). However, the EIA process is not 
free from problems and critics, and criticism of this process includes doubts regarding the 
degree to which the process influences decision-making (September, 2012:6). Cashmore 
(2004:404) states that, “while there is a general consensus that EIA has led to enhanced 
consideration of environmental factors in decision-making, its achievements appear most 
favourable when compared to past neglect and failings, rather than when measured against 
sustainable development goals.” In other words, the EIA process is better than nothing, but is 
still not contributing sufficiently to sustainable development (Cashmore, 2004:404). 
 
Other concerns regarding the EIA process include the amount of time and money spent on 
the process, and the poor quality of some reports (Sandham and Pretorius, 2008; Retief and 
Chabalala, 2009; Sandham et al., 2010). The EIA process has often been blamed for delaying 
projects, and thus hindering development and economic growth (September, 2012:7).  
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Figure 2.4: The number of EIA applications in South Africa from 1997-2006 (from September, 2012:6, adapted 
from Kidd and Retief, 2009). 
 
Despite some criticism of the EIA process, over the last 40 years, the EIA has changed from a 
voluntary, ad hoc process to a legal requirement (Kidd and Retief, 2009:971). The 
formalisation of the EIA process was aided by the inclusion of an environmental right in the 
Bill of Rights (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:3). The EIA process can be used with other 
environmental management tools such as Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and 
Environmental Management Framework (EMF), which assist in assessing cumulative impacts 
(September, 2012:6).  
 
The basic foundation of environmental assessment is its anticipatory nature, and it aims to 
ensure that environmental impacts are understood before development is approved and 
includes plans to mitigate these impacts (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:1). In fact, Wood 
(1995:1) describes EIA as: “an anticipatory, participatory environmental management tool…” 
NEMA is also forward-looking (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:9). For example, the following 
provisions and regulations in NEMA pertain to the potential environmental impacts of 
proposed activities: 
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 According to Chapter 5 (24[1]) of NEMA, the “potential” environmental consequences 
or impacts of activities must be identified, studied, and presented to the competent 
authority. 
 Chapter 5 (24[4a(iii)]) of NEMA states that applications for environmental authorisation 
must include a description of the environment likely to be impacted by the “proposed 
activity”. 
 According to EIA Regulation 17 (b) the EAP compiling the EIA report must be 
knowledgeable regarding NEMA and the EIA regulations as they pertain to the 
“proposed activity”. 
 EIA Regulation 22 (2[g]) requires that the need and desirability of the “proposed” 
activity is described. 
 The EIA Regulations also require the EAP to identify the “potential” environmental 
effects of the “proposed” activity during the scoping process. 
 
As is evident above, the EIA regulations do not concern authorisation of an activity that has 
already been undertaken or finished. NEMA is written in language referring to the 
authorisation of prospective activities only (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:10).  
Furthermore, the Environmental Management Principles in Section 2 of Chapter 1 of NEMA 
contain the following provisions (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:12): 
 Development must be socially, environmentally and economically sustainable; 
 Sustainable development requires the avoidance of: 
-disturbance of ecosystems and loss of biological diversity; 
-pollution and degradation of the environment; 
-disturbance of landscapes and sites that constitute the nation’s cultural heritage, and 
-waste 
Where these things cannot be avoided altogether, they must be minimised and 
remedied; 
 Sustainable development also requires the application of a risk-averse and cautious 
approach which takes into account the limits of current knowledge about the 
consequences of decisions and actions (precautionary principle); and 
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 Sustainable development further requires that negative impacts on the environment 
and on people’s environmental rights be anticipated and prevented and where they 
cannot  be altogether prevented, are minimised and remedied (preventative principle). 
 
The “Preventative Principle” outlined above is aimed at minimising negative environmental 
impacts by providing that such impacts be anticipated before commencement of the activity 
(Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:13). Similarly, the internationally known “Precautionary 
Principle” presents an “if in doubt, stay out” approach in situations where there is uncertainty 
as to the potential environmental impacts of an activity (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:13).  
 
 
2.7 THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE 
One of the environmental management principles under Chapter 1 of NEMA is known as the 
“Polluter Pays Principle”.  
Section 2(4) (p) of NEMA, states that:  
The costs of remedying pollution, environmental degradation and consequent health effects 
must be paid for by those responsible for harming the environment.  
The “Polluter Pays Principle” requires that the cost of pollution on society and the 
environment be borne by the polluter. The “Polluter Pays Principle”, having been included in 
the Rio Declaration, is an important component of environmental law (Nabileyo, 2009:9). 
Another, more controversial part of NEMA is s 24G, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.8  SUMMARY 
The idea of sustainable development was developed in response to a number of 
environmental issues being bought to the attention of society during the 1980’s (Gerber, 
2012:14). NEMA, specifically the EIA process, is designed to help South Africa strive for 
sustainable development (Gerber, 2012:14). NEMA contains a number of environmental 
management principles, including the “Precautionary Principle”, the “Preventative Principle” 
and the “Polluter Pays Principle”, amongst others (Van der Linde, 2009:201). These principles 
guide authorities in making environmentally responsible decisions. Over the last 40 years, the 
EIA has changed from a voluntary, ad hoc process to a legal requirement (Kidd and Retief, 
2009:971).The basic foundation of environmental assessment is its anticipatory nature, and it 
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aims to ensure that environmental impacts are understood before development is approved 
and includes plans to mitigate these impacts (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:1).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EX POST FACTO ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORISATION UNDER NEMA 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Section 24F of NEMA, entitled “Offences relating to commencement or continuation of listed 
activity,” states that no person may commence with a listed activity without environmental 
authorisation from the competent authority. Section 24F outlines the punishment for convicted 
offenders to be a fine of R1 million or less1, or imprisonment for up to ten years, or both a fine 
and imprisonment.  
 
NEMA s 24G (Consequences of unlawful commencement of activity) is a controversial 
component of South Africa’s environmental framework legislation, which allows for ex post 
facto environmental authorisation. S 24G was originally used during the transition from the 
Environment Conservation Act (ECA) of 1989 to NEMA, allowing individuals whose activities 
were not authorised under the new law a window period to apply for approval under the new 
regulations and therefore remain lawful (Du Plessis, 2006; Gosling, 2013). However, s 24G 
has since been amended to become a part of the legislation (Gosling, 2013).  
 
 
3.2 STEPS OF A S 24G APPLICATION 
S 24G enables an individual or company who commenced with a listed activity without 
authorisation to avoid prosecution by applying to the Minister or MEC for ex post facto 
environmental authorisation (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:23). The general steps of a s 24G 
application are as follows (under NEMA 2010 Regulations) (Paschke and Glazewski, 
2006:23): 
 The guilty individual seeking retrospective environmental authorisation applies to the 
Minister or MEC for a directive requiring the applicant to compile an EIA report 
containing certain information. 
                                                          
1
 Increased to R5 million as per the National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment, 2013 of 18 
December 2013. 
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 The applicant may be required by the Minister or MEC to submit additional information 
or conduct additional studies as necessary. 
 An administrative fee is determined by the competent authority  
 After the applicant pays the administrative fine, the Minister or MEC reviews the 
applicant’s report and then either: 
-orders the activity to be discontinued, and requires environmental rehabilitation to take 
place within a specific time period 
-grants an environmental authorisation which is normally subject to certain conditions 
S 24G applications can arise from authorities detecting non-compliance, applicants coming 
forward themselves, or from complaints by neighbours or other interested and affected parties 
(September, 2012:7). Regardless, applying for ex post facto environmental authorisation is 
voluntary, and authorities may not force offenders to apply. However, at any time enforcement 
action can be taken against environmental offenders (September, 2012:8).  
 
 
3.3 UNCLEAR PURPOSE AND EFFECTS OF S 24G 
The purpose of s 24G in NEMA is unclear. One purpose of the process is to stop unlawful and 
environmentally destructive activities, and restore compliance with the law, in an attempt to 
mitigate environmental impacts and provide the necessary approvals to continue with the 
activity (September, 2012:5). However, by requiring an administrative fee, s 24G seems to 
sanction non-compliance with environmental law, and the uncertainty over s 24G conveys a 
confusing message to both authorities and applicants (September, 2012:8). 
 
According to September (2012:8), the ambiguity around s 24G contributes to inconsistency in 
the treatment of applications by authorities. Some provinces, or some individual authorities, 
may be stricter towards applicants, while others may be more relaxed and in effect allow 
environmental crime (September, 2012:8). As a result, argues September (2012:8), potential 
offenders may view the s 24G process as a low risk, high reward route to environmental 
authorisation, which is unfortunately the current perception. Van der Linde (2009:207) argues 
that s 24G: “has proven to be controversial and frustrating in its scope, its application and its 
operating to both applicants and decision-makers alike.” September (2012:8) emphasises the 
belief that, in a country such as South Africa facing abundant non-compliance with 
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environmental legislation, clear and definitive environmental law and enforcement is 
imperative.  
 
 
3.4 CRITICISM OF S 24G RETROSPECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORISATION 
Yolan Friedmann of the Endangered Wildlife Trust states the problem with s 24G very 
accurately: “The environmental legislation in this country must be the only case of ‘ignorance 
of the law is not only a good excuse but allows you to be forgiven with the right paperwork...’” 
Yolan Friedmann, Endangered Wildlife Trust, in CER (2011).  
 
The provision for ex post facto environmental authorisation provided for in NEMA s 24G has 
been criticised by a number of organisations as well as individuals. In fact, the Centre for 
Environmental Rights (CER), a non-profit organisation founded in 2009 by eight notable civil 
society organisations (CSOs) in the environmental and environmental justice fields, submitted 
a letter to the DEA, stating that: “the application of the rectification mechanism in s 24G has 
had unfortunate unintended consequences for environmental management, and it has been a 
thorn in the flesh of civil society organisations for some years” (CER, 2011). The main 
arguments and criticisms against s 24G are discussed below.   
 
S 24G undermines NEMA 
Allowing ex post facto environmental authorisation undermines the principles outlined in 
section 2 of NEMA, especially the “Preventative” and “Precautionary Principles”, which are 
aimed at encouraging sustainable development. In addition, one goal of integrated 
environmental management as described in NEMA is to make certain that the impacts of 
activities on the environment are thoroughly considered before the activity commences. As ex 
post facto environmental authorisation so clearly contradicts principles and purposes of 
NEMA, such authorisation should only be allowed under exceptional circumstances, and 
should be prevented from becoming the norm (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:24).  
 
NEMA emphasises the importance of public participation in making the EIA process inclusive 
and transparent, however, in September’s (2012:62) opinion, the s 24G process is inadequate 
in this regard. The traditional EIA process under NEMA also requires the consideration of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 22 
 
alternatives, which is clearly lacking in the s 24G process (September, 2012:62). Van Der 
Linde (2009) also argued against s 24G from an environmental management point of view, 
stating that s 24G can potentially undermine the entire aim of environmental impact 
assessment, integrated environmental management, and sustainable development. In the 
end, the right to environmental protection as stated in the constitution can be undermined 
(Van der Linde, 2009). September (2012:2) found that: “…S24G provisions have been 
abused in an attempt to circumvent the prescribed EIA process and may have thereby 
effectively provided an escape route for criminals, thus suggesting that blatant disregard of 
the law and the environment may be tolerated…”  
 
Section 24G seems to undermine the foundation of environmental assessment, integrated 
environmental management, and sustainable development as described in NEMA (Van der 
Linde, 2009:207). The judge in the Silvermine Valley Coalition v Sybrand van der Spuy 
Boerdery and Others case described retrospective EIAs as holding: “no legal significance in 
terms of the legislative structure in which the EIA is located.” 
 
Authorities have little reason to reject s 24G applications 
Generally, the competent authority reviewing an application for ex post facto environmental 
authorisation would have little reason to reject the application. Even if the activity had a 
significant negative impact on the environment, the harm had already been done, and 
therefore there is little reason to reject the application (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:24).  
 
Companies and individuals may budget for the administrative fine 
Retrospective environmental authorisation in NEMA presents individuals considering the 
undertaking of a listed activity with two options: either they follow the legal route and apply for 
environmental authorisation before undertaking the activity, or, if they perceive the benefits to 
outweigh the costs, they can commence with the activity and seek environmental 
authorisation at a later date (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:24). The CER (2011) has noted 
the misuse of the s 24G process when companies simply budget for the s 24G administrative 
fine and proceed with illegal commencement of a listed activity. 
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Repeat and purposeful offenders treated the same as ignorant and first time offenders 
S24G has been criticised by the CER (2011) as making inadequate provision to react to 
differing levels of fault. Purposeful as well as repeat offenders may get away easily, while 
oblivious and first-time offenders may face the stigma of a criminal record resulting from a 
contravention of s 24 F (CER, 2011).  
 
Misuse of emergency situation clause 
Companies or individuals may claim an emergency situation in order to avoid criminal 
prosecution, and then file a s 24G application (CER, 2011). A newspaper article written by 
Melanie Gosling in the Cape Times recently exposed an example of the misuse of the 
emergency situation clause of s 24G along the famous Garden Route of South Africa. Local 
environmental groups became aware of a property owner along the Keurbooms River who 
was undertaking bank stabilisation activities. When these environmental groups reported the 
activities to the Western Cape DEA&DP, they were informed that the property owner had 
been issued with a directive to undertake bank stabilisation in order to prevent a small stand 
of protected Milkwood trees from falling into the river (emergency situation). 
 
The environmental groups noted that the property owner had then misused the authorisation 
to undertake various other activities, such as dredging in an estuary. Alarmingly, while the 
Milkwood stand only required about 50m of bank stabilisation, up to 400m of work had been 
done along the river, including work in an adjacent protected forest and wetland. The area of 
land under consideration is an extremely sensitive and important ecological corridor, and was 
recently discovered to be hosting the mangrove snail, which was previously believed to only 
occur north of the Bushmans River. Although environmental groups attempted to appeal the 
directive issued by DEA&DP, they were unsuccessful as there is no legal consideration given 
for appealing directives (Gosling, 2015).  
 
When questioned, DEA&DP stated that the property owner had applied to the department for 
authorisation to stabilise the riverbank, but began with stabilisation activities before 
authorisation was granted. The property owner was ordered by the department to cease 
activities, but was allowed to employ “temporary protection measures” to prevent the 
Milkwood trees from washing away. According to DEA&DP, such work was undertaken in 
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accordance with the directive, and no further activities were to be undertaken. The property 
owner has since applied for s 24G retrospective authorisation, which is still being considered 
(Gosling, 2015).  
 
The environmental groups involved in opposing the property owner’s activities believe that s 
24G is a significant loophole enabling landowners to act illegally and then apply to legalise 
their criminal activities, and that the s 24G process is being misused, leading to the 
authorisation of environmental damaging actions (Gosling, 2015).  
 
Damaging misconceptions surrounding s 24G 
Damaging perceptions exist regarding s 24G, including that s 24G is a route to guaranteed 
authorisation, and authorities are unlikely to pursue convictions for s 24F contraventions if the 
offender submits a s 24G application. Interestingly, in a 2013 submission to the Chairperson 
of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Environmental Planning in the Western Cape 
Provincial Parliament, the CER argues that since payment of the s 24G administrative fine 
always precedes the authority’s decision as to whether or not to allow environmental 
authorisation, authorities may feel obligated to authorise all s 24G applications (CER, 2013).  
The CER (2011) strongly argues that the administrative fines associated with s 24G are too 
low to represent an effective disincentive for contravening environmental law. These fines can 
further be reduced by an appeal, and corruption concerns have been raised as the calculation 
of fines is not transparent (CER, 2011). 
 
 
3.5 THE ROLE OF THE S 24G ADMINISTRATIVE FEE IN DETERRING NON-
COMPLIANCE 
“It is about money. If the fine is less than the money lost due to a later start or no start at all, 
then the practice will continue.” 
Koos Pretorius, Federation for a Sustainable Environment (CER, 2011). 
“I question the need for a s 24G application in its current form- to my mind, something done 
without permission should constitute a serious offence, and the penalty should be sufficiently 
onerous to act as a major deterrent.” 
Susie Brownlie, EAP and member of the CER’s expert panel (CER, 2011).   
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Various authors have argued that the administrative fine associated with s 24G applications is 
not a sufficient disincentive to prevent individuals from pursuing the retrospective 
environmental authorisation option (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006; CER, 2011; September, 
2012). However, the increase of the maximum fine to R5 million: “would suggest that 
legislators intend to exploit and increase the punitive potential of S24G administrative fines” 
(September, 2012:53). 
 
According to Kidd (2013:395), the R5 million administrative fine under s 24G is likely to 
support the perception that s 24G is a punitive measure (and therefore a substitute for 
prosecution). Instead, s 24G should be a provision which addresses the failure to assess the 
environmental effects of the unlawful activity. In Kidd’s (2013:395) opinion, the administrative 
fine should be an “inconvenience fee”, and if the unlawful activity deserves a large punitive 
measure, criminal proceedings should follow. Interestingly, Kidd (2013:395) believes that 
severe administrative fees such as the fee provided for by s 24G, allow a great scope for 
abuse.  
  
Although the authorities interviewed by September (2012:53) believed the fines issued in 
most s 24G applications to be sufficient to prevent further non-compliances, other concerned 
individuals and organisations disagree (CER, 2011). In fact, repeat offenders of s 24G seem 
to confirm that the administrative fee is too low to deter non-compliance (September, 
2012:53).  
 
As Koos Pretorius states above, the fines issued in terms of s 24G may be a relatively low 
price to pay when compared to the expensive delays potentially faced by 
developers/businesses during the environmental assessment process. 
Developers/businesses are even more likely to pursue the s 24G option when there is a 
possibility that environmental authorisation will not be granted through the traditional EIA 
process (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:26). The competent authority will then be faced with a 
fait accompli, and have little choice but to allow authorisation, and unfortunately, such a 
situation normally occurs where the damage caused to the environment by the development 
is irreparable, even with rehabilitation (September, 2012:55).  
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If the financial benefits of proceeding with the development before obtaining environmental 
authorisation outweigh the cost of the s 24G application, the individual/company may simply 
budget for the maximum fine of R5 million and proceed with development, which essentially 
renders environmental assessment ineffective (Paschke and Glazewski, 2006:26). Such 
abuse of s 24G is challenging to address, as the optimal fine amount must be calculated to 
ensure successful deterrence, and there is no specific formula for this calculation. 
 
When calculating the optimal fine amount, financial benefits gained by contravening the law 
must also be taken into consideration. If offenders are not adequately punished for economic 
benefits gained by environmental offences, a perception may be created that s 24G is a cost-
effective method of obtaining environmental authorisation (September, 2012:53). This 
perception is in fact supported by September (2012:55), who reasons that the approval rate 
for s 24G applications is similar to the approval rate for EIA applications (approximately 97%), 
and may even be higher. Economic benefits, as well as time saving benefits of following the s 
24G route, cause law-abiding individuals and companies to be disadvantaged in relation to 
offenders (September, 2012:53).  
 
The s 24G administrative fine faces numerous additional difficulties. Offenders are allowed to 
appeal the amount of the fine, and are often successful in decreasing the amount. The 
method used to calculate fines for each applicant is not transparent, which raises the issue of 
possible corruption. Also, the fine administered does not take into consideration repeat 
offenders or ignorant violators (September, 2012:53). 
 
3.6 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE, SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, AND S 24G  
The EIA process in South Africa is a tool for the promotion of sustainable development, which 
is described in Section 2.2. The EIA process relies on effective and consistent compliance 
from those undertaking environmental activities. By providing a solution for those who have 
undertaken environmental activities which may not otherwise have been authorised, s 24 G is 
not upholding or encouraging environmental compliance or the legitimacy of the EIA process. 
In offering a way around the EIA process for potentially damaging environmental activities, s 
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24 G is inhibiting the use of the EIA process as an effective implementation tool for 
sustainable development in South Africa.  
 
3.7 S 24G IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
Similar legislation to NEMA s 24G is found in other countries, and it is just as controversial. In 
India, the Director of the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests issued an office 
memorandum allowing developments which have made significant construction progress to 
be granted environmental clearance by an expert committee despite not having obtained the 
necessary approvals prior to construction. However, a petition was launched by the National 
Green Tribunal of India arguing that the memorandum violated India’s Environmental 
Protection Act, Environmental Impact policies, constitution, and international obligations such 
as the Rio Declaration. The petition argued that projects which commenced without the 
required environmental approvals must be fined, and that ex post facto authorisation 
undermined the entire purpose of laws aiming to protect the environment (Press Trust of 
India, 2013).  
 
In 2010, the government of Papua New Guinea amended their Environment Act to prevent 
third parties from legally challenging pollution permits granted by the government to 
encourage resource projects. This amendment gave the government of Papua New Guinea 
the power to authorise certain environmental activities associated with development, including 
retrospective authorisation. The Director of Environment’s decision to grant authorisation is 
final and may not be challenged by the courts. The Director of Environment also has the 
power to issue exemption certificates for instances of non-compliance with environmental law.  
The amendments to the environmental law in Papua New Guinea are highly controversial and 
the government has been accused of amending laws due to political underpinnings (Cole, 
2010).  
 
3.8 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF S 24G CHALLENGED 
Some argue that s 24G contradicts other sections of NEMA (Paschke and Glazewski, 
2006:24), while others question the constitutionality of such a provision (Van Der Linde, 
2009). Van der Linde (2009) has suggested that s 24G is unconstitutional as it disagrees with 
the principles of the rule of law and administrative legality, which states that a lawful activity 
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may not follow from an unlawful activity.  The current court case Lezmin 3039 CC and another 
v the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others challenges the constitutionality of s 24G 
based on the seemingly arbitrary way in which administrative fines are issued by officials. The 
plaintiff is an owner of a company in South Africa that was issued with a directive by the 
Department of Economic Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs of the Free State 
after failing to obtain environmental authorisation for the construction of buildings on state 
land. After filing a s 24G application, the plaintiff was issued with a R617 500 administration 
fine, which he is now challenging in court.  
 
 
3.9 PAST AMENDMENTS TO S 24G 
S 24G has been amended since it was first included in the environmental legislation in 1998. 
The most recent amendments to s 24G took place on 18 December 2013, with the National 
Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment, 2013. Notable amendments made to 
s 24G in this act include the specific mention of the applicability of s 24G to illegally 
commenced waste management activities subject to the Waste Act, and the increase of the 
administrative fine from R1 million to R5 million. In addition, this amendment increased the 
Minister’s power to issue directives, such as immediately suspending unlawful activities until a 
decision has been made regarding the s 24G application. With regards to criminal 
prosecution, the amended act clearly states that submission of a s 24G application does not 
detract from an EMI’s authority to pursue criminal charges against offenders of NEMA or any 
SEMA, and the Minister/MEC may defer issuing a decision on the s 24 application until 
criminal investigations are complete. Importantly, the amended act now allowed for listed 
activities to be undertaken without environmental authorisation during emergency situations. 
Emergency situations have been defined by the amended act as: “unexpected, sudden, and 
uncontrolled release...that causes, has caused or may cause significant harm to the 
environment, human life or property.” 
 
According to the Memorandum on the Objects of the National Environmental Management 
Laws Amendment Bill, 2012 (Republic of South Africa, 2012), the above mentioned 
amendments to s 24G were made to address the following: 
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 Inquiries were made to the DEA regarding the relevance of s 24G to unlawful waste 
management activities under the National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 
2008 (Act No. 59 of 2008) (Waste Act, or NEM:WA). Thus, the amended s 24G 
provides clarity regarding waste activities.  
 Having noticed the trend of companies budgeting for the s 24G administrative fine and 
illegally commencing with activities, the DEA wished to deter such practices by 
increasing the administrative fine.  
 The DEA was asked by the Department of Cooperative Affairs to make provision for 
persons undertaking listed activities in response to emergency situations to be exempt 
from paying the administrative fine. Previously, the act did not permit the authorities to 
consider a s 24G application before the administrative fine was paid.  
3.10  SUMMARY 
NEMA s 24G is a controversial component of South Africa’s environmental framework 
legislation, which allows for ex post facto environmental authorisation. By requiring an 
administrative fee, s 24G seems to sanction non-compliance with environmental law, and the 
uncertainty over s 24G conveys a confusing message to both authorities and applicants. 
NEMA s 24G has been criticised by a number of organisations as well as individuals. 
Criticisms of s 24G include that it undermines the environmental management principles 
NEMA, especially the “Preventative” and “Precautionary Principles”, which are aimed at 
encouraging sustainable development. Another criticism of s 24G is that authorities have little 
reason to reject the application, as the harm to the environment had already been done. 
Opponents of s 24G have argued that the administrative fine associated with s 24G 
applications is not a sufficient disincentive to prevent individuals from pursuing the 
retrospective environmental authorisation option. Some authors have even questioned the 
constitutionality of s 24G. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
WESTERN CAPE CASE STUDY 
 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
The research design type of this study is evaluative research, as the effectiveness of s 24G in 
deterring non-compliance with environmental law is examined. This research combines 
quantitative and qualitative research, and the quantitative component of the research consists 
of statistical information obtained from the Western Cape Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Development Planning (DEA&DP).  
 
 
4.2 THE WESTERN CAPE AS A CASE STUDY 
During the early stages of research planning and drafting of the initial research proposal, the 
intention was for the data analysis to include s 24G applications throughout the entire South 
Africa. However, due to time constraints of data collection from every provincial department, it 
was decided to focus the research on the Western Cape Province.   
The Western Cape Province is an appropriate case study for the following reasons:  
 The Western Cape hosts the fynbos vegetation type, which is not found anywhere else 
on earth. Fynbos is characterised by plants with small, fine leaves which allow them to 
survive the dry, hot summers in the Western Cape. Fynbos vegetation is unique as a 
majority of plant species occurring in fynbos, as well as a few animal species, are 
endemic (Manning, 2007). The presence of fynbos in the Western Cape makes 
effective environmental management in this region all the more important.  
 The Western Cape is home to Table Mountain, the Stellenbosch Winelands, Cape 
Point, and numerous other tourist attractions. As such, the province attracts many 
visitors, and it is important for the natural beauty, resources and heritage of this region 
to be conserved.  
 DEA&DP has a specific “Section 24G Applications” Sub-directorate under the 
Environmental Governance directorate for processing s 24G applications.  
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 According to the 2013/2014 NECER, DEA&DP had recorded the second highest total s 
24G fines paid during that time period (R 3 495 975), behind DEA, which recorded R5 
931 000 (DEA, 2014:3). 
 Of all the provinces, DEADP recorded the greatest number (173 in total) of 
administrative enforcement notices in the year 2013/2014. These enforcement notices 
comprised of 113 pre-compliance notices, 21 final compliance notices, 29 pre-
directives and 10 directives. (DEA, 2014) 
 
For the purposes of this study, only s 24G applications for activities listed in the NEMA EIA 
regulations were examined. S 24G applications relating to ECA listed activities were not 
included in this study.  
 
 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
An official from the “Section 24G Applications” Sub-directorate within DEA&DP was contacted 
directly to supply the required information. However, the official required that a Promotion of 
Access to Information (PAIA) request be submitted under the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, (Act 2 of 2000) (Republic of South Africa, 2000). A PAIA application was 
submitted to the Information Officer of the DEA&DP on 9 July 2015. The required R35 
application fee was paid on 20 July 2015, and the requested information was received via 
email on 20 August 2015. The information was neatly organised in a table on Microsoft Excel. 
It is assumed that the statistical data provided by DEA&DP is reliable and accurate.  
 
4.4 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING SECONDARY DATA 
This study only made use of secondary data, i.e. data collected by others. The advantages of 
using secondary data in this research include saving time (no interviews undertaken, data 
already organised), money (no resources used in collecting data), and having access to a 
greater breadth of data that could not have been collected during one study. However, there 
were disadvantages to using secondary data in this study. These disadvantages include no 
data collected on certain aspects of s 24G applications, notably, the number of environmental 
authorisations refused. Another disadvantage was that the data collected by the DEA&DP 
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regarding the various industries in which s 24G applications were filed was very general, and 
therefore not very helpful in the analysis of the research question.  
 
 
4.5 STATISTICAL INFORMATION  
Statistical information was included in the research in order to identify and describe trends 
concerning s 24G applications in the Western Cape. Data was obtained from the Sub-
directorate “Section 24G Applications” of DEA&DP. DEA&DP provided information on s 24G 
records from 2006-2014.  
The information provided by DEA&DP consisted of the following: 
 Number of s 24G applications received 
 Environmental Authorisations issued and refused 
 Sector (individual/private, company, trust, state department/municipality) 
 Listed activities involved 
 Number of administrative fines paid 
 Amount paid in administrative fines 
 Average amount per administrative fine paid 
 
 
4.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to present the statistics obtained from DEA&DP in a clear format, graphs were 
compiled using Microsoft Excel. Both line and pie graphs were used to show trends and 
patterns observed over the time periods included in this study.  
 
 
4.7 S 24 G APPLICATIONS RECEIVED 
A total of 347 s 24 G applications were received by DEA&DP between 2006 and 2014. Of 
these 347, 230 were granted an Environmental Authorisation, representing 66% of 
applications. The remaining 34% of applications were either withdrawn, or a directive was 
issued by the Department.  
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Figure 4.1: The number of s 24G application received by DEA&DP between 2006 and 2014 for listed activities 
under NEMA. 
 
According to Figure 4.1, between 2006 and 2014, there has been a general increasing trend 
in the number of s 24G applications received by DEA&DP, from merely 6 applications in 
2006, to 69 in 2014 (a 1050% increase). Looking at percentage change, the largest increases 
in applications were seen between 2008-2009 (136% increase) and 2009-2010 (73% 
increase). A 52% increase was seen between 2011-2012, while 2012-2013 saw a 38% 
decrease in the number of applications, the only decrease seen between 2006 and 2014.  
 
 
4.8 SECTORS INVOLVED IN S 24G APPLICATIONS  
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Figure 4.2: Number of s 24G applications between 2006 and 2014 originating from various sectors. 
 
Data received from DEA&DP’s records indicates that of the 347 s 24G applications received 
by DEA&DP between 2006 and 2014, a majority (221 applications, or 64%) were filed by 
companies. Individuals/private accounted for 74 applications, or 21%, with State 
Departments/Municipalities accounting for 26, or 8% of applications. The lowest number of s 
24G applications was filed by trusts (22 applications, or 6%) (Figure 4.2). 
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4.9 MOST PREVALENT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
 
According to DEA&DP’s records, most s 24G applications resulted from the following 
activities: 
 Activities within 100m of  the high water mark 
 Activities within 32m of a watercourse 
 Infilling and/or removal within a watercourse 
 Removal of vegetation 
 Waste related activities (treatment, storage, disposal of waste) 
 Agriculture (concentration of livestock, chicken farming) 
 Telecommunication (cellphone masts, antennas, etc.) 
 
 
4.10 S 24G ADMINISTRATIVE FINES 
Since 2006, DEA&DP has received more than R8 000 000 in s 24G administrative fines. 
Table 4.1 below shows the s 24G administrative fines paid in the Western Cape since 2006.  
 
Table 4.1: The Number of s 24G administrative fines paid, amounts paid, and average fine between 2006 and 
2014. 
  
 
Number of administrative 
fines paid Amount paid in administrative fines
Average amount per S24G 
administrative fine paid
2006 1 R 7 500 R 7 500
2007 8 R 90 495 R11 312
2008 8 R342 900 R42 863
2009 20 R300 850 R15 043
2010 1 R10 000 R10 000
2011 9 R351 000 R39 000
2012 33 R1 382 250 R41 886
2013 65 R3 385 400 R52 083
2014 50 R2 788 450 R55 769
Total 195 R8 658 845 R275 456
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Figure 4.3: Average amounts of s 24G administrative fines between 2006 and 2014. 
 
 
As is evident by Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3 above, the average administrative fine has 
increased greatly from R7500 in 2006, to R55 769 in 2014, which represents a 644% 
increase. A large increase in the average fine was observed in 2008, after which the average 
fine dropped, increasing again in 2011.  
 
Most of the results obtained from DEA&DP’s records correlate with the results obtained by 
September (2012) from GDARD, although September only collected data for the years 
between 2006 and 2010. Between 2006 and 2010, GDARD received 195 applications, while 
DEA&DP only received 97 applications during the same time period. In terms of number of 
applications received per year, a similar result was seen as GDARD only received 1 s 24G 
application in 2006. September (2012:41) notes that the low number of applications in 2006 
could be because the first EIA Regulations were promulgated in the middle of that year. 
However, GDARD saw a large number of applications being filed in 2008, which September 
(2012:41) ascribed as being due to increased knowledge of the new legislation. September 
(2012:41) saw a possible decreasing trend in the amount of s 24G applications between 2006 
and 2010, although she admitted that not enough data was available at the time to come to 
such conclusions.  
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In terms of sectors involved in s 24G applications, the results obtained from DEA&DP are 
very similar to September’s (2012) results obtained from GDARD. September (2012) also 
found that a majority of s 24G applications came from companies, followed by individuals and 
the public sector (both 7%), with the lowest number of applications originating from trusts. 
With regards to type of activity, September (2012) found a fairly even distribution between 
different activities applied for, with no “typical” s 24G activity noted. The results obtained from 
DEA&DP suggest similar findings, with a wide variety of activities applied for from a wide 
variety of industries.  
 
Regarding the average amounts of s 24G fines, the results obtained from DEA&DP are 
difficult to compare with September’s (2012) results obtained from GDARD, as September 
only collected information between 2006-2010. However, September’s (2012) results show no 
pattern in the average amounts per fine, whereas the results from DEA&DP show an 
increasing trend between 2006 and 2014.  
 
 
4.11 ANALYSIS 
Although time constraints for this study made interviews with officials from DEA&DP 
unfeasible, September (2012) conducted interviews with officials from GDARD in order to 
assist with the interpretation of the statistical information surrounding s 24G. Much of the 
information revealed through these interviews is applicable to s 24G applications throughout 
the country. This information will be discussed further below, and applied to the information 
gathered from DEA&DP’s records.  
 
Unfortunately, the information provided by DEA&DP offers no clarity regarding negative 
records of decision (i.e. environmental authorisation refused). September (2012) also 
received no conclusive data from GDARD relating to the number of environmental 
authorisations refused, however, she states that it can rationally be assumed that the 
approval rate for s 24G applications is similar to the approval rate for traditional EIA 
applications (September, 2012:55). However, September (2012:56) admits that the high 
approval rate does not take into consideration the partial authorisation of activities, which may 
be reduced to a point where they are no longer viable. September (2012:56) also notes that 
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environmental authorisations may require certain structures to be demolished (often when 
structures are within 32m of a watercourse).  
 
Officials interviewed by September (2012:41) stated that a majority of s 24G applications 
received by GDARD arise from non-compliance detected by enforcement officials (such as 
EMIs) in response to public complaints or during routine inspections. A small number of 
offenders may come forward themselves after becoming aware of the unlawfulness of their 
activity. Offenders may become aware of the unlawfulness of their activities when they sell 
their property, or when they request municipal services (September, 2012:42). 
 
According to the officials interviewed by September (2012), more than 90% of s 24G 
applications are due to ignorance of the environmental law, or sometimes, negligence. The 
officials consider a small number of applications to arise from intentional offences. Although it 
is challenging to determine the exact extent of intentional offences, September (2012:42) 
considers the above estimates of the officials to be reasonably accurate due to their 
experience and knowledge of non-compliance activities. 
 
The results obtained from DEA&DP reveal that a majority of s 24G applicants are companies. 
This could be due to pressure experienced by companies to save time and money. In 
situations where undertaking a traditional EIA process could result in profit losses, companies 
may be more likely to undertake a listed activity illegally (September, 2012:42). The large size 
of some companies may cause difficulty in controlling and regulating environmental activities, 
leading to non-compliance due to negligence. On the other hand, smaller companies may 
have fewer resources available to stay informed of changes in environmental legislation and 
regulations (September, 2012:42).  
 
September (2012:42) attributed the s 24G offences originating from State Departments and 
Municipalities to crucial service delivery, for example, service provision to a new informal 
settlement.  September (2012:42) specifically cites an example of a municipality that had to 
urgently install a pipeline to provide a local community with drinking water, and did not have 
time to wait for the required environmental approvals. However, since September’s (2012) 
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research, NEMA s 24F has been amended to make provision for emergencies such as the 
aforementioned situation.  
 
The results obtained from DEA&DP reveal that although the average administrative fine has 
increased consistently since 2006, the number of s 24G applications received has also 
increased consistently. This trend would appear to suggest that s 24G, in particular the 
administrative fine associated with s 24G, is not an effective deterrent to prevent non-
compliance with environmental law.  However, this conclusion makes the assumption that the 
number of s 24G applications received is an accurate reflection of the number of 
environmental non-compliances being committed. It could be argued that the number of 
environmental non-compliances in the time period considered in this study remained the 
same, but that improved enforcement of environmental law led to improved detection of non-
compliance. 
 
The results from the most recent NECER (discussed in Chapter 6) show an increase in the 
number of reported environmental incidents, the number of EMIs, the number of complaints 
from the Environmental Crimes and Incidents Hotline, and the number of facilities inspected. 
Also, DEA&DP rank third in terms of the number of non-compliances detected, behind the 
DEA and the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs (DAEA). 
Therefore, detection of environmental non-compliance certainly has improved, and could 
explain the consistent increase in the number of s 24G applications received by DEA&DP.  
 
Although it cannot reasonably be concluded from the above results that s 24G is an 
ineffective deterrent to environmental non-compliance, s 24G has numerous challenges and 
pitfalls which must be addressed in order to prevent its misuse and abuse by the regulated 
community. The downsides of s 24G are discussed in Chapter 2, and the following Chapter 5 
will discuss possible remedies for these downsides.  
 
 
4.12  SUMMARY 
The Western Cape was used as a case study for this research due to the presence of fynbos 
vegetation and the Western Cape’s value as a tourist destination. In addition, the Western 
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Cape DEA&DP has a dedicated Sub-directorate for processing s 24G applications, and 
according to the 2013/2014 NECER, the DEA&DP had recorded the second highest total s 
24G fines paid during that time period. Statistical information from DEA&DP was included in 
the research in order to identify and describe trends concerning s 24G applications. The 
results reveal that a majority of s 24G applicants are companies, and this could be due to 
pressure experienced by companies to save time and money. 
 
In situations where undertaking a traditional EIA process could result in profit losses, 
companies may be more likely to undertake a listed activity illegally (September, 2012:42). 
The results also reveal that although the average administrative fine has increased 
consistently since 2006, the number of s 24G applications received has also increased 
consistently. This trend would appear to suggest that the administrative fine associated with s 
24G is not an effective deterrent to prevent non-compliance with environmental law. However, 
this conclusion makes the assumption that the number of s 24G applications received is an 
accurate reflection of the number of environmental non-compliances being committed. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF S 24G 
AS A DETERRENT FOR CONTRAVENING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
Various measures have been suggested by different stakeholders to remove the unintended 
consequences of s 24G and to prevent s 24G from being used by dishonest individuals and 
businesses as a loophole to avoid the EIA process. These recommendations and suggestions 
will be discussed, analysed and expanded on below.  
 
 
5.2 THE CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS’ RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The CER (2011) suggested numerous legislative amendments to both s 24F and s 24G, 
which are described and explained below.  
24F Offences relating to commencement or continuation of listed activity 
(4) A person convicted of an offence in terms of subsection (2) is liable to: 
 (a) a fine not exceeding R5 million or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten 
years, or to both such fine and such imprisonment, if that person is a natural person; 
and 
 (b) A fine not exceeding the greater of 10% of the person’s annual turnover in the 
Republic and its exports from the republic during the person’s preceding financial year, 
or R10 million, if that person is not a natural person.  
Note: these suggestions were made by the CER in 2011. Subsequently, the administrative 
fine under s 24G was raised to R5 million in 2013, as per the CER’s suggestion (a) above.  
According to the CER, the purpose of the proposed amendments above is to guarantee a 
criminal fee for larger companies that serve as an effective disincentive to contravening s 
24F. The CER based the penalty formation on s 59 (2) of the Competition Act (Act 89 of 1998, 
Republic of South Africa) (CER, 2011).  
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(5) When determining the penalty, a court must have regard [for] all relevant factors, including 
the following: 
 (a) the extent of the intention or negligence of the person who committed the offence in 
terms of s 24F (2)(a); 
 (b) the severity of the offence in terms of its impact, or potential impact, on health, well-
being, safety and the environment; 
 (c) the degradation of the environment caused by the commission of the offence; 
 (d) the behaviour of the person who committed the offence; 
 (e) the monetary or other benefits which accrued to the convicted person through the 
 commission of the offence; 
 (f) the degree to which the person who committed the offence has cooperated with 
authorities; 
 (g) whether the person who committed the offence has previously been found in 
contravention of this act or any specific environmental management Act; and 
 (h) the amount of any administrative fine paid in terms of section 24G (3) (b) 
 
The CER (2011) intended the measures outlined above to guide courts in deciding on an 
appropriate penalty. These factors are based on various factors for deciding administrative 
fines described in s 59 (3) of the Competition Act, as well as the factors for criminal penalties 
described in s 52 of the National Environmental Management Act: Air Quality Act, 2004 
(Republic of South Africa) (CER, 2011). Many of the prominent concerns regarding s 24G are 
addressed in the provisions above. Notably, repeat offenders are addressed in (g), and in the 
event of negligent offenders, the consideration of administrative fees already paid under s 
24G (CER, 2011).  
 
24G Additional consequences of unlawful commencement or continuation of listed 
activity 
An important amendment suggested by the CER (2011) is removing the reference to 
“rectification” in the title of s 24G, in order to modify the perceptions regarding this legislation.  
 
(1) A person who has committed an offence in terms of section 24F (2) (a) must immediately 
cease the commencement or continuation of the activity or activities that constituted the 
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offence and take reasonable measures to mitigate degradation of the environment caused by 
the commission of the offence and to prevent further degradation of the environment.   
The above amendment obligates offenders to cease their activities and to apply measures to 
prevent environmental damage from worsening. The activity(ies) must be ceased until a 
decision has been made regarding the s 24G application (CER, 2011). The above provision 
was in part included in the 2013 amendment to s 24G, as the minister or MEC was given the 
right to order activities to cease pending the outcome of the s 24G application. However, the 
ceasing of activities is still not compulsory, as suggested above by the CER (2011).  
 
(2) A person who has committed an offence in terms of section 24F (2) (a) and who is unable 
to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence was not committed intentionally, must, 
to the satisfaction of the competent authority or the Minister of Mineral Resources, as the 
case may be, rehabilitate all degradation of the environment caused by the commission of the 
offence, without the option of applying for an environmental authorization in terms of 
subsection (3).  
 
The provision suggested above clearly does not allow those who intentionally commence 
listed activities without environmental authorisation from applying for s 24G rectification. 
Intentional offenders are ordered to stop activities and rehabilitate. Such a provision would 
prevent individuals and businesses from using s 24G as an alternative to the traditional EIA 
process (CER, 2011).  
 
The suggestion made by the CER (2011) above clearly places the onus of proving innocence 
on the offender, who has to prove to authorities, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence 
was unintentional. Notably, repeat offenders would automatically be placed in this category, 
as having been caught for unintentional/negligent contravention previously, it would be nearly 
impossible to prove innocence a second time. Intentional offenders, according to the above 
suggestion, would not be apply to apply for rectification, and therefore no administrative fine 
would be payable. Instead, the offender would pay a criminal fine decided by a court.  
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(3) A person who has committed an offence in terms of section 24F (2) (a) and who, on a 
balance of probabilities, is able to show that the offence was not committed intentionally but is 
unable to show that the offence was not committed negligently, and who has- 
 
 
 
 (a) complied with subsection (1); and 
 (b) paid an administrative fine determined by the competent authority in terms of 
subsection (7) below- may be directed by the Minister, Minister of Mineral Resources 
or MEC concerned, as the case may be, either to: 
  (i) wholly or in part rehabilitate all degradation of the environment caused by the 
 commission of the offence, without the option of applying for an environmental 
 authorisation in accordance with subsection (5) 
  (ii) wholly or in part rehabilitate all degradation of the environment caused by the 
 commission of the offence, and apply for an environmental authorisation  
 in accordance with subsection (5); or  
  (iii) apply for an environmental authorisation in accordance with subsection (5).  
 
The above suggested provision includes the current s 24G, but applies it only to those who 
have negligently commenced with a listed activity without permission. Negligent offenders 
include those who should have been aware of the requirement to apply for permission but did 
not do so, or those who had people working for them (e.g. subcontractors) who unlawfully 
commenced with activities. In negligent situations, offenders must cease activities, mitigate 
damage, and pay a fine before authorities decide whether the offender will be allowed to 
apply for rectification or not. Such a provision is significant as it allows authorities to only 
accept rectification applications for situations where authorisation could be allowed. In 
situations where authorisation would not have been allowed to begin with, the offender must 
cease and rehabilitate under (i) above. Such a provision allows authorities greater discretion 
when assessing specific situations (CER, 2011).  
 
(4) Subsection (3) applies to a person who has committed an offence in terms of section 24F 
(2) (a) and who is able to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence was not 
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committed intentionally or negligently, except that such a person does not have to pay the 
administrative fine in subsection (3) (b).  
 
This provision is similar to (3), but it applies to “innocent” offenders, and therefore does not 
require the payment of a fee. “Innocent offenders” in this case include those who did not know 
and could not reasonably have known that environmental permission was necessary. An 
example of such a person is an inhabitant of a rural village lacking access to legal information 
(CER, 2011).  
 
(5) Where the Minister, Minister of Mineral Resources or MEC concerned, as the case may 
be, has directed a person to apply for an environmental authorisation in terms of this section, 
that person must: 
 (a) compile a report containing – 
  (i) an assessment of the nature, extent, duration and significance of the      
 consequences for or impacts on the environment of the activity, including the 
 cumulative effects; 
  (ii) a description of mitigation measures undertaken or to be undertaken in 
 respect of the consequences for or impacts on the environment of the activity; 
  (iii) a description of the public participation process followed during the course of 
 compiling the report, including all comments received from interested and 
 affected parties and an indication of how issues raised have been addressed; 
  (iv) an environmental management programme; and 
 (b) provide such other information or undertake such further studies as the Minister or 
MEC, as the case may be, may deem necessary. 
 
(6) The Minister or MEC concerned must consider any reports or information submitted in 
terms of subsection (5) and thereafter may- 
 (a) direct the person to rehabilitate all degradation of the environment caused by the 
 commission of the offence in terms of section 24F(2) (a) within such time and 
 subject to such conditions as the minister or MEC may deem necessary; or 
 (b) issue an environmental authorisation to such person subject to such conditions as 
 the Minister or MEC may deem necessary.  
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Note: only the underlined phrases in provisions (5) and (6) above were inserted by the CER. 
The remainder of the text represents s 24G as it currently reads. The above provisions have 
been amended by the CER to include all destruction of the environment caused by the 
unlawful activity, which is more specific than the generic “rehabilitate the environment” 
currently provided for by s 24G (CER, 2011).  
 
(7) The administrative fine payable in terms of this section may not exceed R10 million and 
must be determined by the competent authority having regard to all relevant factors, including 
the following: 
 (a) the extent of the intention or negligence of the person who committed the offence in 
 terms of s 24F (2)(a); 
 (b) the severity of the offence in terms of its impact, or potential impact, on health, well-
 being, safety and the environment; 
 (c) the degradation of the environment caused by the commission of the offence; 
 (d) the behaviour of the person who committed the offence; 
 (e) the monetary or other benefits which accrued to the convicted person through the 
 commission of the offence; 
 (f) the degree to which the person who committed the offence has cooperated with 
 authorities; 
 (g) whether the person who committed the offence has previously been found in 
 contravention of this act or any specific environmental management Act; and  
 
In the amendments proposed in (7) above, the CER suggests a maximum administrative fine 
of R10 million. The factors listed above are based on factors for determining administrative 
fines described by s 59 (3) of the Competition Act as well as s 52 of the National 
Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, 2004 (Republic of South Africa, 2004). The lack 
of transparency involved in the determination of administrative fines remains a concern, and 
such information should be made publicly available (CER, 2011). The administrative fine 
under s 24G was subsequently raised to R5 million in 2013. 
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8. Except for a person mentioned in subsection (4), no application in terms of subsection (3) 
or any environmental authorisation issued in terms of subsection (6) (b) shall derogate from 
liability under section 24F(2).  
This provision is suggested by the CER (2011) in order to ensure that intentional and 
negligent offenders do not avoid criminal proceedings. When negligent offenders are 
concerned, administrative fees paid must be considered when deciding on a criminal fee, 
whereas innocent offenders are exempt from being held criminally liable (CER, 2011).  
 
 
5.3 STAKEHOLDER SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In addition to the suggested amendments to the legislation above, the CER invited EAPs, 
lawyers, conservationists, environment forums, and other stakeholders to submit their 
comments on the function of s 24G. Many insightful comments were made by these 
stakeholders, which will be discussed below (refer to Addendum B for original comments).  
 
Level of negligence, ignorance or willfulness 
Susie Brownlie, EAP and member of the CER’s expert panel, commented that different levels 
of transgressions should be identified. Ms Brownlie’s comment is similar to the suggestion 
made by the CER above, whereby both intentional and genuinely unintentional activities are 
considered.  
 
Mr Charl de Villiers, environmental consultant, also stated that offenders of s 24F should be 
given opportunity to defend their actions, and explain any mitigating circumstances which are 
of relevance. Mr de Villiers describes situations where farms are inherited, along with 
unsustainable land uses or farming practices. Such practices are continued as they have 
been for many generations, and the landowner may be oblivious that some of his/her 
practices are subject to environmental authorisation.  
 
Andrew Muir of Austen Smith makes an interesting argument, noting that if provision is not 
made for genuinely accidental cases of contravening environmental law, then “innocent” 
offenders may be fearful of coming forward to the relevant authority. These offenders will then 
remain incompliant, and continue with potentially environmentally damaging unlawful 
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activities. If provision is made for “innocent” offenders, then such offenders can be bought 
back into compliance and be assisted with mitigating environmental damage stemming from 
their activities.  
 
 
Special consideration for sensitive or protected areas 
I&APs, such as Nicole Barlow of the Environment and Conservation Association (ECA), 
suggest that s 24G must provide for undertaking listed activities within sensitive areas, such 
as wetlands. Ms Barlow suggests that in cases of illegal commencement within sensitive 
areas, no application for rectification should be allowed, and instead, the offender must be 
ordered to immediately cease and rehabilitate. John Wesson, of the National Association of 
Conservancies of South Africa, also argues that illegal listed activities within protected areas 
should be considered equal to poaching in the level of punishment.    
 
Emergency situations and public interest 
Cara Stokes, a consultant at CSEnvironmental, states that a s 24G application should be 
allowed in cases responding to environmental emergencies, or in the public interest. For 
example, the upgrading of roads or sewage plants could be considered in the public interest 
and should be treated differently to cases of environmental neglect. However, Chrissie Cloete 
of the Plettenberg Bay Community Environment Forum notes that she has observed the 
misuse of so called “emergency” situations being used to carry out a host of other 
environmentally damaging activities.  
 
Financial and criminal punishment under s 24G 
Many CER stakeholders had comments regarding criminal prosecution of s 24G offenders 
and the controversial administrative fee. Mark Botha of the WWF argues that there should be 
a distinct difference between the criminal fine and the administrative fine, stating that in some 
cases an administrative fee may suffice as punishment, while in other cases a more stringent 
punishment may be required. However, Nicole Barlow comments that judges sentencing 
environmental offenders may not have adequate knowledge of the environmental 
consequences of the unlawful activities. Judith Taylor and Rachel Adatia of ELA state that 
offenders should be fined in proportion to the cost of the development, while Chris Galliers of 
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the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA) argues that both short and 
long term financial benefits of non-compliance to companies be taken into consideration. 
Carolyn Schwegman of WESSA laments that fines are often reduced by 50% upon appeal by 
the applicant.  
 
Greater transparency regarding the administrative fee 
Charl de Villiers, as well as a few other stakeholders, emphasises the need for transparency 
in the calculation of the fee. The Hout Bay and Llandudno Environment Conservation Group 
comments that the administrative fine goes into the competent authority’s coffers, while fines 
paid through criminal sanctions go into the National Revenue Fund to be included in the 
national government’s budget. Thus, the competent authority may have an incentive to allow 
rectification as revenue is much needed by most government departments. The CER (2013) 
suggests that s24G administrative fines should be calculated by an independent tribunal. 
 
Offenders register, external review panel and director/authority accountability 
Many stakeholders, including the CER (2011) itself, also mentioned the idea of a register for 
offenders, to prevent repeat offenders from escaping detection. Nicole Barlow believes that 
directors of companies should be held accountable, and should be tracked to prevent 
offending directors from dissolving companies and starting new companies in order to leave 
no trace of their previous crimes.  
 
Chris Galliers suggests an external review panel for s 24G applications, which may improve 
public participation in the s 24G process. An external review panel should also serve to 
decrease corruption and increase the accountability of competent authorities. Advocate 
Tsheko Ratsheko argues that Ministers and MECs must provide reasons for their decisions 
regarding s 24G applications.  
 
 
5.4 IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONTROVERSIAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
FINE AS A DETERRENT 
September (2012:63) discusses the controversy surrounding the s 24G administrative fine, 
and notes that many stakeholders consider the fines to have great deterrence potential, while 
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others feel that the fines are not intended to be a punishment to begin with. Numerous 
options, some suggested by September (2012), are available to improve the effectiveness of 
the s 24G administrative fine as a deterrent.  
 
 
Calculation of the administrative fee, and the ideal fine quantity 
September (2012:63) notes that poor transparency in the calculation of the administrative fine 
is a major concern and may allow corruption (for example, offenders may bribe officials to 
lower their fine). In addition, unlike criminal penalties, money from s 24G fines is sent to the 
administering authority’s coffers, offering a financial motivation to authorities issuing the fine 
(September, 2012:64). Macrory (2010:91) emphasises the potential danger of authorities 
perceiving administrative fines as a method of collecting revenue.  
 
Increased transparency in the process of fine calculation will lower the risk of corruption, and 
prevent authorities from using the administrative fine to collect revenue (September, 
2012:64). Improving transparency would also improve peoples’ perceptions of the equity of 
the s 24G process, thus making the regulated community more likely to comply.  
 
In September’s (2012:64) thesis, she outlines the United States’ Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) Policy on Civil Penalties (1984). This policy demonstrates a multi-step 
process to determine the ideal fine amount: 
1. Determine the “preliminary deterrence amount,” which is derived from the economic 
gains factor (e.g. money saved due to lack of mitigation of environmental damage) and 
the gravity factor (e.g. damage done to environment, and the size of the company, 
assuming that an offence by a larger company is worse than an offence by a smaller 
company).  
2. Include “adjustment factors” to determine the “Initial Penalty Target Figure”. 
Adjustment factors include the perceived level of wilfulness or negligence, past records 
of non-compliance, and willing cooperation with authorities. 
3. Adjust the “Initial Penalty Target Figure” to take into account the offender’s capability of 
paying, or if changes are made to the adjustment factors used in calculating the “Initial 
Penalty Target Figure” due to new information coming to light.  
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Determining the level of negligence, ignorance or wilfulness 
The degree of the individual or company’s wilfulness, ignorance or negligence in committing 
the non-compliance is very difficult to determine. People are unlikely to be open and honest 
regarding their level of intent, and therefore an investigation will need to be undertaken by 
authorities, requiring large amounts of time (September, 2012:57). In addition, attempting to 
determine level of ignorance may lead to the questioning of authorities’ objectivity and may 
even lead to allegations of corruption.  
 
 
Determining the economic gains from non-compliance 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)(2009:88) found that 
most government authorities and non-government specialists believe that although financial 
penalties may stop unlawful activities, they are not large enough to outweigh the economic 
benefits gained from non-compliance, and therefore do not act as significant deterrents. The 
OECD (2009:88) observed a trend in governments linking financial penalties to financial 
benefits stemming from non-compliance.  
 
September (2012:65) admits that determining the economic profits gained (both directly and 
indirectly) from a non-compliance is very challenging. Fourie (2009:25) states that: “While 
EMIs and other enforcement officials work against the odds in this system to achieve modest 
and occasional fines, violators of environmental legislation (particularly non-compliant 
corporate entities) continue to enjoy substantial illegal financial gains at the expense of their 
compliant competitors, the environment and the people whose health, wellbeing and natural 
heritage depend on it.” 
 
Economic benefits from unlawful environmental activities are difficult to calculate as benefits 
can be long term or short term, and often come in different forms. In most cases the authority 
issuing the s 24G administrative fine is not trained to determine the financial benefits 
accumulated due to non-compliance (September, 2012:65).  
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Although quantifying the economic benefits accrued from environmental non-compliance is 
extremely difficult, it is crucial to make efforts to quantify such benefits, as offending 
companies should not be allowed to reap financial benefits (higher profits or lower costs) from 
non-compliance. Dishonest companies should not be given an advantage over honest 
companies who spend time and money in order to remain compliant (September, 2012:65). 
The US EPA attempts to quantify the economic benefits arising from non-compliance through 
the use of economic models, which are described below.  
 
Enforcement economic models 
The US EPA has several economic models used to evaluate the economic aspects of 
enforcement actions. These economic models are as follows (adapted from OECD, 2009:89): 
1. BEN: determines an offender’s economic savings from postponing or entirely avoiding 
pollution control measures. 
2. PROJECT: computes the actual cost to an offender of a proposed supplemental 
environmental scheme (and the ensuing reduced penalty). 
3. ABEL: assesses a company’s capacity to pay for compliance costs, remediation of 
damage, or penalities. 
4. INDIPAY: estimates an individual’s capacity to pay for compliance costs, remediation 
of damage, or penalities. 
5. MUNIPAY: appraises a municipality’s capacity to pay for compliance costs, 
remediation of damage, or penalities. 
 
Although some of the abovementioned models are somewhat contentious, these models are 
a positive step in increasing the objectivity and transparency of fines (September, 2012:65). 
Interestingly, after the BEN Model was launched, fines increased significantly (Fourie, 2009). 
 
Accurately reflecting the environmental impacts of non-compliance 
In order for s 24G administrative fines to accurately reflect environmental damage caused by 
a particular activity, the economic value of a particular ecosystem, and thus the cost to society 
of the degradation of that ecosystem, must first be quantified. Quantifying the value of the 
environment and the various services it provides should also encourage people to comply 
with environmental law, as they will understand the value of the many ecological services that 
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could be destroyed by their actions (IBRD, 2005:2). However, in general, economic policies 
and markets do not accurately value biodiversity or the protection of environmental systems 
(IBRD, 2005). Efforts to encourage environmental protection are handicapped by a poor 
understanding of the economic value of ecosystems, and the cost of environmental 
degradation (IBRD, 2005).  
The economic valuation of ecosystems 
Ecosystems provide many services, including the filtering of air and water, pollination, nutrient 
cycling, carbon sequestration, and soil formation (IBRD, 2005:5). The Millenium Ecosystem 
Assessment (2003) divides ecosystem services into four distinct categories, namely: 
“provisioning services”, “regulating services”, “cultural services” and “supporting services” 
(IBRD, 2005:6). “Provisioning services” include foodstuff and water, “regulating services” 
include stormwater and disease control, “cultural services” include recreational and historical 
benefits, while “supporting services” sustain the conditions for life (eg. nutrient cycling) (IBRD, 
2005:6). In spite of the crucial services they provide, global ecosystems are under immense 
pressure from direct and indirect effects of human development and expansion (IBRD, 
2005:6).  
 
The valuing of environmental services is complicated by the perspective of who is valuing the 
ecosystem. Benefits supplied by ecosystems are distributed differently amongst groups, and 
ecosystems which are highly valued by one group may cause losses to another group (IBRD, 
2005:2). Benefits of ecosystems are distributed amongst local inhabitants, the people of the 
specific country, and the global community. The unequal distribution of costs and benefits of 
environmental actions has ethical ramifications, which need to be considered by studying the 
flow of these costs and benefits to different groups of people, especially indigenous peoples 
(IBRD, 2005:22).   
 
Until fairly recently, most economists considered environmental costs and benefits to be 
impossible to quantify. However, great progress has been made in this regard, and many 
methods of valuing environmental costs and benefits have been developed (IBRD, 2005:27). 
The purpose of valuation of ecosystems is to produce objective, accurate information 
regarding the costs and benefits of protecting a certain system, in order to assist in decision 
making. Although the techniques used to value the environment are not without fault, they are 
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helpful in illustrating trade-offs and assisting in decision-making (IBRD, 2005:4). Economists 
generally value ecosystem services based on how they are utilised.   
 
 
Ecosystem values are first divided into “non-use values” and “use values”. “Use values” are 
then further divided into “direct use values”, “indirect use values”, and “option values” (IBRD, 
2005:9). “Direct use values” are ecosystem products and services which are directly used by 
mankind. Food products, timber, and medicinal products are examples of “consumptive” 
direct uses. “Non-consumptive” direct uses include hiking in or visiting and ecosystem.  
“Indirect use values” refer to ecosystem services which supply benefits beyond the particular 
ecosystem, for example water purification, which advantages people living downstream of a 
river, or carbon sequestration, which benefits the entire earth. “Option values” refer to 
possible future uses of ecosystems, either by the current generation (option value), or future 
generations (bequest value). “Non-use values” are derived from the pleasure obtained by 
knowing that a resource simply exists (“existence value”) (IBRD, 2005:10).  
 
“Direct use values” tend to be the easiest to quantify, as they often involve measurable 
quantities of a product that has a market price. “Recreational value” can also easily be 
measured by counting the number of visits to an area. Measuring the benefits of visitors to an 
area is more challenging, but methods have been developed which consider visitors’ travel 
costs and willingness to pay to enter a protected area. Assessing “indirect use values” is more 
challenging than assessing “direct use values”, as the quantities of the services delivered are 
usually difficult to measure (IBRD, 2005:10). In addition, these services are often not sold on 
markets, so a market price cannot be determined (IBRD, 2005:11). The “non-use value” of an 
ecosystem (“existence value”) is the most challenging value to describe, as it is not usually 
observable, even in peoples’ behaviour. However, surveys can be used to estimate peoples’ 
willingness to pay to protect a species or ecosystem which they do not directly use (IBRD, 
2005:12).  
 
Many of the ecosystem benefits discussed above are included in national accounts (for 
example, “extractive uses”). However, many services are not considered at all (“non-use 
values” and “indirect use values”), or are attributed to other sectors of the economy (many 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 55 
 
“indirect use values”) (IBRD, 2005:14). Therefore, the benefits supplied by the environment 
may appear to be much less than they really are (IBRD, 2005:15). If the costs and benefits of 
the various services provided by South Africa’s natural resources can better be quantified in 
monetary terms, it will certainly be easier to conserve them. For example, a farmer is much 
less likely to illegally remove a patch of indigenous fynbos from his land if he is aware of the 
value of the various services provided by the vegetation (IBRD, 2005:2). 
 
The Total Economic Value [TEV] of a particular ecosystem (had it not been damaged by 
unlawful activity) could be used to calculate a s 24G administrative fine which more accurately 
reflects the environmental damage caused. A fine which accurately reflects the full extent of 
the economic cost of the damage caused by the non-compliance will certainly be seen by the 
public, the regulated community, and the offender, as more equitable. Admittedly, this may be 
difficult to implement in practice.  
 
 
5.5 DIFFICULTIES WITH PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The above suggestions to improve the effectiveness of s 24G as a deterrent for contravening 
environmental law certainly contain much merit. However, although these suggestions are 
sound in theory, there are a number of challenges facing the practical implementation of such 
recommendations. Some of these challenges, such as accurately determining financial gains, 
quantifying environmental damage arising from non-compliance, and determining degree of 
ignorance, are discussed above.  
 
The basic origin of the challenges with implementing the measures suggested above, as 
September (2012:67) also notes, is a lack of financial resources, time, and human resources. 
In fact, Lehmann (2009:269) refers to such a lack of resources as: “the Achilles heel of all 
law.” Lehmann further notes that lack of resources is a particularly serious problem for 
developing countries, and as such, environmental management practices which do not utilise 
high amounts of state resources are increasing in use (Lehmann, 2009:269).  Some of these 
innovative environmental management practices will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
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5.6  SUMMARY 
Various measures have been suggested by different stakeholders to prevent s 24G from 
being used by dishonest individuals and businesses as a loophole to avoid the EIA process. 
The CER (2011) suggested numerous legislative amendments to both s 24F and s 24G, 
including raising the administrative fine and not allowing intentional offenders to apply for ex 
post facto authorisation. Another suggestion is to determine the economic value of the non-
compliance to the company or individual. However, economic benefits from unlawful 
environmental activities are difficult to calculate as benefits can be long term or short term, 
and often come in different forms. In most cases the authority issuing the s 24G 
administrative fine is not trained to determine the financial benefits accumulated due to non-
compliance (September, 2012:65). There are a number of challenges facing the practical 
implementation of recommendations to improve s 24G, most significantly a lack of financial 
resources, time, and human resources (September, 2012:67). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN A CURE:  
IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE 
 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
In order for NEMA to effectively protect the environment, society’s compliance with its 
regulations is essential. Perhaps the answer to improving compliance with environmental law 
in South Africa does not involve retrospective, punitive measures such as s 24G, but instead 
in improving environmental compliance to begin with, through compliance promotion 
measures. Compliance promotion is described by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) (2009:48) as: “assistance, incentives, and other 
activities designed to promote observance of environmental requirements.”  
 
 
6.2 COMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Non-compliance with NEMA is extremely common in South Africa (Craigie et al., 2009; Fourie 
2009; Kidd 2011). This is evidenced by the 2010/11 NECER, which found the commencement 
of listed activities without prior authorisation to be the most prevalent environmental 
transgression in every province but the Northern Cape (DEA, 2011).  
Compliance can be defined as the obedience to legal requirements or principles and from a 
legal point of view, governance and regulation are futile without compliance (Craigie et al., 
2009:41). Traditionally, compliance is encouraged by criminal, judicial and administrative 
means, although voluntary and incentive-based means can also be employed to reward 
compliance (September, 2012:9).  
 
Bowles (1971) believes that: “20 percent of the regulated population will automatically comply 
with any regulation, 5 percent will attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75 percent will 
comply as long as they think that the 5 percent will be caught and punished.” In September’s 
(2012:59) opinion: “the danger with s 24G is that the 75% of the regulated community 
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perceive that intentional offenders are not adequately punished (very low prosecution rate 
coupled with relatively low fines) and systematically obtain authorisation, and start non-
complying as a result, thereby increasing the proportion of non-compliance and potentially 
making a small problem unmanageable.” 
 
Craigie et al. (2009:45) cite a number of reasons why environmental non-compliance is rife in 
South Africa. First, historical discrimination and injustice, as well as poor law enforcement, 
have led to increased environmental non-compliance. Also, restricted capacity and resources 
within the government makes enforcement and monitoring of compliance very difficult (Craigie 
et al., 2009:45).  
 
The compliance mechanisms used for environmental law in South Africa are traditional 
command-and-control mechanisms. A command-and-control system functions by prescribing 
legal obligations, and encouraging compliance through various enforcement measures, such 
as criminal, administrative and civil measures (September, 2012:12). These measures are 
intended to compel compliance, discipline violators, and/or prevent future non-compliance 
(Craigie et al., 2009:45). Problems with command-and-control measures include that they are 
resource-heavy, time-consuming, costly, do not permit authorities to use their discretion, and 
present no incentive to go above and beyond the required standards (du Plessis and Nel, 
2011).  
 
The purpose of penalties, according to Macrory (2010:37), is to improve compliance by 
developing a “transparent system with appropriate sanctions that would aim to get firms back 
into compliance, ensure future compliance, provide a level playing field for business and 
enable regulators to pursue offenders who flout the law in a more effective manner.” In light of 
this, Macrory (2010:64) designed numerous principles of penalties, which are as follows: 
Sanctions should: 
1. Intend to improve the behaviour of the offender 
Instead of simply punishing an offender, a sanction should also encourage the offender 
to return to compliance and remain compliant.  
2. Eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance 
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No economic profits should be made from non-compliance. Therefore, sanctions 
should not allow businesses that have financially benefited from non-compliance to 
gain an advantage over law abiding businesses. Removing financial benefits also 
serves to decrease the incentive to break the law again. 
3. Be at the discretion of the authority 
Sanctions should be responsive to each individual situation and environmental offence. 
The authority should decide which sanction would be most appropriate in each 
situation, and most effective in bringing the offender back into compliance. Similarly, 
authorities should be able to impose a sanction in situations where a lesser 
punishment could be imposed.  
4. Take into account the type of offence and the damage caused 
Sanctions should consider the environmental consequences of the non-compliance so 
that offenders are fully accountable for their actions.  
5. Attempt to restore the damage caused 
In cases where a non-compliance results in harm to the environment or society, 
sanctions must provide incentives to institute remedial action and guarantee that 
offenders compensate those harmed. 
6. Prevent future non-compliance 
Sanctions should clearly demonstrate that non-compliance will not be allowed. 
Offenders should not get the idea that their non-compliance will be ignored or that they 
will be “let off the hook” easily. 
 
 
Essentially, sanctions must decrease the incentive to contravene the environmental law by 
putting the offender in a worse position than those which complied with the law from the 
beginning (Macrory, 2010:37). Administrative fines, such as those issued to s 24G offenders, 
are administered directly by the government, and recipients have the right to appeal such 
fines (Macrory, 2010:79). Evidence has proven such fines to be an effective method to ensure 
compliance (Macrory, 2010:80; Fourie, 2009). Monetary penalties that can be varied 
depending on the nature of the contravention allow the authorities to use their discretion and 
consider various factors in deciding on an appropriate fine (September, 2012:22). Such 
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factors may include the compliance history of the offender, the damage caused to the 
environment, and the monetary strength of the business/individual (Macrory, 2010:80).  
Although there is evidence that administrative fines, such as the fine issued to those applying 
for s 24G approval, improve compliance, financial penalties have numerous shortcomings, 
including the following (Macrory, 2010:100): 
 Deterrence: a financial punishment is only effective if it is the right amount. Large 
businesses may simply pay small fines and consider them an overhead cost. As a 
result, such small fines have little influence on the environmental compliance of large 
businesses.  
 Spill over: if the offender passes on the financial burden of the penalty to third parties 
such as shareholders, employees or customers, fines will not be effective.  
 Disproportionate impact: smaller companies may be more negatively affected by 
monetary fines because of financial constraints. 
 Failure to rehabilitate: ensuring long-term compliance can be expensive and time-
consuming, therefore companies may regard fines as business losses instead of fixing 
the non-compliance. This is usually the case when non-compliance leads to substantial 
financial gains, and the fines are too small to negate these gains.  
 
Alternatives to command-and-control measures 
Due to the problems experienced when using command-and-control measures, South African 
policy-makers are increasingly looking for alternative compliance and enforcement measures. 
The two main types of alternative enforcement measures which will be discussed are 
incentive-based measures, and voluntary measures (Craigie et al., 2009:58). These 
alternative measures follow the normative theory of compliance, which focuses on assisting 
the regulated community to encourage compliance, rather than punishing non-compliance 
(Craigie et al., 2009:45).  
 
Incentive-based measures 
Incentive-based measures are established on the idea that it is most effective and efficient to 
reward positive behaviour rather than to punish unwanted behaviour. However, incentive-
based measures can also include disincentives to discourage unwanted behaviours. The 
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most commonly employed incentive-based tool in South Africa is market-based incentives 
(Craigie et al., 2009:58).  
 
Market-based incentives make use of existing markets, or establish new markets, to 
manipulate economic behaviour and thereby encourage compliance with specific laws or 
standards, as well as discourage non-compliance. For example, in order to encourage certain 
behaviours, authorities can provide tax benefits, refund schemes, and subsidies. Non-
compliance can also be discouraged using incentives, by imposing various disposal charges, 
user charges and taxes on members of the regulated community who do not comply with 
certain standards. Environmental taxes are a widely used market-based incentive tool, as 
they require less time and money from authorities, and they allow the regulated community to 
use the least expensive method of reaching the prescribed standard, and even go above and 
beyond the standard. In addition, environmental taxes are preventive, not reactive (Craigie et 
al., 2009:58).  
 
Voluntary measures 
Voluntary measures refer to the wide variety of actions that companies undertake to improve 
their environmental performance. Voluntary measures include self-regulatory actions (eg. 
certification and labelling schemes, and corporate environmental responsibility programmes), 
as well as co-regulatory (e.g. co-operative agreements between public and/or private 
sectors). Voluntary measures are not required by law, and instead complement the standard 
compliance and enforcement regime. In South Africa, the ISO 14001 certification scheme is a 
widely employed voluntary compliance measure which standardizes environmental 
management systems (Craigie et al., 2009:60).  
 
 
6.3 IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Craigie et al. (2009) suggest that an integrated approach should be used to improve South 
Africa’s environmental compliance and enforcement regime, which would differ from the 
current “piecemeal” approach, which emphasises certain priority areas and utilises mostly 
traditional criminal and administrative procedures.  
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Hart (1994) argues that in order to be successful, an environmental compliance and 
enforcement regime should incorporate incentives for those willing to comply, and sanctions 
for those who are not willing to comply. Complete transparency is also crucial, which includes 
an open enforcement policy, transparency of enforcement measures taken, identities of 
offenders, and the results of the case (Hart, 1994).  
 
According to Craigie et al. (2009) and INECE (2009), crucial elements of a successful 
compliance and enforcement regime include the following: 
 Rules and regulations that are enforceable 
 Clear guidelines as to who is subject to the rules 
 Fair and equal rules 
 Encouragement of compliance 
 Monitoring of compliance 
 Non-compliances are dealt with 
 The relationship between environmental compliance and economic development 
should be encouraged 
 It must be ensured that those who are compliant with environmental law are not 
disadvantaged compared to those who are compliant 
Increased compliance with environmental law not only protects the environment, it also 
decreases the monetary cost to the government of prosecution and remediation (Craigie et 
al., 2009:61).  
 
The Problem of the “Compliance Deficit” 
Macrory (2010:57) describes a “compliance deficit” as a situation where non-compliance has 
been detected, but authorities do not act due to limited resources, and the time and expenses 
required by criminal proceedings. This “compliance deficit” situation could explain why 
September (2012:54) found the rate of prosecution for s 24G offenders to be extremely low. 
September (2012:54) attributed the low rate of prosecution to the authorities’ lack of time and 
resources, the congested court system, and insufficient convictions. The aforementioned 
challenges leave authorities with little incentive to pursue criminal prosecution for offenders, 
especially when the environmental damage is considered to be insignificant, and authorities 
may be hesitant to pursue criminal prosecution if they perceive the time and resources 
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required in the prosecution process to be greater than the potential penalty for the offender 
(September, 2012:54). 
 
In her research, September (2012:54) found that the abovementioned challenges to pursuing 
criminal prosecution have led to authorities adopting a “pick your battles” standpoint, where 
they consider the environmental damage, available resources, and likelihood of a successful 
prosecution before deciding to pursue prosecution of an offender.  
 
Trends in Environmental Compliance in South Africa 
Some new developments in environmental and corporate law have improved corporate 
compliance with environmental regulations (September, 2012:29). While environmental 
compliance in the business world has always been seen as a financial expense and an 
administrative exercise, compliance is now being viewed as a matter of risk. The risks of non-
compliance with environmental law include excess costs, liability, and a negative impact on 
the corporation’s image and competitiveness (Fet, 2002). 
Relatively new measures which encourage corporate compliance with environmental law 
include (from September, 2012:29): 
 Sustainability reports which detail environmental standards and compliance of 
companies  
 Various labeling schemes  
 Carbon footprinting projects  
 
These new measures emerged from a variety of factors, such as greater awareness of 
mankind’s impacts on the environment, stricter regulatory controls, higher stakeholder 
expectations of corporate standards, and investors’ emphasis on sustainable business 
models (September, 2012:29). In response to the above mentioned measures, many 
businesses have shifted their focus from short-term, reactive approaches, to preventative 
measures, as well as a more pro-active approach which relates to the business’ general 
social and economic roles (Howes, 2005; Raufflet, 2006). 
 
Corporate environments are increasingly being scrutinised by stakeholders based on their 
“corporate social responsibility”, “triple bottom line”, accountability, transparency and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 64 
 
ethical/sustainable practices (September, 2012:30). Due in part to such scrutiny by 
stakeholders, the corporate environment has adapted to become more open to sustainable 
business models by innovating incentives to increase environmental performance and 
minimise environmental risks (September, 2012:30). Many financial corporations now 
consider environmental risks when assessing loan requests, and compliance with 
environmental laws may be mandatory to access finance (OECD and EIRIS, 2003).  
 
Numerous businesses currently believe that “overcompliance” with environmental regulations 
is a successful business tactic, and regard a reputation as a “green” company to be highly 
beneficial (Mehta and Hawkins, 1998). Harmful publicity regarding environmental practices 
can result in a company losing customers, alienating local communities, losing market share, 
and being more closely scrutinised by regulators (Thornton et al., 2005:264).  
 
Stock exchanges have begun to list companies as “ethical”, “sustainable”, and “socially 
responsible”, which has encouraged companies to improve their environmental performance 
(September, 2012:31). In particular, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) initiated the 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Index in 2004, after an increasing number of investors 
desired to know the environmental and social impacts of listed businesses (September, 
2012:31). However, despite the above mentioned changes and improvements in 
environmental compliance, environmental non-compliance remains a problem in South Africa.  
 
National Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
Every year, or every two years, the national Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
releases a NECER, which details the efforts of the various environmental authorities 
comprising the “Environmental Management Inspectorate” in enforcing compliance with 
environmental law. The “Environmental Management Inspectorate” consists of officials at 
national, provincial and local levels of government, who are responsible for completing 
criminal investigations and issuing directives and compliance notices (DEA, 2014:1). NECERs 
are intended for a wide variety of stakeholders, and are intended to provide the following 
(DEA, 2014:1): 
 The general public with information regarding the actions of the environmental 
compliance and enforcement sector which enforces Section 24 of the Constitution; 
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 Groups such as non-governmental organisations and interest groups with information 
pertaining to compliance and enforcement tasks related to specific industries or 
facilities; 
 Feedback to national, provincial and local environmental authorities regarding their 
compliance and enforcement efforts, compared to previous years as well as compared 
to departments in other provinces; and 
 Records of consequences for contravening environmental laws to act as a deterrent for 
potential offenders. 
 
In the foreword to the 2013/2014 NECER, Ishaam Abrader of the DEA emphasises the 
importance of societal compliance with environmental law. Abrader states that the impacts of 
non-compliance reach beyond the natural environment, affecting the economy, livelihoods, 
effective governance, and the rule of law. Abrader also states that properly enforcing 
environmental law benefits society by providing a healthy and safe environment for current 
and future generations. A stable investment situation, based on the rule of law, argues 
Abrader, further encourages economic growth. 
 
Encouragingly, according to the 2013/2014 NECER, the number of Environmental 
Management Inspectors (EMIs) has increased more than twofold since being founded in 
2007. This increase has led to improved environmental standards in the power generation 
and refinery industries, as a result of increased monitoring by EMIs. However, the NECER 
notes high rates of illegal actions in terms of environmental impact assessment regulations 
(DEA, 2013/14). 
 
Environmental Management Inspectors 
EMIs are employed as per provincial legislation and local by-laws, and are able to perform 
environmental compliance and enforcement tasks as stipulated by such legislation (DEA, 
2014:5).   
EMIs undertake compliance and enforcement tasks in various industries related to 
environmental management. These sectors are colour-coded into green, brown and blue. 
Green refers to biodiversity and protected areas, blue refers to integrated coastal 
management, and brown refers to pollution, waste and EIA (DEA, 2014).  
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EMIs are split into different categories which are graded based on the compliance and 
enforcement authority granted to them by Chapter 7 of NEMA. The latest data available in the 
national EMI register kept by the DEA records a total of 1915 EMIs throughout the country 
(DEA, 2014:5).  
 
Table 6.1 below depicts the number of EMIs per institution. All the institutions listed 
experienced an increase in EMIs between 2011/12 and 2013/14, except for the DEA, the 
Mpumalanga DEDET, and Mpumalanga Parks, which decreased by only one EMI during this 
time period.  
 
Table 6.1: Environmental Management Inspectorates per institution (DEA, 2014:6). 
 
 
National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Statistics 
The following compliance and enforcement statistics are contained in the 2013/2014 NECER 
(the latest report at time of writing) and pertain to environmental compliance and enforcement 
at a national and provincial level. 
 
Enforcement Statistics (DEA, 2014:3): 
 There has been a 34.52% increase in the number of reported environmental incidents, 
from 4 479 in 2012/13 to 6 025 in 2013/14. 
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 There was a general increase in the number of criminal dockets registered in the 
previous three financial year cycles, from 1 080 (50.42% increase) in 2011/12, 1 488 
(37.7% increase) in 2012/13 and 1 862 (25% increase) in 2013/14. 
 The number of criminal dockets handed to the NPA increased by 41.42% from 268 in 
2012/13 to 379 in 2013/14. 
 The total number of arrests by EMIs has decreased by 35.77% from 1 818 in 2012/13 
to 1 371 in 2013/14. 
 The total number of acquittals has remained the same at 8 in 2012/13 and 2013/14. 
 Convictions reported have slightly increased by 11.43% from 70 reported in 2012/13 to 
78 in 2013/14. 
 There has been a decrease in the number of plea and sentence agreements reached 
from 14 in 2012/13 to 11 reported in 2013/14. 
 The total number of warning letters issued has increased from 187 in 2012/13 to 228 in 
2013/14 which equates to an increase of 21.93%. 
 The total number of administrative notices issued increased by 22.88% from 577 in 
2012/13 to 709 in 2013/14. 
 The number of civil court applications launched decreased by 50% from 4 in 2012/13 
to 2 in 2013/14. 
 There was a dramatic increase by 199.48% in the total value of section 24G 
administrative fines paid from R 5,385,215 in 2012/2013 to R 16,127,751 in 2013/14. 
 
Compliance Monitoring Statistics (DEA, 2014:3): 
 There were a total of 2 849 facilities inspected in 2013/14, which reflects a 3% increase 
from the 2 766 facilities inspected in 2012/13. 
 Of the total number of facilities inspected 71% (2019) were against brown legislative 
requirements, while 29% (830) were in the green subsector. 
 There was a significant increase of 60% in the total number of proactive inspections 
conducted bringing the total from 1 215 in 2012/13 to 1 953 in 2013/14. 
 The total number of reactive inspections conducted in 2013/14 amounted to 896, which 
reflects a 40.21 % increase from the 639 conducted in 2012/13. 
 The total number of non-compliances detected during inspection has decreased from 2 
482 in 2012/13 to 1 539 in 2013/14, representing a significant 61.23% decrease. Of the 
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total number of non-compliances detected, 623 (616 Brown and 7 Green) resulted in 
enforcement action being taken. This figure represents an increase in non-compliances 
resulting in enforcement action of 18.3 % in comparison to the 2012/13 figure of 524. 
Put differently, while the total number of non-compliances detected has decreased 
significantly, those that require enforcement action have increased. 
 A total of 2 271 inspection reports were finalised in the 2013/14 financial year. 
 Of the 2 849 inspections conducted, the greater majority (832) were as a result of 
routine inspections, 658 emanated from complaints and 343 were triggered by permit 
inspections. 
 
Statistics per institution/province (DEA, 2014:3):r Institution/Province 
 SANParks recorded the highest number of criminal dockets registered at 532, followed 
closely by Ezemvelo 2  with 531 criminal dockets. The third highest was Limpopo 
DEDET with 435 dockets registered while Mpumalanga DEDET, North West 
Department of Economic Development, Environment, Conservation and Tourism 
(DEDECT) and KwaZulu-Natal DAEA reported no criminal cases. 
 Ezemvelo recorded the highest number of arrests at 538, followed by Limpopo DEDET 
with 514 arrests. 
 Admission of guilt fines (J534s) issued by Ezemvelo achieved the highest value 
bringing in a total of R462 350 from the 395 fines issued. This was followed by 
SANParks with a value of R341 685.00 from 549 fines issued. 
 With a total of 173, the Western Cape DEADP recorded the highest number of 
administrative enforcement notices comprising of 113 pre-compliance notices, 21 final 
compliance notices, 29 pre-directives and 10 directives. With a total of 9, Limpopo 
DEDET reported the lowest number of administrative enforcement notices. These 
comprised of 2 pre-compliance notices and 7 pre-directives. SANParks, CapeNature, 
Ezemvelo, Eastern Cape Parks and Mpumalanga Parks recorded no administrative 
enforcement. 
 Limpopo DEDET issued 80 warning letters, the highest of the EMI Institutions. They 
are followed by Mpumalanga DEDET who issued 52 warning letters. 
                                                          
2
 Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (Ezemvelo) is a governmental organisation responsible for maintaining conservation areas and public 
nature reserves in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Province. 
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 DEA recorded the highest total value of S24G fines paid, being R 5 931 000 while the 
Western Cape DEADP had recorded R 3 495 975 and GDARD recorded a total 
payment of R 3 109 026. 
 North West DEDECT recorded the highest number of facilities inspected at 943 of 
which 382 were in respect of brown issues and 561 on green issues. This was followed 
by KwaZulu-Natal DAEA with 872 (867 brown and 5 green) and Western Cape with 
291 brown issues only. At 30 inspections, the Free State Department of Economic 
Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs (DEDTEA) recorded the lowest number of 
facilities inspected. 
 DEA recorded the highest number of non-compliances detected (708) during the 
execution of compliance inspections, followed by KwaZulu-Natal DAEA which detected 
525 non-compliances and Western Cape DEA&DP with 184. Both Limpopo DEDET 
and the North West DEDECT reported 40 non-compliances. Free State DEDTEA 
detected 22 non-compliances while Mpumalanga DEDET reported 20 non-
compliances. 
 
According to the above statistics, the general enforcement of environmental legislation seems 
to have improved, with an increase in the number of criminal dockets recorded between 
2011/12 and 2013/14, although the number of arrests by EMIs decreased. The number of 
warning letters and administrative notices issued both increased by approximately 22% 
between 2012/13 and 2013/14. Noticeably, between 2012/13 and 2013/14, there was a 
remarkable increase of approximately 200% in the total value of s 24G administrative fines 
paid (DEA, 2014:3). In terms of compliance monitoring, the number of inspections (both 
proactive and reactive) increased since 2012/13, and the total number of non-compliances 
detected during monitoring has decreased. However, although the number of non-
compliances detected has decreased, the number of non-compliances resulting in 
enforcement action has increased (DEA, 2014:3).  
 
With regards to the Western Cape, the DEA&DP registered the highest number of 
administrative enforcement notices (173 in total), as well as the second highest total value of 
s 24G administrative fines paid during 2013/14. The DEA&DP ranked third behind the DEA 
and the Kwa-Zulu Natal DAEA in terms of non-compliances detected (DEA, 2014:3).  
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Most Widespread Environmental Crimes Reported 
According to the 2013/14 NECER, the most common environmental crimes uncovered by 
EMIs were similar to previous years. In the “brown” sub-sector, the illegal commencement of 
listed activities was the most prevalent non-compliance, while illegal hunting was the most 
widespread environmental offense in the “green” sub-section (DEA, 2014:13).  
 
Table 6.2 below depicts the specific national legislation being disobeyed. NEMA (illegal 
commencement of listed activities) and the NEM:BA (specifically the TOPS and CITIES 
Regulations) are the most commonly contravened environmental legislation in South Africa 
(DEA, 2014:14).  
 
Table 6.2: The most commonly contravened environmental legislation (from DEA, 2014:15). 
 
 
Compliance Monitoring by EMIs 
Effective monitoring is crucial to ensuring compliance with environmental legislation, and 
without such monitoring, non-compliance may remain unnoticed and the proper enforcement 
action will not be taken.  The DEA emphasises the importance of compliance monitoring: 
“Conducting compliance monitoring inspections to ascertain whether or not the regulated 
community is complying with the relevant legislative provisions, as well as with any and all 
authorisations, licences and permits issued in terms of this legislation, plays a critical role in 
ensuring continued compliance” (DEA, 2014:15).  
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Tables 6.4 and 6.5 (split into two) below depict compliance inspections undertaken during 
2013/14, consisting of both “brown” and “green” activities. It is important to remember that the 
number of facilities inspected does not automatically correlate with the number of 
environmental authorisations, licences or permits issued, as one facility may require multiple 
authorisations, licences and permits (DEA, 2014:15).   
 
Table 6.2: The number of compliance monitoring inspections undertaken by various EMI Institutions during 
2013/14 (from DEA, 2014:15).  
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Table 6.3: Number of “brown” facilities inspected by various EMI Institutions during 2013/14 (DEA, 2014:16). 
 
 
Use of Enforcement Mechanisms and Convictions by EMIs 
According the NECER for 2013/14, administrative enforcement (directives and notices) is the 
tool favoured by EMIs addressing “brown” issues. During 2013/14, the DEA&DP issued the 
highest number of directive and notices (DEA, 2014:29) (refer to Figure 6.2 below). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The number of administrative enforcement tools (i.e. directives and notices) utilised by EMI 
Institutions during 2013/14 (from DEA, 2014:29).  
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Environmental Crimes and Incidents Complaints 
The NECER reported statistics regarding environmental grievances received from the 
Environmental Crimes and Incidents Hotline, as well the Minister’s office, and various other 
organs of state. The aforementioned hotline appears to be the preferred method of reporting 
environmental offences and emergency situations, and excludes complaints sent directly to 
government/EMI authorities. The total number of complaints has increased from 467 in 
2012/13 to 536 in 2013/14, with unlawful development and poaching showing considerable 
increases (DEA, 2014:68). The controversial s 24G attempts to address such complaints and 
unlawful developments.  
 
6.4 BENEFITS OF COMPLIANCE 
As the OECD (2009:48) states, improved compliance financially benefits both authorities and 
the regulated community. Compliance decreases the financial burden on authorities as less 
time and money can be spent on enforcement of laws, as well as remediation of 
environmental damage caused by non-compliance. The regulated community benefits from 
compliance in avoiding fines such as s 24G, as well as avoiding negative publicity 
surrounding environmental non-compliance (Craigie et al., 2009; OECD, 2009:48). 
The regulated community must be made aware of the economic benefits of compliance, such 
as increased efficiency and innovation. The regulated community must also be assisted by 
authorities in their efforts to comply with environmental law. The following measures are 
suggested to assist the regulated community in compliance: establishing an incentive based 
structure, and providing EMIs, other support staff, and educational programmes to assist the 
regulated community in understanding their environmental responsibilities (Craigie et al., 
2009).  
 
 
6.5 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INCENTIVES 
The OECD (2009:53) found that countries rarely offer direct financial rewards to industry for 
compliance with environmental regulations, as a matter of principle. However, there are 
countries which offer financial incentives available for companies prepared to invest in 
innovative environmental technologies, especially when such technologies enable companies 
to go beyond mere compliance (OECD, 2009:53).  
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The OECD (2009:55) discusses adverse publicity as an effective negative incentive and 
deterrent for non-compliance with environmental law. This could include the public “naming 
and shaming” of companies who do not comply. A negative impact on a company’s public 
image, reputation and competitiveness acts as a major incentive for compliance (OECD, 
2009:55; September, 2012:70). This is evidenced in that the main reasons why companies 
willingly adopt environmental management systems are to ease pressure from consumers 
and other stakeholders, as well as to avoid liability for environmental damage. Companies 
wish to maintain a positive environmental image in the public eye, which is why they often 
publish annual sustainability reports, especially in industries notorious for causing 
environmental damage, such as the mining and petroleum industries (Lehmann, 2009). In 
addition, public disclosure can lead to market repercussions and public pressure against 
offenders (OECD, 2009: 55). It has been observed that after specific cases of enforcement 
are made public, other companies with similar environmental issues use the information to 
solve any non-compliances they may have, and companies have even contacted 
environmental authorities for advice in doing so (OECD, 2009:55). While companies who fail 
to comply with environmental laws should be publically named, companies going above and 
beyond the minimum standard for compliance should also be given public recognition 
(Lehmann, 2009).  
 
 
6.6 COMPLIANCE PROMOTION THROUGH EDUCATION AND SUPPORT 
It is important to realise that the incentive based structure described above will only be 
successful if companies are educated on their environmental responsibilities. It is thus vitally 
important that companies be supported in designing their internal environmental management 
programmes. Although companies may be aware of the importance of complying with 
environmental law, they may be unsure of how to develop and implement a suitable plan of 
action (Bregmann et al., 1996). Bregmann et al. (1996) describes the difficulty companies 
face in educating each employee on environmental standards, complicated by the laws 
frequently changing. In addition, legislation is often written using language that is often 
unintelligible to the average person (Bregmann et al., 1996). Therefore, according to the 
OECD (2009:48), businesses should be provided with support in comprehending and 
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complying with regulations. Such support will guarantee that companies are aware of their 
environmental obligations and assist them with the knowledge necessary to improve their 
capacity to comply (OECD, 2009:48). 
 
Jankousky (1994:35) names three crucial aspects of an environmental compliance program, 
namely: identifying and categorising environmental activities, determining relevant regulatory 
requirements, and training employees. Therefore, the first step for establishing an effective 
environmental management and compliance program would be assessing the specific 
environmental requirements imposed on the business. The business must determine which 
environmental regulations are relevant to its operations, and which of its actions are most 
likely to cause non-compliances (Bregmann et al., 1996). This is where the government could 
assist by providing capable, trained individuals to provide such knowledge and education to 
businesses. Regular follow-up visits must also be conducted to ensure continued compliance 
and to identify possible weaknesses in the environmental management system. Jankousky 
(1994) describes important tools in supporting companies in their environmental management 
programs. These tools include environmental compliance manuals, self-inspection 
guidebooks, a system to track activities and follow up on activities identified during self-
inspections, availability of expert advice if necessary, and regular compliance audits 
undertaken by an objective third party (Jankousky, 1994:35).  
 
Jankousky (1994:36) argues that companies aiming to be effective at environmental 
compliance must consider environmental compliance like other important business functions. 
This involves setting goals, initiating plans to reach these goals, allocating resources to 
support the plan, regularly measuring progress towards the goals, and rewarding employees 
for their contributions toward achieving the goals. If a company has vague statements about 
its environmental responsibility, but does not have clear environmental management goals 
and systems for encouraging employee cooperation, the company is unlikely to achieve 
employee behaviour which supports these environmental goals (Jankousky, 1994:36). In fact, 
incentives for employees to comply with environmental systems, such as financial bonuses, 
as well as recognition of efforts, is listed by Jankousky (1994:36) as one of the factors needed 
to exhibit commitment to environmental compliance. A company which rewards employees for 
reaching certain financial targets, without providing incentives to encourage environmental 
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compliance, risks forcing employees to choose between being financially rewarded or 
promoted, and complying with environmental standards. In companies with prominent 
environmental compliance systems, it will be in the employee’s best interest financially to 
comply (Jankousky, 1994:36).  
 
 
6.7 THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IN PROMOTING 
COMPLIANCE 
According to the OECD (2009:24), there are three important elements of ensuring 
environmental compliance, which are mutually supportive. First is compliance promotion, 
which includes incentives, education and support, as described above. Second is compliance 
monitoring, which consists of audits and self-monitoring, also described above. The third 
element described by the OECD (2009:24) is enforcement, which involves actions taken by 
the authorities to force offenders to return to compliance, as well as punish non-compliance. 
The OECD (2009:25) emphasises the importance of efficient enforcement due to the rational 
behaviour that can be expected of individuals and companies.  
 
According to Jankousky (1994), both individuals and businesses behave rationally (i.e. in a 
manner which will promote their own best interest, usually in an economic sense). Businesses 
aim to maximize shareholder value, which is in their best interest. Economically, there is no 
clear evidence that taking action to improve environmental compliance will maximize 
shareholder value, especially in the short term. Therefore, decision makers within a business, 
taking only financial considerations into account, would not willingly forfeit operating outputs 
unless forced to do so by environmental law. If the likelihood of being caught and punished for 
environmental non-compliance is lower than 100 percent, then some businesses may choose 
to rationally act in their best interest and break the law, if they perceive the benefits of non-
compliance (in terms of cost savings) to outweigh the risks (Jankousky, 1994:35). Therefore it 
is crucially important in the promotion of environmental compliance that enforcement is 
effective and that businesses do not expect to get away with non-compliance unpunished 
(OECD, 2009:25; September, 2012:59).  Enforcement must also be swift and fair, with 
penalties great enough to negate the benefits of non-compliance (OECD, 2009:25). This is 
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especially relevant when businesses are given an “escape route” in the form of s 24G 
(September, 2012:60).  
 
 
6.8 HOW COMPLIANCE PROMOTION CAN BE USED WITH REGARDS TO S 24G 
As discussed above, providing incentives may be an effective measure to improve 
businesses’ compliance with environmental law. In South Africa, a positive incentive which 
can be used to encourage compliance with environmental law is a financial reward or tax 
benefit for a certain period of compliance (e.g. five consecutive years). Financial incentives 
can also be used for companies which go above and beyond mere compliance, such as 
companies which make an extra effort to reduce emissions below the standard, or decrease 
their carbon footprint significantly.  
 
Publically “naming and shaming” non-compliant companies, as discussed by the OECD 
(2009:55), could be used as a negative incentive in South Africa. The environmental 
authorities already produce a NECER every two years, and the names of non-compliant 
companies, as well as companies with excellent environmental compliance records, could be 
published in this report. Publicising the names and environmental crimes of non-compliant 
companies will also increase the public’s awareness of environmental laws and regulations, 
and the public can, in turn, help keep companies accountable to the law. Consumers will also 
then be aware and able to make environmentally sound choices and use their money/buying 
power to exert influence.  
 
As discussed above, an important aspect of compliance promotion is providing businesses 
with adequate support to comply with environmental laws (OECD, 2009:48). Environmental 
authorities in South Africa should be trained to provide support to companies in understanding 
environmental regulations, and developing effective environmental management 
programmes. Training workshops could be offered to educate staff working for companies in 
certain industries on their environmental responsibilities and the negative consequences of 
non-compliance. This type of support should prove to decrease the number of s 24G 
applications submitted due to ignorance, neglect and negligence.  
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6.9  SUMMARY 
There are a number of reasons why environmental non-compliance is rife in South Africa, 
including historical discrimination, poor law enforcement, and restricted capacity and 
resources within government. The answer to improving compliance with environmental law in 
South Africa may lie in improving environmental compliance through compliance promotion 
measures, such as financial incentives, naming and shaming, and providing businesses with 
adequate support to comply with environmental law. Improved compliance financially benefits 
both authorities and the regulated community. Compliance decreases the financial burden on 
authorities as less time and money can be spent on enforcement of laws, as well as 
remediation of environmental damage caused by non-compliance.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
This research critically examines the effectiveness of s 24G in supporting and upholding 
South Africa’s environmental legislation by asking the question: is s 24G an effective 
deterrent for contravening environmental law in South Africa? 
A major complaint regarding s 24G is that the administrative fines issued are too low to act as 
a deterrent for unscrupulous businesses and individuals. The findings of this research show 
that despite a consistent increase in average amount of administrative fines every year since 
2006, the number of s 24G applications received by the DEA&DP has also increased 
consistently. This result would appear to suggest that the administrative fines issued are not 
acting as a deterrent for non-compliance with environmental law. However, this conclusion 
must be further examined.  
 
 
7.2 REASONS FOR INCREASE IN S 24G APPLICATIONS 
It should not be assumed that an increasing number of s 24G applications reflects increasing 
non-compliance with NEMA EIA Regulations. The increasing number of s 24G applications 
observed by the DEA&DP since 2006 could be due to increased awareness of environmental 
legislation, leading to members of the regulated community reporting their own environmental 
non-compliances in order to return to compliance. Also, environmental enforcement in South 
Africa has improved steadily, as described in the 2013/2014 NECER.  Improved enforcement 
of environmental law can be expected to lead to more effective detection of non-compliance, 
which could explain the increasing number of s 24G applications.  
 
 
7.3  REDUCING NON-COMPLIANCE DUE TO IGNORANCE 
Officials involved with s 24G applications have estimated that a vast majority of applications 
are due to simple ignorance of environmental law (September, 2012:42). In cases of 
ignorance, the administrative fine associated with s 24G would not act as a deterrent, 
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because the offender does not have knowledge of the law. In fact, in some cases the 
administrative fine issued to such an individual could be financially crippling (September, 
2012:50). The results of this study show that most s 24G applications are from businesses. 
Therefore, the number of s 24G applications can be decreased by improving business’ 
knowledge of environmental law and therefore assisting them in avoiding non-compliances 
due to ignorance. Environmental education and monitoring programmes within companies 
should also serve to decrease non-compliances due to employee negligence.  
 
 
7.4  REDUCING NON-COMPLIANCE DUE TO WILLFUL DISREGARD 
Although the vast majority of s 24G applications are due to ignorance, some are due to willful 
disregard for environmental law. Willful offenders may follow the s 24G route in order to save 
time and money, or if they do not expect to be granted environmental authorisation through 
the traditional EIA process. Such offenders are the cause of the controversy surrounding s 
24G. Stakeholders and members of the public are concerned that s 24G provides an “escape 
route” for these criminals (September, 2012:2). The concerns surrounding willful offenders 
can be addressed by effective enforcement, so that the likelihood of being caught in non-
compliance is great. A high likelihood of being detected, as well as a substantial fine which 
negates all gains from illegal activity, should deter potential willful offenders. The possibility of 
profits from environmental crimes being forfeited has significant value as a deterrent (Craigie 
et al., 2009:54). This approach should be successful in deterring non-compliance, according 
to the deterrence theory, which describes the inverse relationship between the likelihood of 
punishment and the number of offenders (September, 2012:52).  
 
Compliance with the proper EIA process should be rewarded and not perceived to be a 
burden, and instead seen as a mechanism to avoid non-compliance and therefore avoid 
additional costs (September, 2012:63). In order to prevent the regulated community from 
preferring the s 24G option over the traditional EIA process in order to save time, the entire 
EIA process must be streamlined to be more efficient. Alberts (2011) emphasises the 
importance of changing the negative perceptions of the EIA process by streamlining the 
process. The amended 2014 EIA Regulations attempt to streamline the EIA process by 
requiring most of the specialist studies and assessment work to be done prior to submission 
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of the Application Form. This prevents EAPs from using the EIA process to formulate the 
project, thus saving time. However, delays are still experienced in the issuing and signing off 
of Environmental Authorisations. The lack of resources in government departments causing 
such backlogs must be addressed in order for the EIA process to operate at maximum 
efficiency. In addition, September (2012:63) suggests implementing norms and standards in 
certain sectors to reduce the need for EIAs. 
 
 
7.5  NECESSITY OF S 24G 
There are many issues and factors surrounding the s 24G process which make it difficult to 
determine its effectiveness as a deterrent for non-compliance with environmental law. 
Solutions which seem apparent, such as increasing the administrative fine, could have 
unintended consequences such as discouraging truly “innocent”, ignorant offenders from 
coming forward due to fear of a crippling administrative fine (CER, 2011). However, although 
s 24G has challenges, it is a necessary provision. For example, s 24G makes provision for 
emergency situations. Some actions taken during emergency situations may prevent 
environmental damage, or promote human well-being. In addition, since most offences are 
due to ignorance, s 24G allows offenders to restore compliance, and prevent future non-
compliance (September, 2012:49).  
 
7.6  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The OECD (2009:17) explains the importance of environmental compliance in contributing to 
good governance: “…create a predictable investment climate based on the rule of law, 
thereby stimulating economic development and innovation and enhancing markets for 
environmental goods and services.” Due to political corruption, unreliable electricity supply, 
and high crime rates, South Africa already risks a reputation as being an unpredictable 
investment climate. Not only will improving compliance with environmental law support 
compliance with the rule of law in general, it will also save resources (time and financial) for 
our already overburdened government officials.  
 
As suggested in Chapter 6, deterring non-compliance with environmental law does not rest 
solely on s 24G. Instead, considering the results of this research, the most effective method of 
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deterring non-compliance consists of a combination of an improved s 24G, and compliance 
promotion programmes to educate and assist businesses and individuals in understanding 
and implementing environmental regulations and monitoring programmes. Perhaps as 
knowledge of environmental laws improves, and companies implement effective 
environmental monitoring programmes, the rectification of unlawful commencement of listed 
activities will become obsolete, and can be phased out of the legislation.  
 
 
7.7  SUMMARY 
Despite a consistent increase in average amount of administrative fines every year since 
2006, the number of s 24G applications received by the DEA&DP has also increased 
consistently. This would appear to suggest that administrative fines are not acting as a 
deterrent for non-compliance with environmental law. However, it should not be assumed that 
an increasing number of s 24G applications reflects increasing non-compliance with NEMA 
EIA Regulations as the increasing number of s 24G applications could be due to increased 
awareness of environmental legislation, leading to members of the regulated community 
reporting their own environmental non-compliances in order to return to compliance. It is 
argued that the number of s 24G applications can be decreased by improving business’ 
knowledge of environmental law and therefore assisting them in avoiding non-compliances 
due to ignorance. Improving compliance with environmental law will support compliance with 
the rule of law in general, and will also save resources (time and financial) for government 
departments.  
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Addendum A: NEMA Sections 24F and 24G as amended 
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Please note that most Acts are published in English and another South African 
official language. Currently we only have capacity to publish the English versions. 
This means that this document will only contain even numbered pages as the other 
language is printed on uneven numbered pages. 
Government Gazette 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 Vol. 582                                    Cape Town      18 Dcember201 No. 37170
THE PRESIDENCY 
No. 1019                         18 December 2013 
It is hereby notified that the President has assented to the following Act, which is hereby 
published for general information:– 
Act No. 30 of 201: National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Act, 201 
AIDS HELPLINE: 0800-123-22 Prevention is the cure 
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2 No. 37170 GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 18 DECEMBER 2013
Act No. 30 of 2013 National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Act, 2013
GENERAL EXPLANATORY NOTE:
[ ] Words in bold type in square brackets indicate omissions from
existing enactments.
Words underlined with a solid line indicate insertions in
existing enactments.
ACT
To amend the National Environmental Management Act, 1998, so as to amend
certain deﬁnitions; to adjust the timeframes for the preparation of environmental
implementation plans and environmental management plans; to provide for the
process and procedure for submitting environment outlook reports; to promote or
facilitate the mainstreaming of integrated, environmentally sustainable and sound
management considerations into business processes, practices, technology and
decision-making across the economy; to enable, as appropriate, the use of spatial
tools, norms and standards and environmental management instruments in
decision-making as an alternative to environmental authorisation procedures; to
empower the Minister to restrict or prohibit development in speciﬁed geographical
areas; to empower the Minister or MEC to develop norms and standards for
activities, sectors and geographical areas; to clarify when the Minister is the
competent authority; to identify the Minister as the competent authority where the
MEC is usually the competent authority and a Cabinet decision stipulates that the
Minister must be the competent authority for activities related to a matter declared
as a national priority or matters related to such national priority; to empower the
Minister to take a decision in the place of the MEC under certain circumstances; to
allow for the transfer of rights and obligations relating to an environmental
authorisation; to provide legal clarity on the applicability of section 24G to the
unlawful commencement, undertaking or conducting of a waste management
activity under the National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008; to
provide legal clarity on the options available to the competent authority in
processing a section 24G application, to increase the administrative ﬁne and to
provide for criminal investigation and prosecution in certain circumstances; to
further provide for exemptions under certain circumstances and to clarify that
there will be no exemptions provided from obtaining an environmental
authorisation; to provide for the consideration of adopted environmental manage-
ment instruments when considering an environmental authorisation application;
to provide for emergency situations and to distinguish between an ‘‘incident’’ and
an ‘‘emergency situation’’; to provide for the power and the circumstances under
which an environmental management inspector may, without a warrant, seize any
mechanism of transport; to insert provisions to regulate products which have a
detrimental effect on the environment; to provide for all regulations to be tabled in
Parliament before promulgation; to add provisions regarding the delivery of
documents; to consolidate all offences and penalties under the Act; and to correct
(English text signed by the President)
(Assented to 14 December 2013)
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Act No. 30 of 2013 National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Act, 2013
or delete certain obsolete provisions; and to provide for matters connected
therewith.
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, asfollows:—
Amendment of section 1 of Act 107 of 1998, as amended by section 1 of Act 56 of
2002, section 1 of Act 46 of 2003, section 1 of Act 8 of 2004, section 60 of Act 39 of
2004, section 3 of Act 44 of 2008, section 1 of Act 62 of 2008 and section 4 of Act 14
of 2009
1. Section 1 of the National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (hereinafter
referred to as the principal Act), is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution for the deﬁnition of ‘‘activities’’ of the following
deﬁnition:
‘‘ ‘activities’, when used in Chapter 5, means policies, programmes,
processes, plans and projects identiﬁed in terms of section 24(2)(a) and
(b);’’;
(b) by the substitution for the deﬁnition of ‘‘commence’’ of the following
deﬁnition:
‘‘ ‘commence’, when used in Chapter 5, means the start of any physical
implementation in furtherance of a listed activity or speciﬁed activity,
including site preparation and any other [activity] action on the site [in
furtherance of a listed activity or speciﬁed activity] or the physical
implementation of a plan, policy, programme or process, but does not
include any [activity] action required for the purposes of an investigation
or feasibility study as long as such investigation or feasibility study does
not constitute a listed activity or speciﬁed activity;’’;
(c) by the substitution for the deﬁnition of ‘‘Department’’ of the following
deﬁnition:
‘‘ ‘Department’ means the Department [of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism] responsible for environmental affairs;’’;
(d) by the substitution for the deﬁnition of ‘‘Director-General’’ of the following
deﬁnition:
‘‘ ‘Director-General’ means the Director-General of [Environmental
Affairs and Tourism] the Department;’’;
(e) by the substitution for the deﬁnition of ‘‘environmental assessment practitio-
ner’’ of the following deﬁnition:
‘‘ ‘environmental assessment practitioner’, when used in Chapter 5,
means the individual responsible for the planning, management [and],
coordination or review of environmental impact assessments, strategic
environmental assessments, environmental management [plans]
programmes or any other appropriate environmental instruments intro-
duced through regulations;’’; and
(f) by the substitution for the deﬁnition of ‘‘speciﬁc environmental management
Act’’ of the following deﬁnition:
‘‘ ‘speciﬁc environmental management Act’ means—
(a) the Environment Conservation Act, 1989 (Act No. 73 of 1989);
(b) the National Water Act, 1998 (Act No. 36 of 1998);
(c) the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act,
2003 (Act No. 57 of 2003);
(d) the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004
(Act No. 10 of 2004); [or]
(e) the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, 2004
(Act No. 39 of 2004);
(f) the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Man-
agement Act, 2008 (Act No. 24 of 2008);
(g) the National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008 (Act
No. 59 of 2008); or
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(h) the World Heritage Convention Act, 1999 (Act No. 49 of 1999),
and includes any regulation or other subordinate legislation made in terms
of any of those Acts;’’.
Amendment of section 11 of Act 107 of 1998, as amended by section 7 of Act 14 of
2009
2. Section 11 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for
subsections (1) and (2) of the following subsections, respectively:
‘‘(1) Every national department listed in Schedule 1 as exercising functions
which may affect the environment and every [province] provincial department
responsible for environmental affairs must prepare an environmental implementa-
tion plan within [one year of the promulgation] ﬁve years of the coming into
operation of thisAct, and at [least every four] intervals of not more than ﬁve years
thereafter.
(2) Every national department listed in Schedule 2 as exercising functions
involving the management of the environment must prepare an environmental
management plan within [one year of the promulgation] ﬁve years of the coming
into operation of this Act, and at [least every four] intervals of not more than ﬁve
years thereafter.’’.
Insertion of section 16A in Act 107 of 1998
3. The following section is hereby inserted in the principal Act after section 16:
‘‘Environment outlook report
16A. (1) The Minister must within four years of the coming into
operation of the National Environmental Management Laws Second
AmendmentAct, 2013, prepare and publish a national environment outlook
report for the Republic and at intervals of not more than four years
thereafter.
(2) An MEC must—
(a) prepare and publish a provincial environment outlook report which
must contain the information determined by the Minister in terms of
subsection (4); and
(b) within four years of the coming into operation of the National
Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Act, 2013,
submit the report to the Minister and at intervals of not more than four
years thereafter.
(3) A metropolitan or a district municipality may prepare and publish a
municipal environment outlook report which must—
(a) contain the information determined by the Minister in terms of
subsection (4); and
(b) be submitted to the Minister and MEC within four years of the coming
into operation of the National Environmental Management Laws
Second Amendment Act, 2013 and at intervals of not more than four
years thereafter.
(4) The Minister must, for the purposes of the environment outlook
reports contemplated in subsection (2) and (3), by notice in the Gazette,
determine—
(a) the procedure for compiling the report;
(b) the format; and
(c) the content of the report.
(5) The Minister must prescribe the process for the submission,
evaluation and adoption of the environment outlook report.
(6) The relevant organs of state must co-operate with the Minister or
MEC by furnishing the Minister or MEC with information required for
inclusion in a national or a provincial environment outlook report.
(7) The Minister may, at the request of a province, assist with the
preparation of a provincial environment outlook report.
(8) The MEC may, at the request of a municipality, assist with the
preparation of a municipality’s environment outlook report.’’.
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Insertion of section 23A in Act 107 of 1998
4. The following section is hereby inserted in the principal Act after section 23:
‘‘Mainstreaming environmental management
23A. (1) The Minister may, with a view to promote or facilitate
integrated, environmentally sustainable and sound management, provide
for—
(a) the guidelines on the development, content and use of voluntary
organisation or sector based instruments; and
(b) the circumstances under which such instruments may be submitted to
and considered by the Minister.
(2) Such instruments must, at least—
(a) integrate environmental considerations into decision-making;
(b) provide for the implementation of best environmental practice;
(c) promote the progressive adoption of environmentally sound technol-
ogy; or
(d) promote sustainable consumption and production, including, where
appropriate, eco-endorsement or labelling.
(3) In his or her consideration of such instruments, the Minister may—
(a) as appropriate, engage with the organisation or sector concerned, as
the case may be, on the content and use of its instrument if the
organisation or sector concerned, as the case may be, requires the
Minister to endorse or approve such instrument; or
(b) endorse or approve such instrument.’’.
Amendment of section 24 of Act 107 of 1998, as substituted by section 2 of Act 62
of 2008
5. Section 24 of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution in subsection (2) for paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the
following paragraphs, respectively:
‘‘(b) geographical areas based on environmental attributes, and as
speciﬁed in spatial development tools adopted in the prescribed
manner by the [environmental authority] Minister or an MEC,
with the concurrence of the Minister, in which speciﬁed activities
may not commence without an environmental authorisation [by]
from the competent authority;
(c) geographical areas based on environmental attributes, and speciﬁed
in spatial [development] tools or environmental management
instruments, adopted in the prescribed manner by the [environmen-
tal authority] Minister or an MEC, with the concurrence of the
Minister, in which speciﬁed activities may be excluded from the
requirement to obtain an environmental authorisation from the
competent authority; [or]
(d) activities contemplated in paragraphs (a) and (b) that may
[commence without] be excluded from the requirement to obtain
an environmental authorisation from the competent authority, but
that must comply with prescribed norms or standards[:]; or’’;
(b) by the addition to subsection (2) of the following subparagraph:
‘‘(e) activities contemplated in paragraphs (a) and (b) that, based on an
environmental management instrument adopted in the prescribed
manner by the Minister or an MEC, with the concurrence of the
Minister, may be excluded from the requirement to obtain an
environmental authorisation from the competent authority:’’;
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(c) by the insertion after subsection (2) of the following subsection:
‘‘(2A) (a) In accordance with the risk averse and cautious approach
contemplated in section 2(4)(a)(vii) and subject to paragraphs (e) and (f),
the Minister may by notice in the Gazette prohibit or restrict the granting
of an environmental authorisation by the competent authority for a listed
or a speciﬁed activity in a speciﬁed geographical area for such period and
on such terms and conditions as the Minister may determine, if it is
necessary to ensure the protection of the environment, the conservation
of resources or sustainable development.
(b) Where the Minister has exercised his or her powers in terms of
paragraph (a), the competent authority must—
(i) not accept any further application for an environmental
authorisation for the identiﬁed listed or speciﬁed activity in the
identiﬁed geographical area until such time that the prohibition has
been lifted; and
(ii) deem all pending applications to have been withdrawn.
(c) The exercise of the Minister’s powers in terms of paragraph (a)
does not affect the undertaking of activities authorised by means of an
environmental authorisation prior to the prohibition or restriction
becoming effective.
(d) Where the prohibition or restriction affects the exercise of a power
that an MEC has in terms of this Act, the prohibition or restriction
contemplated in paragraph (a) may be published in the Gazette after
consulting the MEC concerned.
(e) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette—
(i) lift a prohibition or restriction made in terms of paragraph (a) if the
circumstances which caused the Minister exercise his or her powers
in terms of paragraph (a) no longer exist; or
(ii) amend any period, term or condition applicable to a prohibition or
restriction if the circumstances which caused the Minister to
exercise his or her powers in terms of paragraph (a) have changed.
(f) Before the exercise of his or her powers in terms of paragraph (a),
the Minister must—
(i) consult all Cabinet members whose areas of responsibility will be
affected by the exercise of the power;
(ii) in accordance with the principles of co-operative governance set out
in Chapter 3 of the Constitution, consult an MEC who will be
affected by the exercise of the power; and
(iii) publish a notice in the Gazette inviting members of the public to
submit to the Minister, within 30 days of publication of the notice in
the Gazette, written representations on the proposed prohibition or
restriction.’’;
(d) by the insertion in subsection (5) after paragraph (bA) of the following
paragraph:
‘‘(bB)laying down the procedure for the preparation, evaluation and
adoption of the instruments referred to in subsection (2)(c), (d) and
(e), including criteria or conditions to be included in such
instruments;’’; and
(e) by the substitution in subsection (10)(a) for subparagraph (i) of the following
subparagraph:
‘‘(i) develop or adopt norms or standards for—
(aa) a listed activity or speciﬁed activity contemplated in subsec-
tion (2)(a) and (b);
(bb) any part of the listed or speciﬁed activity referred to in item
(aa);
(cc) any sector relating to item (aa);
(dd) any geographical area relating to item (aa); or
(ee) any combination of the activities, sectors, geographical areas,
listed activities or speciﬁed activities referred to in items (aa),
(bb), (cc) and (dd);’’.
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Amendment of section 24C of Act 107 of 1998, as substituted by section 3 of Act 62
of 2008
6. Section 24C of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution in subsection (2) for the words preceding paragraph (a) of
the following words:
‘‘The Minister must be identiﬁed as the competent authority in terms of
subsection (1), unless otherwise agreed to in terms of section 24C(3), if
the activity—’’;
(b) by the substitution in subsection (2) for paragraph (a) of the following
paragraph:
‘‘(a) has implications for international environmental commitments or
relations, and where—
(i) it is identiﬁed by the Minister by notice in the Gazette; or
(ii) it is an activity that takes place in an area protected by means
of an international environmental instrument, other than—
(aa) a conservancy;
(bb) a protected natural environment;
(cc) a proclaimed private nature reserve;
(dd) a natural heritage site;
(ee) the buffer zone or transitional area of a biosphere reserve;
or
(ff) the buffer zone or transitional area of a world heritage
site;’’;
(c) by the deletion in subsection (2) of paragraph (b);
(d) by the insertion after subsection (2A) of the following subsection:
‘‘(2B) (a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, and in
the event of the Minister not being the competent authority, the Minister
must be identiﬁed as the competent authority where a Cabinet decision
stipulates that the Minister must be the competent authority for activities
related to a matter declared as a national priority or matters related to
such national priority.
(b) Notice must be given by the Minister in the Gazette approximately
90 days prior to the Cabinet decision referred to in paragraph (a).
(c) The notice referred to in paragraph (b) must as a minimum contain
the following information:
(i) The proposed decision to be considered by Cabinet and its rationale;
(ii) the approximate date of the consideration of the proposed decision
by Cabinet;
(iii) the proposed date on which the decision will come into effect;
(iv) the proposed time-frame for which the Minister will be the
competent authority, where appropriate;
(v) the activities contemplated in section 24(2)(a) or geographical areas
contemplated in section 24(2)(b); and
(vi) any transitional arrangements that may be applicable to applications
for environmental authorisations that already have been or are being
processed.
(d) Once Cabinet has made the decision referred to in paragraph (a),
the Minister must publish the decision by notice in the Gazette.’’; and
(e) by the addition of the following subsections:
‘‘(4) In accordance with section 125(2)(b) of the Constitution,
whenever an MEC fails to take a decision on an application for an
environmental authorisation within the time periods prescribed by this
Act, the applicant may apply to the Minister to take the decision.
(5) The applicant must notify the MEC in writing of the intention to
exercise the option in subsection (4) at least 30 days prior to the
exercising of such option.
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(6) The application contemplated in subsection (4) must, at least,
contain all the documents submitted to the MEC in order to enable the
Minister to take a decision.
(7) Before taking a decision contemplated in subsection (4), the
Minister must request the MEC to provide him or her with a report within
a speciﬁed time period on the status and causes of delay in the
application.
(8) After having received the report referred to in subsection (7) or in
the event that no response or no satisfactory response or cooperation is
received from the MEC within the speciﬁed time period the Minister
must, where appropriate—
(a) inform the applicant in the event that the MEC had complied with
the relevant prescripts;
(b) assist the MEC in accordance with section 125(3) of the Constitu-
tion to fulﬁl his or her obligations under this Act; or
(c) direct the MEC to take the decision and such other steps as the
Minister may deem necessary within a speciﬁed time period.
(9) In the event that the MEC fails to take the decision within the
speciﬁed time period or in any other manner fails to comply with the
directive contemplated in subsection (8)(c), the Minister must take the
decision within a reasonable period of time.
(10) The Minister must, simultaneously with the submission of the
annual report contemplated in section 40(1)(d)(i) of the Public Finance
Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999), submit a report to
Parliament setting out the details regarding the exercise of the power
referred to in subsection (8) during the previous ﬁnancial year.’’.
Amendment of section 24E of Act 107 of 1998, as inserted by section 3 of Act 8 of
2004
7. Section 24E of the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for
paragraph (c) of the following paragraph:
‘‘(c) provision is made for the transfer of rights and obligations [when there is a
change of ownership in the property].’’.
Amendment of section 24F of Act 107 of 1998, as inserted by section 3 of Act 8 of
2004 and amended by section 5 of Act 62 of 2008
8. Section 24F of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution for the heading of the following heading:
‘‘[Offences] Prohibitions relating to commencement or continuation
of listed activities’’; and
(b) by the deletion of subsections (2), (3) and (4).
Substitution of section 24G of Act 107 of 1998, as substituted by section 6 of Act 62
of 2008
9. The following section is hereby substituted for section 24G of the principal Act:
‘‘Consequences of unlawful commencement of activity
24G. (1) On application by a person who—
(a) has commenced with a listed or speciﬁed activity without an
environmental authorisation in contravention of section 24F(1);
(b) has commenced, undertaken or conducted a waste management
activity without a waste management licence in terms of section 20(b)
of the National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008 (Act
No. 59 of 2008),
the Minister, Minister responsible for mineral resources or MEC con-
cerned, as the case may be, may direct the applicant to—
(i) immediately cease the activity pending a decision on the application
submitted in terms of this subsection;
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(ii) investigate, evaluate and assess the impact of the activity on the
environment;
(iii) remedy any adverse effects of the activity on the environment;
(iv) cease, modify or control any act, activity, process or omission causing
pollution or environmental degradation;
(v) contain or prevent the movement of pollution or degradation of the
environment;
(vi) eliminate any source of pollution or degradation;
(vii) compile a report containing—
(aa) a description of the need and desirability of the activity;
(bb) an assessment of the nature, extent, duration and signiﬁcance of
the consequences for or impacts on the environment of the
activity, including the cumulative effects and the manner in
which the geographical, physical, biological, social, economic
and cultural aspects of the environment may be affected by the
proposed activity;
(cc) a description of mitigation measures undertaken or to be
undertaken in respect of the consequences for or impacts on the
environment of the activity;
(dd) a description of the public participation process followed during
the course of compiling the report, including all comments
received from interested and affected parties and an indication
of how the issues raised have been addressed;
(ee) an environmental management programme; or
(viii) provide such other information or undertake such further studies as the
Minister, Minister responsible for mineral resources or MEC, as the
case may be, may deem necessary.
(2) The Minister, Minister responsible for mineral resources or MEC
concerned must consider any report or information submitted in terms of
subsection (1) and thereafter may—
(a) refuse to issue an environmental authorisation; or
(b) issue an environmental authorisation to such person to continue,
conduct or undertake the activity subject to such conditions as the
Minister, Minister responsible for mineral resources or MEC may
deem necessary, which environmental authorisation shall only take
effect from the date on which it has been issued; or
(c) direct the applicant to provide further information or take further steps
prior to making a decision provided for in paragraph (a) or (b).
(3) The Minister, Minister responsible for mineral resources or MEC
may as part of his or her decision contemplated in subsection (2)(a), (b) or
(c) direct a person to—
(a) rehabilitate the environment within such time and subject to such
conditions as the Minister, Minister responsible for mineral resources
or MEC may deem necessary; or
(b) take any other steps necessary under the circumstances.
(4) A person contemplated in subsection (1) must pay an administrative
ﬁne, which may not exceed R5 million and which must be determined by
the competent authority, before the Minister, Minister responsible for
mineral resources or MEC concerned may act in terms of subsection (2)(a)
or (b).
(5) In considering a decision contemplated in subsection (2), the
Minister, Minister responsible for mineral resources or MEC may take into
account whether or not the applicant complied with any directive issued in
terms of subsection (1) or (2).
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(6) The submission of an application in terms of subsection (1) or the
granting of an environmental authorisation in terms of subsection (2)(b)
shall in no way derogate from—
(a) the environmental management inspector’s or the South African
Police Services’ authority to investigate any transgression in terms of
this Act or any speciﬁc environmental management Act;
(b) the National Prosecuting Authority’s legal authority to institute any
criminal prosecution.
(7) If, at any stage after the submission of an application in terms of
subsection (1), it comes to the attention of the Minister, Minister for mineral
resources or MEC, that the applicant is under criminal investigation for the
contravention of or failure to comply with section 24F(1) or section 20(b)
of the National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008 (Act No. 59
of 2008), the Minister, Minister responsible for mineral resources or MEC
may defer a decision to issue an environmental authorisation until such time
that the investigation is concluded and—
(a) the National Prosecuting Authority has decided not to institute
prosecution in respect of such contravention or failure;
(b) the applicant concerned is acquitted or found not guilty after
prosecution in respect of such contravention or failure has been
instituted; or
(c) the applicant concerned has been convicted by a court of law of an
offence in respect of such contravention or failure and the applicant
has in respect of the conviction exhausted all the recognised legal
proceedings pertaining to appeal or review.’’.
Amendment of section 24M of Act 107 of 1998, as inserted by section 8 of Act 62 of
2008
10. Section 24M of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution for subsection (1) of the following subsection:
‘‘(1) The Minister or MEC, as the case may be, may grant an
exemption from any provision of this Act, except from the provision of
section 24(4)(a) or the requirement to obtain an environmental
authorisation contemplated in section 24(2)(a) or (b).’’; and
(b) by the deletion in subsection (4) of the word ‘‘or’’ at the end of paragraph (b),
the insertion of the expression ‘‘; or’’ after the word ‘‘parties’’ at the end of
paragraph (c) and the addition to that subsection of the following paragraph:
‘‘(d) the activity is of national or provincial importance and is aimed at
preventing or mitigating serious harm to the environment or
property.’’.
Amendment of section 24O of Act 107 of 1998, as inserted by section 8 of Act 62 of
2008
11. Section 24O of the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution in
subsection (1)(b) for subparagraph (viii) of the following subparagraph:
‘‘(viii) any guidelines, departmental policies, and [decision making] environmental
management instruments that have been [developed or] adopted in the
prescribed manner by the Minister or MEC, with the concurrence of the
Minister, and any other information in the possession of the competent
authority that are relevant to the application; and’’.
Amendment of section 28 of Act 107 of 1998, as amended by section 12 of Act 14 of
2009
12. Section 28 of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution for subsection (4) of the following subsection:
‘‘(4) The Director-General or a provincial head of department may,
[after consultation with any other organ of state concerned and] after
having given adequate opportunity to affected persons to inform him or
her of their relevant interests, direct any person who [fails to take the
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measures required under subsection (1)] is causing, has caused or may
cause signiﬁcant pollution or degradation of the environment to—
(a) [investigate, evaluate and assess the impact of speciﬁc activities
and report thereon] cease any activity, operation or undertaking;
(b) [commence taking speciﬁc reasonable measures before a given
date] investigate, evaluate and assess the impact of speciﬁc
activities and report thereon;
(c) [diligently continue with those measures; and] commence taking
speciﬁc measures before a given date;
(d) [complete them before a speciﬁed reasonable date] diligently
continue with those measures; and
(e) complete those measures before a speciﬁed reasonable date:
Provided that the Director-General or a provincial head of department
may, if urgent action is necessary for the protection of the environment,
issue such directive, and consult and give such opportunity to inform as
soon thereafter as is reasonable.’’;
(b) by the substitution in subsection (5) for paragraph (e) of the following
paragraph:
‘‘(e) the desirability of the State fulﬁlling its role as custodian holding
the environment in public trust for the people; and’’;
(c) by the substitution for subsection (7) of the following subsection:
‘‘(7) Should a person fail to comply, or inadequately comply, with a
directive under subsection (4), the Director-General or a provincial head
of department [responsible for environmental affairs] may take
reasonable measures to remedy the situation or apply to a competent
court for appropriate relief.’’; and
(d) by the deletion of subsections (14) and (15).
Amendment of section 30 of Act 107 of 1998, as amended by section 13 of Act 14 of
2009
13. Section 30 of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution for the heading of the following heading:
‘‘Control of [emergency] incidents’’;
(b) by the substitution in subsection (1) for paragraph (a) of the following
paragraph:
‘‘(a) ‘incident’ means an unexpected, sudden and uncontrolled release
of a hazardous substance, including from a major emission, ﬁre or
explosion, that causes, has caused or may cause signiﬁcant harm to
the environment, human life or property;’’; and
(c) by the deletion of subsection (11).
Insertion of section 30A in Act 107 of 1998
14. The following section is hereby inserted in the principal Act after section 30:
‘‘Emergency situations
30A. (1) The competent authority may on its own initiative or on written
or oral request from a person, direct a person verbally or in writing to carry
out a listed or speciﬁed activity, without obtaining an environmental
authorisation contemplated in section 24(2)(a) or (b), in order to prevent or
contain an emergency situation or to prevent, contain or mitigate the effects
of the emergency situation.
(2) The request from the person referred to in subsection (1) must at least
include, where known—
(a) the nature, scope and possible impact of the emergency situation;
(b) the listed or speciﬁed activities that will be commenced with in
response to the emergency situation;
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(c) the cause of the emergency situation; and
(d) the proposed measures to prevent or to contain the emergency
situation or to prevent, contain or mitigate the effects of the emergency
situation.
(3) The competent authority may direct the person to undertake speciﬁc
measures within a speciﬁc time period in order to prevent or contain an
emergency situation or to prevent, contain or mitigate the effects of the
emergency situation.
(4) The verbal directive referred to in subsection (1) must be conﬁrmed
in writing at the earliest opportunity, which must be within seven days.
(5) Before making a decision contemplated in subsection (3), the
competent authority must at least, where information is available,
consider—
(a) the nature of the emergency situation;
(b) the information contained in the request referred to in subsection (2);
(c) whether the emergency situation was caused by or the fault of the
person;
(d) the principles in section 2;
(e) the risk of the impact on the environment as a result of the emergency
and the costs of the measures considered; and
(f) the risk of the impact on the environment of the emergency situation,
prevention, control or mitigation measures and the post-event mitiga-
tion or rehabilitation measures that may be required.
(6) If the competent authority decides not to issue a directive provided
for in subsection (1), the activity cannot commence or continue in the
absence of an environmental authorisation.
(7) In this section ‘emergency situation’means a situation that has arisen
suddenly that poses an imminent and serious threat to the environment,
human life or property, including a ‘disaster’ as deﬁned in section 1 of the
Disaster ManagementAct, 2002 (Act No. 57 of 2002), but does not include
an incident referred to in section 30 of this Act.’’.
Amendment of section 31J of Act 107 of 1998, as inserted by section 4 of Act 46 of
2003
15. Section 31J of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution in subsection (1) for the words preceding paragraph (a) of
the following words:
‘‘An environmental management inspector, within his or her mandate in
terms of section 31D, may, without a warrant, enter and search any
vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or search any pack-animal or any other
mechanism of transport, on reasonable suspicion that that vehicle, vessel,
aircraft[ or], pack animal or other mechanism of transport—;’’; and
(b) by the substitution for subsection (2) of the following subsection:
‘‘(2)An environmental management inspector may, without a warrant,
seize a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, pack-animal or any other mechanism of
transport or anything contained in or on any vehicle, vessel, aircraft [or],
pack-animal [that may be used as evidence in the prosecution of any
person for an offence in terms of this Act or a speciﬁc environmental
management Act] or other mechanism of transport—
(a) which is concerned in or is on reasonable grounds believed to be
concerned in the commission of an offence;
(b) which may afford evidence of the commission or suspected
commission of an offence;
(c) which is intended to be used or is on reasonable grounds believed to
be intended to be used in the commission of an offence; or
(d) which, on reasonable grounds, is being utilised in a manner that is
likely to cause signiﬁcant pollution, impact or degradation of the
environment,
in terms of this Act or a speciﬁc environmental management Act.’’.
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Amendment of section 31N of Act 107 of 1998, as inserted by section 4 of Act 46 of
2003 and amended by section 7 of Act 44 of 2008 and section 20 of Act 14 of 2009
16. Section 31N of the principalAct is hereby amended by the deletion of subsections
(1) and (3).
Amendment of section 31Q of Act 107 of 1998, as inserted by section 4 of Act 46 of
2003
17. Section 31Q of the principal Act is hereby amended by the deletion of subsection
(2).
Repeal of section 34A of Act 107 of 1998
18. Section 34A of the principal Act is hereby repealed.
Amendment of section 34H of Act 107 of 1998, as inserted by Act 14 of 2009
19. Section 34H of the principal Act is hereby amended by the addition of the
following subsection, the existing section becoming subsection (1):
‘‘(2) Where a competent authority is of the view that a more severe penalty could
be considered than those penalties referred to in section 49B, the competent
authority may request the National Prosecuting Authority to institute the criminal
proceedings in the High Court.’’.
Insertion of section 39A in Act 107 of 1998
20. The following section is hereby inserted in the principal Act after section 39:
‘‘Prohibition of certain products
39A. The Minister may from time to time regulate, prohibit or control the
production, sale, distribution, import or export of products that may have a
substantial detrimental effect on the environment.’’.
Amendment of section 44 of Act 107 of 1998, as amended by section 2 of Act 56 of
2002
21. Section 44 of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the deletion in subsection (1) of the word ‘‘and’’ at the end of paragraph
(aA) and the insertion after that paragraph of the following paragraphs:
‘‘(aB) dealing with the production, prohibition, control, sale, distribu-
tion, import or export of products that may have a substantial
detrimental effect on the environment;
(aC) relating to the procedure and criteria to be followed in the
determination of an administrative ﬁne in terms of section 24G;
(aD) relating to the procedure to be followed when oral requests are
made in terms of section 30A; and’’; and
(b) by the insertion after subsection (1) of the following subsections:
‘‘(1A) Any regulation made under subsection (1) must be made after
consultation with all Cabinet members whose areas of responsibility will
be affected.
(1B) Until such time that the regulations made under subsection (1)
have come into effect, the existing standard operating procedure, adopted
by the Minister for determining administrative ﬁnes in terms of section
24G, applies.’’.
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Amendment of section 47 of Act 107 of 1998, as amended by section 5 of Act 8 of
2004 and section 11 of Act 62 of 2008
22. Section 47 of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution for subsection (2) of the following subsection:
‘‘(2) The Minister must, [within] 30 days [after promulgating and
publishing] before the ﬁnal publication of any regulations made under
this Act, table the regulations in [the National Assembly and the
National Council of Provinces, and an MEC must so table the
regulations in the relevant provincial legislature or, if Parliament or
the provincial legislature is then not in session, within 30 days after
the beginning of the next ensuing session of Parliament or the
provincial legislature] Parliament.’’;
(b) by the insertion after subsection (2) of the following subsection:
‘‘(2A) An MEC must, 30 days before the ﬁnal publication of any
regulations made under this Act, table the regulations in the relevant
provincial legislature.’’; and
(c) by the deletion of subsection (3).
Amendment of section 47D ofAct 107 of 1998, as inserted by section 11 ofAct 46 of
2003
23. Section 47D of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the deletion in subsection (1)(b) of the word ‘‘or’’ at the end of
subparagraph (ii) and the insertion in subsection (1) after paragraph (b) of the
following paragraphs:
‘‘(bA) by faxing a copy of the notice or other document to the person, if
the person has a fax number;
(bB) by e-mailing a copy of the notice or other document to the person,
if the person has an e-mail address; or
(bC) by posting a copy of the notice or other document to the person by
ordinary mail, if the person has a postal address;’’; and
(b) by the substitution for subsection (2) of the following subsection:
‘‘(2) A notice or other document issued in terms of subsection (1)(b),
(bA), (bB), (bC) or (c) must be regarded as having come to the notice of
the person, unless the contrary is proved.’’.
Repeal of section 48 of Act 107 of 1998
24. Section 48 of the principal Act is hereby repealed.
Insertion of sections 49A and 49B in Act 107 of 1998
25. The following sections are hereby inserted in the principal Act after section 49:
‘‘Offences
49A. (1) A person is guilty of an offence if that person—
(a) commences with an activity in contravention of section 24F(1);
(b) fails to comply with any applicable norm or standard contemplated in
section 24(2)(d);
(c) fails to comply with or contravenes a condition of an environmental
authorisation granted for a listed activity or speciﬁed activity or an
approved environmental management programme;
(d) commences or continues with an activity in terms of section 24(2)(c),
(d) or (e) unless he or she complies with the procedures, criteria or
conditions speciﬁed by the Minister or MEC in any regulation made
under section 24(5)(bB);
(e) unlawfully and intentionally or negligently commits any act or
omission which causes signiﬁcant pollution or degradation of the
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environment or is likely to cause signiﬁcant pollution or degradation
of the environment;
(f) unlawfully and intentionally or negligently commit any act or
omission which detrimentally affects or is likely to detrimentally affect
the environment;
(g) fails to comply with a directive issued in terms of this Act;
(h) fails to comply with or contravenes any condition applicable to an
exemption granted in terms of section 24M;
(i) fails to comply with section 30(3), (4), (5) or (6);
(j) contravenes section 31(7) or (8);
(k) fails to comply with or contravenes a compliance notice issued in
terms of section 31L;
(l) discloses information about any other person if that information was
acquired while exercising or performing any power or duty in terms of
section 31Q(1);
(m) hinders or interferes with an environmental management inspector in
the execution of that inspector’s official duties;
(n) pretends to be an environmental management inspector, or the
interpreter or assistant of such an inspector;
(o) furnishes false or misleading information when complying with a
request of an environmental management inspector;
(p) fails to comply with a request of an environmental management
inspector.
(2) It is a defence to a charge in terms of subsection (1)(a) to show that
the activity was commenced or continued with in response to an incident or
emergency situation contemplated in section 30 or section 30A, as the case
may be, so as to protect human life, property or environment: Provided
that—
(a) in the case of an incident, the response is in compliance with the
obligations contemplated in section 30(4) and was necessary and
proportionate in relation to the threat to human life, property or
environment; and
(b) in the case of an emergency situation contemplated in section 30A, the
response is in compliance with a directive issued in terms of section
30A.
Penalties
49B. (1) A person convicted of an offence in terms of section 49A(1)(a),
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) is liable to a ﬁne not exceeding R10 million or to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both such ﬁne or
such imprisonment.
(2) A person convicted of an offence in terms of section 49A(1)(i), (j) or
(k) is liable to a ﬁne not exceeding R5 million or to imprisonment for a
period not exceeding 5 years, and in the case of a second or subsequent
conviction to a ﬁne not exceeding R10 million or to imprisonment for a
period not exceeding 10 years, and in both instances to both such ﬁne and
such imprisonment.
(3) A person convicted of an offence in terms of section 49A(1)(h), (l),
(m), (n), (o) or (p) is liable to a ﬁne or to imprisonment for a period not
exceeding one year, or to both a ﬁne and such imprisonment.’’.
Substitution of certain expressions in Act 107 of 1998
26. The principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the substitution for the expression ‘‘Minister of Minerals and Energy’’,
wherever it occurs, of the expression ‘‘Minister responsible for mineral
resources’’;
(b) by the substitution for the expression ‘‘Minister of Water Affairs and
Forestry’’, wherever it occurs, of the expression ‘‘Minister responsible for
water affairs’’; and
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(c) by the substitution for the expression ‘‘Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism’’, wherever it occurs, of the expression ‘‘Minister responsible for
environmental affairs.’’.
Amendment of Schedule 3 toAct 107 of 1998, as substituted by section 8 ofAct 8 of
2004 and amended by section 25 of Act 14 of 2009
27. Schedule 3 to the principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for the
wording in the sixteenth row of the third column of the following wording:
‘‘[Sections 24F(1) and (2), 24G(3), 28(14), 30(11), 31N(1) and 34A(a), (b), (c)
and (d)] Section 49A’’.
Amendment of Table of Contents of Act 107 of 1998
28. The Table of Contents of the principal Act is hereby amended—
(a) by the insertion after item 16 of the following item:
‘‘16A. Environment Outlook Report’’;
(b) by the insertion after item 23 of the following item:
‘‘23A. Mainstreaming environmental management’’;
(c) by the substitution for item 24F of the following item:
‘‘24F. Prohibitions relating to commencement or continuation of listed
activities’’;
(d) by the substitution for item 24G of the following item:
‘‘24G. Consequences of unlawful commencement of activity’’;
(e) by the substitution for item 30 of the following item:
‘‘30. Control of incidents’’;
(f) by the insertion after item 30 of the following item:
‘‘30A. Emergency situations’’;
(g) by the insertion after item 39 of the following item:
‘‘39A. Prohibition of certain products’’; and
(h) by the insertion after item 49 of the following items:
‘‘49A. Offences
49B. Penalties’’.
Short title and commencement
29. (1) This Act is called the National Environmental Management Laws Second
AmendmentAct, 2013, and all the sections of theAct, except for sections 3, 4, 5 and 14,
come into operation on the date of publication of thisAct by the President in the Gazette
in terms of section 81 of the Constitution.
(2) Sections 3, 4, 5 and 14 take effect on a date 12 months from the date contemplated
in subsection (1) or on a date ﬁxed by the President by proclamation in the Gazette,
whichever is the earliest.
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12	  May	  2011	  
	  
Dear	  Linda	  
	  
CONCERNS	  ABOUT	  AND	  SUGGESTIONS	  FOR	  AMENDMENT	  OF	  SECTIONS	  24F	  AND	  24G	  OF	  THE	  NATIONAL	  
ENVIRONMENTAL	  MANAGEMENT	  ACT,	  1998	  (ACT	  107	  OF	  1998)	  
	  
Thank	   you	   for	   this	   opportunity	   to	   provide	   inputs	   into	   a	   proposed	   amendment	   of	   section	   24G	   of	   the	   National	  
Environmental	   Management	   Act,	   1998	   (Act	   107	   of	   1998)	   (NEMA).	   It	   appears	   that	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
rectification	  mechanism	  in	  s.24G	  has	  had	  unfortunate	  unintended	  consequences	  for	  environmental	  management,	  
and	  it	  has	  been	  a	  thorn	  in	  the	  flesh	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  for	  some	  years.	  
	  
The	  Centre	  for	  Environmental	  Rights	  spent	  the	  last	  few	  weeks	  collecting	  and	  collating	  comments	  and	  suggestions	  
received	   from	   the	   Centre’s	   wider	   stakeholder	   network	   on	   s.24G,	   and	   now	   attach	   those	   comments	   to	   this	  
submission	   (Annexure	   B).	   Most	   of	   those	   who	   commented	   were	   representatives	   of	   non-­‐government	   and	  
community	   organisations	   (plus	   a	   few	   academics),	   but	   we	   have	   also	   had	   some	   comments	   from	   experienced	  
environmental	   assessment	   practitioners	   and	   other	   consultants	   who	   work	   with	   s.24G	   on	   a	   regular	   basis.	   The	  
individuals	   and	   organisations	   also	   represent	   large	   portions	   of	   the	   country,	   including	   Gauteng,	   Western	   Cape,	  
KwaZulu-­‐Natal.	  
	  
Several	  recurring	  and	  remarkably	  consistent	  themes	  appear	  from	  these	  comments:	  
	  
1. insufficient	  provision	  within	  s.24G	  to	  cater	  for	  different	  responses	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  fault.	  Intentional	  
and	  repeat	  offenders	  are	  let	  off	  too	  easily,	  while	  innocent	  offenders	  are	  prejudiced	  by	  the	  criminal	  stigma	  
that	  attaches	  to	  s.24G	  in	  the	  context	  of	  strict	  liability	  under	  s.24F;	  
2. administrative	   and	   criminal	   fines	   that	   are	   way	   too	   low	   to	   constitute	   a	   proper	   disincentive	   for	   non-­‐
compliance.	  There	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  tendency	  for	  fines	  to	  be	  reduced	  on	  appeal.	  There	  is	  also	  general	  
concern	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  fines,	  giving	  rise	  to	  concerns	  about	  corruption;	  
3. the	   cynical	   abuse	   of	   s.24G	   whereby	   companies	   simply	   budget	   for	   the	   administrative	   fine	   and	   then	  
proceed	  with	  contraventions	  of	  s.24F	  (and	  do	  not	  stop	  when	  caught	  out).	  There	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  trend	  
to	  rely	  on	  the	  emergency	  defence	  in	  s.24F(3)	  to	  criminal	  liability,	  followed	  by	  a	  s.24G	  application;	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4. the	  phenomenon	  of	   repeat	   offenders,	   and	   the	  need	   for	   a	   register	   of	   offenders,	   particularly	   to	   capture	  
violators	  who	  commit	  s.24F	  offences	  in	  different	  provinces;	  
5. a	  perception	  that	  s.24G	  applications	  always	  end	  in	  authorisations	  being	  granted;	  
6. a	  perception	  that	  authorities	  are	  less	  keen	  to	  prosecute	  contraventions	  of	  s.24F	  where	  s.24G	  applications	  
are	  submitted,	  effectively	  creating	  an	  escape	  route	  from	  criminal	  prosecution	  for	  violators;	  
7. a	   lack	   of	   clarity	   and	   insufficient	   communication	   to	   interested	   and	   affected	   parties	   about	   the	   process	  
around	  the	  s.24G	  application	  and	  particularly	  public	  participation.	  There	  is	  also	  concern	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  
consideration	  of	  alternatives	  in	  a	  s.24G	  application,	  as	  would	  be	  required	  in	  an	  EIA;	  and	  
8. generally	   speaking,	   most	   (but	   not	   all)	   participants	   felt	   that	   s.24G	   did	   serve	   some	   purpose,	   and	   were	  
opposed	  to	  its	  abolition.	  
	  
Against	   the	   background	   of	   these	   concerns,	   the	   Centre	   has	   drafted	   amendments	   to	   s.24F	   and	   s.24G	   for	  
consideration	  by	  the	  Department.	  We	  attach	  as	  Annexure	  A	  our	  proposed	  amendments,	  and	  attach	  as	  Annexure	  
B	  a	  marked-­‐up	  version	  of	  s.24F	  and	  s.24G	  with	  explanatory	  notes.	  
	  
We	  understand	  that	  our	  proposal	  requires	  officials	  in	  the	  competent	  authority	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  legal	  concepts	  
of	  guilt	  and	  the	  different	  legal	  requirements	  for	  intention,	  negligence	  and	  innocence.	  However	  we	  do	  not	  believe	  
that	  this	  is	  insurmountable,	  and	  can	  be	  addressed	  through	  internal	  guidelines.	  
	  
We	  hope	  that	  you	  will	  give	  serious	  consideration	  to	  our	  proposal.	  Please	  let	  me	  know	  if	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  or	  
requests	   in	   relation	   to	   this	   proposal	   –	   we	   have	   obviously	   given	   this	   extensive	   thought.	   Thanks	   again	   for	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  provide	  input.	  	  
	  
Yours	  sincerely	  
	  
	  
Melissa	  Fourie	  
Executive	  Director
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ANNEXURE	  A	  
	  
24F	  	  	  	  	  Offences	  relating	  to	  commencement	  or	  continuation	  of	  listed	  activity	  	  
	  
(1)	   Notwithstanding	  any	  other	  Act,	  no	  person	  may-­‐	  	  
(a)	   commence	  an	  activity	   listed	  or	   specified	   in	   terms	  of	   section	  24	   (2)	   (a)	  or	   (b)	  unless	   the	  competent	  
authority	  or	   the	  Minister	  of	  Mineral	  Resources,	  as	   the	  case	  may	  be,	  has	  granted	  an	  environmental	  
authorisation	  for	  the	  activity;	  or	  	  
(b)	   commence	  and	  continue	  an	  activity	  listed	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24	  (2)	  (d)	  unless	  it	  is	  done	  in	  terms	  of	  
an	  applicable	  norm	  or	  standard.	  	  
	  
(2)	   It	  is	  an	  offence	  for	  any	  person	  to	  fail	  to	  comply	  with	  or	  to	  contravene-­‐	  	  
(a)	   subsection	  (1)(a)	  ;	  	  
(b)	   subsection	  (1)	  (b)	  ;	  	  
(c)	   the	  conditions	  applicable	  to	  any	  environmental	  authorisation	  granted	  for	  a	  listed	  activity	  or	  specified	  
activity;	  	  
(d)	   any	  condition	  applicable	  to	  an	  exemption	  granted	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24M;	  or	  	  
(e)	   an	  approved	  environmental	  management	  programme.	  	  
	  
(3)	   It	  is	  a	  defence	  to	  a	  charge	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (2)	  to	  show	  that	  the	  activity	  was	  commenced	  or	  continued	  
in	  response	  to	  an	  emergency	  so	  as	  to	  protect	  human	  life,	  property	  or	  the	  environment.	  	  
	  
(4)	   A	  person	  convicted	  of	  an	  offence	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (2)	  is	  liable	  to:	  
(a)	   a	  fine	  not	  exceeding	  R5	  million	  or	  to	  imprisonment	  for	  a	  period	  not	  exceeding	  ten	  years,	  or	  to	  both	  
such	  fine	  and	  such	  imprisonment,	  if	  that	  person	  is	  a	  natural	  person;	  and	  
(b)	   a	   fine	   not	   exceeding	   the	   greater	   of	   10%	   of	   the	   person’s	   annual	   turnover	   in	   the	   Republic	   and	   its	  
exports	  from	  the	  Republic	  during	  the	  person’s	  preceding	  financial	  year,	  or	  R10	  million,	  if	  that	  person	  
is	  not	  a	  natural	  person.	  
	  
(5)	   When	  determining	  the	  penalty	  under	  subsection	  (4),	  a	  court	  must	  have	  regard	  all	  relevant	  factors,	  including	  
the	  following:	  
(a)	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   intention	   or	   negligence	   of	   the	   person	   who	   committed	   the	   offence	   in	   terms	   of	  
section	  24F	  (2)	  (a);	  	  
(b)	   the	  severity	  of	  the	  offence	   in	  terms	  of	   its	   impact,	  or	  potential	   impact,	  on	  health,	  well-­‐being,	  safety	  
and	  the	  environment;	  
(c)	   the	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  offence;	  
(d)	   the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence;	  
(e)	   the	  monetary	  or	  other	  benefits	  which	  accrued	   to	   the	  convicted	  person	   through	   the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence;	  
(f)	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence	  has	  cooperated	  with	  authorities;	  	  
(h)	   whether	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence	  has	  previously	  been	  found	  in	  contravention	  of	  this	  
act	  or	  any	  specific	  environmental	  management	  Act;	  and	  
(i)	   the	  amount	  of	  any	  administrative	  fine	  paid	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24G	  (3)	  (b).	  
	  
24G	  	  	  	  	  Additional	  consequences	  of	  unlawful	  commencement	  or	  continuation	  of	  listed	  activity	  	  
	  
(1)	   A	   person	   who	   has	   committed	   an	   offence	   in	   terms	   of	   section	   24F	   (2)	   (a)	   must	   immediately	   cease	   the	  
commencement	   or	   continuation	   of	   the	   activity	   or	   activities	   that	   constituted	   the	   offence	   and	   take	  
reasonable	  measures	  to	  mitigate	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  offence	  
and	  to	  prevent	  further	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment.	  
	  
	  (2)	   A	  person	  who	  has	  committed	  an	  offence	   in	  terms	  of	  section	  24F	  (2)	   (a)	  and	  who	   is	  unable	  to	  show,	  on	  a	  
balance	  of	  probabilities,	  that	  the	  offence	  was	  not	  committed	  intentionally,	  must,	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  
competent	  authority	  or	  the	  Minister	  of	  Mineral	  Resources,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be,	  rehabilitate	  all	  degradation	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of	   the	   environment	   caused	   by	   the	   commission	   of	   the	   offence,	   without	   the	   option	   of	   applying	   for	   an	  
environmental	  authorisation	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (3).	  
	  
	  (3)	   A	   person	   who	   has	   committed	   an	   offence	   in	   terms	   of	   section	   24F	   (2)	   (a)	   and	   who,	   on	   a	   balance	   of	  
probabilities,	  is	  able	  to	  show	  that	  the	  offence	  was	  not	  committed	  intentionally	  but	  is	  unable	  to	  show	  that	  
the	  offence	  was	  not	  committed	  negligently,	  and	  who	  has	  –	  
(a)	   complied	  with	  subsection	  (1);	  and	  
(b)	   paid	  an	  administrative	  fine	  determined	  by	  the	  competent	  authority	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (7)	  below	  -­‐	  
may	  be	  directed	  by	   the	  Minister,	  Minister	  of	  Mineral	  Resources	  or	  MEC	  concerned,	   as	   the	   case	  may	  be,	  
either	  to:	  
(i)	   wholly	  or	   in	  part	  rehabilitate	  all	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence,	  without	   the	  option	  of	   applying	   for	   an	  environmental	   authorisation	   in	  accordance	  
with	  subsection	  (5);	  
(ii)	   wholly	  or	   in	  part	  rehabilitate	  all	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence,	  and	  apply	  for	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	  in	  accordance	  with	  subsection	  (5);	  or	  
(iii)	   apply	  for	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	  in	  accordance	  with	  subsection	  (5).	  
	  
(4)	   Subsection	  (3)	  applies	  to	  a	  person	  who	  has	  committed	  an	  offence	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24F	  (2)	  (a)	  and	  who	  is	  
able	  to	  show,	  on	  a	  balance	  of	  probabilities,	  that	  the	  offence	  was	  not	  committed	  intentionally	  or	  negligently,	  
except	  that	  such	  a	  person	  does	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  administrative	  fine	  in	  subsection	  (3)	  (b).	  
	  
(5)	   Where	  the	  Minister,	  Minister	  of	  Mineral	  Resources	  or	  MEC	  concerned,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be,	  has	  directed	  a	  
person	  to	  apply	  for	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  section,	  that	  person	  must:	  
(a)	  	  	  	  	  compile	  a	  report	  containing	  -­‐	  	  
(i)	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   nature,	   extent,	   duration	   and	   significance	   of	   the	   consequences	   for	   or	  
impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  activity,	  including	  the	  cumulative	  effects;	  	  
(ii)	   a	   description	   of	   mitigation	   measures	   undertaken	   or	   to	   be	   undertaken	   in	   respect	   of	   the	  
consequences	  for	  or	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  activity;	  	  
(iii)	   a	   description	   of	   the	   public	   participation	   process	   followed	   during	   the	   course	   of	   compiling	   the	  
report,	   including	  all	  comments	  received	  from	  interested	  and	  affected	  parties	  and	  an	  indication	  
of	  how	  issues	  raised	  have	  been	  addressed;	  	  
(iv)	   an	  environmental	  management	  programme;	  and	  	  
(b)	  	  	  	  	  provide	  such	  other	  information	  or	  undertake	  such	  further	  studies	  as	  the	  Minister	  or	  MEC,	  as	  the	  case	  
may	  be,	  may	  deem	  necessary.	  	  
	  
(6)	   The	  Minister	  or	  MEC	  concerned	  must	  consider	  any	  reports	  or	  information	  submitted	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  
(5)	  and	  thereafter	  may-­‐	  	  
(a)	  	  	  	  	  direct	  the	  person	  to	  rehabilitate	  all	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  
offence	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24F(2)	  (a)	  within	  such	  time	  and	  subject	  to	  such	  conditions	  as	  the	  Minister	  
or	  MEC	  may	  deem	  necessary;	  or	  	  
(b)	   	   	   	   	   issue	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	   to	  such	  person	  subject	   to	   such	  conditions	  as	   the	  Minister	  or	  
MEC	  may	  deem	  necessary.	  	  
	  
(7)	   The	   administrative	   fine	   payable	   in	   terms	   of	   this	   section	   may	   not	   exceed	   R10	   million	   and	   must	   be	  
determined	  by	  the	  competent	  authority	  having	  regard	  to	  all	  relevant	  factors,	  including	  the	  following:	  
(a)	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   intention	   or	   negligence	   of	   the	   person	   who	   committed	   the	   offence	   in	   terms	   of	  
section	  24F(2)(a);	  	  
(b)	   the	  severity	  of	  the	  offence	   in	  terms	  of	   its	   impact,	  or	  potential	   impact,	  on	  health,	  well-­‐being,	  safety	  
and	  the	  environment;	  
(c)	   the	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  offence;	  
(d)	   the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence;	  
(e)	   the	  monetary	  or	  other	  benefits	  which	  accrued	   to	   the	  convicted	  person	   through	   the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence;	  
(f)	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence	  has	  cooperated	  with	  authorities;	  and	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(h)	   whether	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence	  has	  previously	  been	  found	  in	  contravention	  of	  this	  
act	  or	  any	  specific	  environmental	  management	  Act.	  
	  
(8)	   Except	   for	   a	   person	   mentioned	   in	   subsection	   (4),	   no	   application	   in	   terms	   of	   subsection	   (3)	   or	   any	  
environmental	  authorisation	  issued	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (6)	  (b)	  shall	  derogate	  from	  liability	  under	  section	  
24F(2).	  
	  
(9)	   A	  person	  who	  fails	  to	  comply	  with	  subsection	  (1)	  or	  a	  directive	  contemplated	  in	  subsection	  (3)	  or	  (4)	  or	  who	  
contravenes	  or	   fails	   to	  comply	  with	  a	  condition	  contemplated	   in	  subsection	   (6)	   (b)	   is	  guilty	  of	  an	  offence	  
and	  liable	  on	  conviction	  to	  a	  penalty	  contemplated	  in	  section	  24F	  (4).	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ANNEXURE	  B:	  MARKED-­‐UP,	  WITH	  EXPLANATORY	  NOTES	  
	  
24F	  	  	  	  	  Offences	  relating	  to	  commencement	  or	  continuation	  of	  listed	  activity	  	  
	  
(1)	   Notwithstanding	  any	  other	  Act,	  no	  person	  may-­‐	  	  
(a)	   commence	  an	  activity	   listed	  or	   specified	   in	   terms	  of	   section	  24	   (2)	   (a)	  or	   (b)	  unless	   the	  competent	  
authority	  or	   the	  Minister	  of	  Mineral	  Resources,	  as	   the	  case	  may	  be,	  has	  granted	  an	  environmental	  
authorisation	  for	  the	  activity;	  or	  	  
(b)	   commence	  and	  continue	  an	  activity	  listed	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24	  (2)	  (d)	  unless	  it	  is	  done	  in	  terms	  of	  
an	  applicable	  norm	  or	  standard.	  	  
	  
(2)	   It	  is	  an	  offence	  for	  any	  person	  to	  fail	  to	  comply	  with	  or	  to	  contravene-­‐	  	  
(a)	   subsection	  (1)(a)	  ;	  	  
(b)	   subsection	  (1)	  (b)	  ;	  	  
(c)	   the	  conditions	  applicable	  to	  any	  environmental	  authorisation	  granted	  for	  a	  listed	  activity	  or	  specified	  
activity;	  	  
(d)	   any	  condition	  applicable	  to	  an	  exemption	  granted	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24M;	  or	  	  
(e)	   an	  approved	  environmental	  management	  programme.	  	  
	  
(3)	   It	  is	  a	  defence	  to	  a	  charge	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (2)	  to	  show	  that	  the	  activity	  was	  commenced	  or	  continued	  
in	  response	  to	  an	  emergency	  so	  as	  to	  protect	  human	  life,	  property	  or	  the	  environment.	  	  
	  
(4)	   A	  person	  convicted	  of	  an	  offence	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (2)	  is	  liable	  to:	  
(a)	   a	  fine	  not	  exceeding	  R5	  million	  or	  to	  imprisonment	  for	  a	  period	  not	  exceeding	  ten	  years,	  or	  to	  both	  
such	  fine	  and	  such	  imprisonment,	  if	  that	  person	  is	  a	  natural	  person;	  and	  
(b)	   a	   fine	   not	   exceeding	   the	   greater	   of	   10%	   of	   the	   person’s	   annual	   turnover	   in	   the	   Republic	   and	   its	  
exports	  from	  the	  Republic	  during	  the	  person’s	  preceding	  financial	  year,	  or	  R10	  million,	  if	  that	  person	  
is	  not	  a	  natural	  person.	  
	  
Note:	   The	   objective	   of	   this	   subsection	   (4)	   is	   to	   ensure	   a	   criminal	   fine	   for	   bigger	   companies	   that	   is	   a	   proper	  
disincentive	  to	  contravention	  of	  s.24F.	  This	  penalty	  formulation	  in	  (ii)	  is	  based	  on	  s.59(2)	  of	  the	  Competition	  Act.	  
	  
(5)	   When	  determining	  the	  penalty	  under	  subsection	  (4),	  a	  court	  must	  have	  regard	  all	  relevant	  factors,	  including	  
the	  following:	  
(a)	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   intention	   or	   negligence	   of	   the	   person	   who	   committed	   the	   offence	   in	   terms	   of	  
section	  24F	  (2)	  (a);	  	  
(b)	   the	  severity	  of	  the	  offence	   in	  terms	  of	   its	   impact,	  or	  potential	   impact,	  on	  health,	  well-­‐being,	  safety	  
and	  the	  environment;	  
(c)	   the	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  offence;	  
(d)	   the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence;	  
(e)	   the	  monetary	  or	  other	  benefits	  which	  accrued	   to	   the	  convicted	  person	   through	   the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence;	  
(f)	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence	  has	  cooperated	  with	  authorities;	  	  
(h)	   whether	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence	  has	  previously	  been	  found	  in	  contravention	  of	  this	  
act	  or	  any	  specific	  environmental	  management	  Act;	  and	  
(i)	   the	  amount	  of	  any	  administrative	  fine	  paid	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24G	  (3)	  (b).	  
	  
Note:	  This	  provision	  is	  intended	  to	  give	  guidance	  to	  the	  court	  deciding	  an	  appropriate	  sentence	  (and	  of	  course	  for	  
the	   parties	   involved	   in	   negotiations	   for	   a	   plea	   and	   sentence	   agreement).	   The	   particular	   factors	   are	   based	   on	   a	  
combination	  of	  the	  factors	  for	  determining	  administrative	  penalties	  set	  out	  in	  s.59(3)	  of	  the	  Competition	  Act	  and	  
the	   factors	   for	   criminal	   fines	   set	  out	   in	   s.52	  of	   the	  National	  Environmental	  Management:	  Air	  Quality	  Act,	  2004.	  
Note,	  in	  particular,	  the	  reference	  to	  repeat	  offenders	  in	  (h),	  and	  the	  requirement	  that	  administrative	  penalties	  paid	  
under	   s.24G	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   the	   case	   of	   negligent	   offenders	   (as	   appears	   below,	   intentional	  
offenders	  never	  pay	  an	  administrative	  fine	  and	  cannot	  apply	  for	  rectification).	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24G	  	  	  	  	  Additional	  consequences	  of	  unlawful	  commencement	  or	  continuation	  of	  listed	  activity	  	  
	  
Note:	  We	  think	   it’s	   important	   to	   take	  out	   the	   reference	   to	  “rectification”	   to	  change	  the	  perceptions	  around	  this	  
section.	  
	  
(1)	   A	   person	   who	   has	   committed	   an	   offence	   in	   terms	   of	   section	   24F	   (2)	   (a)	   must	   immediately	   cease	   the	  
commencement	   or	   continuation	   of	   the	   activity	   or	   activities	   that	   constituted	   the	   offence	   and	   take	  
reasonable	  measures	  to	  mitigate	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  offence	  
and	  to	  prevent	  further	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment.	  
	  
Note:	  This	  provision	  creates	  a	  general	  obligation	  on	  any	  person	  that	  has	  contravened	  s.24F	  to	  cease	  what	  they’re	  
doing	  and	  to	  put	  in	  place	  measures	  not	  to	  make	  the	  damage	  worse.	  This	  is	  the	  “holding	  pattern”	  while	  decisions	  
are	   made	   under	   the	   rest	   of	   s.24G.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   s.24G(1),	   EMIs	   can	   issue	   a	   further	  
compliance	  notice.	  
	  
(2)	   A	  person	  who	  has	  committed	  an	  offence	   in	  terms	  of	  section	  24F	  (2)	   (a)	  and	  who	   is	  unable	  to	  show,	  on	  a	  
balance	  of	  probabilities,	  that	  the	  offence	  was	  not	  committed	  intentionally,	  must,	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  
competent	  authority	  or	  the	  Minister	  of	  Mineral	  Resources,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be,	  rehabilitate	  all	  degradation	  
of	   the	   environment	   caused	   by	   the	   commission	   of	   the	   offence,	   without	   the	   option	   of	   applying	   for	   an	  
environmental	  authorisation	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (3).	  
	  
Note:	  	  
• A	  person	  who	   intentionally	   commences	   or	   continues	  with	   a	   listed	  activity	  without	   authorisation	   cannot	  
apply	  for	  rectification,	  and	  must	  simply	  cease	  and	  rehabilitate.	  This	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  cynical	  use	  of	  s.24G	  
to	  avoid	  conducting	  an	  EIA.	  
• Note	   that	   the	   onus	   is	   reverse	   one	   –	   it	   is	   the	   violator	  who	   has	   to	   prove	   to	   authorities,	   on	   a	   balance	   of	  
probabilities,	   that	   the	   offence	   was	   committed	   without	   the	   intention	   to	   do	   so.	   	   This	   envisages	  
representations	   made	   by	   the	   offender	   to	   the	   competent	   authority,	   who	   would	   make	   a	   decision	   on	   a	  
balance	   of	   probabilities.	   That	   decision,	   like	   any	   administrative	   action,	   would	   be	   subject	   to	   appeal	   and	  
review.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  this	  does	  not	  trigger	  concerns	  about	  reverse	  onuses	  in	  the	  context	  of	  criminal	  
proceedings	  that	  could	  fall	  foul	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  in	  s.35	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  
• Importantly,	  repeat	  offenders	  would	  normally	  fall	   into	  this	  category	  –	  once	  you’ve	  been	  caught	  by	  s.24G	  
on	   the	  basis	  of	  negligence	  or	   innocence,	   it	  would	  be	  virtually	   impossible	   to	  argue	   that	  you	   fall	   into	  any	  
other	  category	  but	  the	  intentional	  one.	  
• Because	   there	   is	   no	   rectification	   application	   available,	   there	   can	   be	   no	   administrative	   fine	   –	   the	   fine	  
payable	  by	  the	  person	  will	  be	  a	  criminal	  fine	  levied	  by	  a	  court.	  
	  
(3)	   A	   person	   who	   has	   committed	   an	   offence	   in	   terms	   of	   section	   24F	   (2)	   (a)	   and	   who,	   on	   a	   balance	   of	  
probabilities,	  is	  able	  to	  show	  that	  the	  offence	  was	  not	  committed	  intentionally	  but	  is	  unable	  to	  show	  that	  
the	  offence	  was	  not	  committed	  negligently,	  and	  who	  has	  –	  
(a)	   complied	  with	  subsection	  (1);	  and	  
(b)	   paid	  an	  administrative	  fine	  determined	  by	  the	  competent	  authority	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (7)	  below	  -­‐	  
may	  be	  directed	  by	   the	  Minister,	  Minister	  of	  Mineral	  Resources	  or	  MEC	  concerned,	   as	   the	   case	  may	  be,	  
either	  to:	  
(i)	   wholly	  or	   in	  part	  rehabilitate	  all	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence,	  without	   the	  option	  of	   applying	   for	   an	  environmental	   authorisation	   in	  accordance	  
with	  subsection	  (5);	  
(ii)	   wholly	  or	   in	  part	  rehabilitate	  all	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence,	  and	  apply	  for	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	  in	  accordance	  with	  subsection	  (5);	  or	  
(iii)	   apply	  for	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	  in	  accordance	  with	  subsection	  (5).	  
	  
Note:	   This	   provision	   incorporates	   the	   current	   version	  of	   s24G	  but	  makes	   it	   applicable	   only	   to	   parties	  who	  have	  
negligently	  commenced	  activities	  without	  authorisation,	  i.e.	  should	  have	  known	  that	  there	  was	  a	  requirement	  to	  
apply	   but	   failed	   to	   do	   so,	   or	   should	   have	   had	   better	   control	   over	   the	   subcontractors	  who	   illegally	   commenced	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without	  the	  authorisation	  being	  in	  place.	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  offender	  must	  stop,	  contain	  all	  damage	  and	  pay	  the	  
fine	  before	  the	  authorities	  exercise	  a	  discretion	  whether	  to	  allow	  that	  party	  to	  apply	  for	  rectification.	  	  
This	  discretion	  is	  important	  to	  allow	  authorities	  only	  to	  accept	  applications	  in	  situations	  where	  authorisation	  is	  an	  
actual	   possibility	   –	   where	   authorisation	   would	   never	   be	   granted,	   then	   the	   person	   would	   simply	   have	   to	  
rehabilitate	  under	  (i)	  above.	  
	  
(4)	   Subsection	  (3)	  applies	  to	  a	  person	  who	  has	  committed	  an	  offence	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24F	  (2)	  (a)	  and	  who	  is	  
able	  to	  show,	  on	  a	  balance	  of	  probabilities,	  that	  the	  offence	  was	  not	  committed	  intentionally	  or	  negligently,	  
except	  that	  such	  a	  person	  does	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  administrative	  fine	  in	  subsection	  (3)	  (b).	  
	  
Note:	   This	   provision	   makes	   the	   negligence	   provision	   applicable	   to	   “innocent”	   violators,	   but	   takes	   away	   the	  
penalty.	   Innocent	   violators	   would	   be	   those	   who	   didn’t	   know	   and	   couldn’t	   reasonably	   have	   known	   that	   they	  
required	  an	  authorisation,	  such	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  rural	  community	  without	  access	  to	  information	  about	  the	  legal	  
requirements.	  	  
	  
(5)	   Where	  the	  Minister,	  Minister	  of	  Mineral	  Resources	  or	  MEC	  concerned,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be,	  has	  directed	  a	  
person	  to	  apply	  for	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  section,	  that	  person	  must:	  
(a)	  	  	  	  	  compile	  a	  report	  containing	  -­‐	  	  
(i)	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   nature,	   extent,	   duration	   and	   significance	   of	   the	   consequences	   for	   or	  
impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  activity,	  including	  the	  cumulative	  effects;	  	  
(ii)	   a	   description	   of	   mitigation	   measures	   undertaken	   or	   to	   be	   undertaken	   in	   respect	   of	   the	  
consequences	  for	  or	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  activity;	  	  
(iii)	   a	   description	   of	   the	   public	   participation	   process	   followed	   during	   the	   course	   of	   compiling	   the	  
report,	   including	  all	  comments	  received	  from	  interested	  and	  affected	  parties	  and	  an	  indication	  
of	  how	  issues	  raised	  have	  been	  addressed;	  	  
(iv)	   an	  environmental	  management	  programme;	  and	  	  
(b)	  	  	  	  	  provide	  such	  other	  information	  or	  undertake	  such	  further	  studies	  as	  the	  Minister	  or	  MEC,	  as	  the	  case	  
may	  be,	  may	  deem	  necessary.	  	  
	  
(6)	   The	  Minister	  or	  MEC	  concerned	  must	  consider	  any	  reports	  or	  information	  submitted	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  
(5)	  and	  thereafter	  may-­‐	  	  
(a)	  	  	  	  	  direct	  the	  person	  to	  rehabilitate	  all	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  
offence	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24F(2)	  (a)	  within	  such	  time	  and	  subject	  to	  such	  conditions	  as	  the	  Minister	  
or	  MEC	  may	  deem	  necessary;	  or	  	  
(b)	   	   	   	   	   issue	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	   to	  such	  person	  subject	   to	   such	  conditions	  as	   the	  Minister	  or	  
MEC	  may	  deem	  necessary.	  	  
	  
Note:	  Wording	  changed	  for	  consistency	  with	  previous	  sections.	  
	  
(7)	   The	   administrative	   fine	   payable	   in	   terms	   of	   this	   section	   may	   not	   exceed	   R10	   million	   and	   must	   be	  
determined	  by	  the	  competent	  authority	  having	  regard	  to	  all	  relevant	  factors,	  including	  the	  following:	  
(a)	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   intention	   or	   negligence	   of	   the	   person	   who	   committed	   the	   offence	   in	   terms	   of	  
section	  24F(2)(a);	  	  
(b)	   the	  severity	  of	  the	  offence	   in	  terms	  of	   its	   impact,	  or	  potential	   impact,	  on	  health,	  well-­‐being,	  safety	  
and	  the	  environment;	  
(c)	   the	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  caused	  by	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  offence;	  
(d)	   the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence;	  
(e)	   the	  monetary	  or	  other	  benefits	  which	  accrued	   to	   the	  convicted	  person	   through	   the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence;	  
(f)	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence	  has	  cooperated	  with	  authorities;	  and	  
(h)	   whether	  the	  person	  who	  committed	  the	  offence	  has	  previously	  been	  found	  in	  contravention	  of	  this	  
act	  or	  any	  specific	  environmental	  management	  Act.	  
	  
Note:	  In	  this	  provision,	  the	  maximum	  administrative	  fine	  has	  gone	  from	  R5	  million	  to	  R10	  million.	  The	  factors	  are	  
based	   on	   a	   combination	   of	   the	   factors	   for	   determining	   administrative	   penalties	   set	   out	   in	   s.59(3)	   of	   the	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Competition	  Act	  and	  the	  factors	  for	  criminal	  penalties	  set	  out	  in	  s.52	  of	  the	  National	  Environmental	  Management:	  
Air	  Quality	  Act,	  2004.	  This	  does	  not	  address	  problems	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  regarding	  the	  determination	  of	  
fines,	   and	   we	   would	   argue	   that	   this	   information	   should	   be	   made	   available	   to	   interested	   and	   affected	   parties	  
voluntarily,	  i.e.	  without	  an	  application	  in	  terms	  of	  PAIA.	  
	  
(8)	   Except	   for	   a	   person	   mentioned	   in	   subsection	   (4),	   no	   application	   in	   terms	   of	   subsection	   (3)	   or	   any	  
environmental	  authorisation	  issued	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (6)	  (b)	  shall	  derogate	  from	  liability	  under	  section	  
24F(2).	  
	  
Note:	   This	   provision	   is	   included	   to	   ensure	   that	   neither	   intentional	   nor	   negligent	   offenders	   can	   escape	   criminal	  
prosecution.	   However,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   negligent	   offenders,	   any	   administrative	   penalty	   paid	   must	   be	   taken	   into	  
account	  in	  determining	  the	  criminal	  fine.	  Innocent	  offenders	  are	  excluded	  from	  criminal	  liability.	  
	  
(9)	   A	  person	  who	  fails	  to	  comply	  with	  subsection	  (1)	  or	  a	  directive	  contemplated	  in	  subsection	  (3)	  or	  (4)	  or	  who	  
contravenes	  or	   fails	   to	  comply	  with	  a	  condition	  contemplated	   in	  subsection	   (6)	   (b)	   is	  guilty	  of	  an	  offence	  
and	  liable	  on	  conviction	  to	  a	  penalty	  contemplated	  in	  section	  24F	  (4).	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ANNEXURE	  C:	  COMMENTS	  AND	  INPUTS	  
	  
From	   Comment	  
Koos	  Pretorius,	  
FSE	  
It	  is	  about	  money.	  If	  the	  fine	  is	  less	  than	  the	  money	  lost	  due	  to	  a	  later	  start	  or	  no	  start	  at	  all,	  
then	  the	  practice	  will	  continue.	  It	  also	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  reluctance	  from	  courts	  to	  make	  a	  
developer	  level	  whatever	  is	  built.	  All	  the	  odds	  are	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  the	  illegal	  action	  and	  
rectifying	  it	  later	  on.	  
	  	  
Personally	  I	  don’t	  think	  there	  is	  any	  need	  for	  it	  now.	  Everyone	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  for	  EAs.	  If	  
it	  has	  to	  stay,	  then	  the	  fine	  must	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  profit	  out	  of	  the	  development.	  
Susie	  Brownlie,	  
EAP	  and	  
member	  of	  the	  
CER’s	  Expert	  
Panel	  
I	  question	  the	  need	  for	  a	  s24G	  application	  in	  its	  current	  form	  –	  to	  my	  mind,	  something	  done	  
without	  permission	  should	  constitute	  a	  serious	  offence,	  and	  the	  penalty	  should	  be	  sufficiently	  
onerous	  as	  to	  act	  as	  a	  major	  deterrent.	  	  Ideally,	  one	  wants	  to	  halt	  the	  perception	  that	  once	  
you’ve	  effectively	  transformed	  a	  site	  you’re	  guaranteed	  authorization,	  although	  it	  might	  take	  
some	  time...since	  that	  provides	  an	  incentive	  to	  carry	  on	  transforming	  natural	  areas,	  
potentially	  leading	  to	  irreversible	  /	  irreplaceable	  loss.	  
	  	  
I	  wonder	  if	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  consider	  different	  types	  of	  transgression	  –	  the	  first	  where	  
developers	  simply	  go	  ahead	  with	  a	  listed	  activity	  and	  develop,	  knowing	  that	  asking	  for	  
forgiveness	  is	  easier	  than	  asking	  for	  permission.	  	  They’d	  fall	  into	  the	  latter	  category	  where	  I’d	  
see	  punishment	  being	  severe.	  	  Perhaps	  make	  it	  essential	  to	  ‘undo’	  whatever	  development	  has	  
taken	  place	  (i.e.	  remove	  structures/	  infrastructure)	  and	  only	  then	  apply	  through	  the	  correct	  
channels	  ito	  NEMA	  EIA	  regs.	  	  	  I’d	  see	  measures	  to	  restore/	  offset	  (where	  restoration	  is	  unlikely	  
to	  be	  successful)	  essential	  in	  these	  cases.	  
	  	  
The	  second	  type	  of	  transgression	  could	  perhaps	  be	  treated	  differently	  -­‐	  	  where	  an	  
authorization	  has	  been	  granted,	  an	  EMP	  has	  been	  prepared	  but	  not	  yet	  given	  The	  Nod	  by	  the	  
Department,	  and	  clearing	  of	  a	  site	  has	  been	  initiated	  accidentally	  by	  a	  construction	  team	  prior	  
to	  formal	  acceptance	  of	  that	  EMP.	  	  [I	  know	  of	  several	  situations	  where	  the	  right	  processes	  
have	  been	  followed	  and	  applications	  made,	  but	  there’s	  been	  insufficient	  ‘control’	  over	  
construction	  crew	  on	  site....].	  	  These	  are,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  genuine	  unintended	  events.	  	  Some	  
sort	  of	  penalty,	  yes.	  	  But	  nothing	  like	  for	  the	  first	  type	  of	  transgression.	  	  A	  repeat	  offender	  of	  
this	  type	  should	  face	  a	  far	  heavier	  penalty....	  
Charl	  de	  Villiers,	  
consultant	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  see	  the	  default	  presumption	  of	  guilt	  excised	  from	  s	  24G	  by	  making	  allowance	  
for	  an	  alleged	  transgressor	  to	  motivate	  her/his	  actions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  'noodweer'	  as	  defined	  
in	  s	  24F(3)	  of	  the	  Act.	  
	  	  
I	  consider	  it	  unacceptable	  that	  the	  audi	  alterem	  partem	  principle	  only	  applies	  to	  individuals	  
who	  have	  been	  prosecuted	  under	  the	  Act,	  and	  not	  to	  people	  who	  have	  fallen	  foul	  of	  the	  law	  
due	  to	  circumstances	  that	  may	  not	  be	  of	  their	  own	  making	  or	  required	  an	  urgent	  response	  in	  
the	  face	  of	  imminent	  harm	  to	  the	  environment,	  people	  or	  property.	  
	  	  
Space	  needs	  to	  be	  created	  for	  the	  regulator	  to	  exercise	  discretion	  in	  deserving	  cases,	  and	  for	  
members	  of	  the	  public	  to	  be	  offered	  a	  reasonable	  opportunity	  to	  explain	  their	  actions	  without	  
fear	  of	  being	  assaulted	  by	  a	  randomly	  wielded	  administrative	  bludgeon	  which,	  it	  seems,	  the	  
general	  culture	  by	  which	  the	  EIA	  regulations	  and	  specifically	  s	  24G	  are	  enforced.	  
	  	  
This	  particularly	  applies	  to	  agricultural	  contexts	  where	  landowners	  often	  have	  inherited	  
unsustainble	  patterns	  of	  land	  use	  and	  whose	  strategies	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  environmental	  
consequences	  of	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  may	  not	  be	  desirable,	  but	  in	  many	  instances	  leaves	  the	  
affected	  person	  little	  option	  but	  to	  act	  in	  self-­‐interest	  without	  sufficienlty	  interrogating	  the	  
environmental	  consequences	  of	  that	  choice	  into	  account,	  or	  having	  the	  luxury	  of	  time	  to	  make	  
that	  precautionary	  estimation.	  
	  	  
The	  effects	  of	  flooding	  immediately	  come	  to	  mind:	  drifts	  that	  are	  washed	  away,	  animals	  that	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cannot	  be	  watered	  or	  fed,	  crops,	  arable	  land	  and	  infrastructure	  that	  are	  damaged	  or	  
destroyed,	  etc.	  
	  	  
The	  objective,	  surely,	  is	  to	  encourage,	  support	  and	  facilitiate	  a	  move	  towards	  more	  
sustainable	  land	  use	  practices	  through	  reason,	  resources	  and	  good	  example.	  These	  things	  do	  
not	  happen	  overnight.	  
	  	  
We	  may	  be	  able	  to	  bash	  individual	  non-­‐compliant	  farmers	  into	  lawfulness,	  but	  hyper-­‐'paraat',	  
prosecutorial	  law	  enforcement	  in	  its	  own	  right	  is	  certainly	  not	  going	  to	  cultivate	  a	  positive	  
attitude	  towards	  farming	  that	  voluntarily	  promotes	  and	  pursues	  ecosystem	  resilience	  and	  
sustainable	  rural	  development.	  
	  	  
Maybe	  a	  'three-­‐strikes-­‐and-­‐you're-­‐out'	  policy	  is	  what	  is	  needed,	  but	  at	  least	  the	  first	  point	  of	  
engagement	  between	  the	  state	  and	  alleged	  transgressor	  should	  be	  as	  neutral	  as	  possible,	  
aimed	  at	  establishing	  facts,	  motives	  and	  effects,	  and	  helping	  to	  find	  solutions	  to	  difficult	  
problems,	  rather	  than	  automatically	  reaching	  for	  the	  metaphorical	  ticket	  book	  and	  ballpoint	  
pen	  in	  a	  leering	  flush	  of	  Schadenfreude.	  	  
	  	  
Also,	  administrative	  fines	  should	  be	  proportional	  to	  the	  irreversibility	  of	  environmental	  
damage,	  its	  significance	  and	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  the	  unauthorised	  activity	  was	  
undertaken.	  The	  calculation	  of	  the	  fines	  also	  need	  to	  be	  transparent	  and	  explicable,	  
considerations	  that	  are	  entirely	  absent	  under	  the	  current	  dispensation.	  
	  	  
Directives	  i.t.o.	  s	  28?	  Good	  suggestion,	  and	  especially	  if	  they	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  non-­‐punitive	  
fashion.	  By	  all	  means,	  punish	  those	  who	  deliberately	  and	  obstinately	  do	  harm	  to	  the	  
environment	  but,	  by	  the	  same	  token,	  demonstrate	  some	  understanding	  and	  flexibility	  where	  
reason	  and	  reasonableness	  demand	  that.	  
Mark	  Botha,	  
WWF	  
1.	  	  	  	  	  I	  think	  there	  should	  be	  a	  decision	  making	  framework	  to	  guide	  S24G	  –	  to	  limit	  the	  
discretion	  of	  officials	  in	  their	  powers.	  Something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  decision	  hierarchy	  
for	  offsets.	  Objective	  would	  be	  flushing	  out	  innocent	  errors,	  unforeseen	  consequences	  vs	  
blatant	  disregard,	  flagrant	  flouting	  of	  ROD	  provisions	  etc.	  would	  need	  to	  think	  it	  through	  
some	  more	  
2.	  	  	  	  	  	  It	  should	  link	  to	  post	  ROD	  mitigation	  actions	  –	  “post	  fact	  offsets”	  that	  are	  so	  substantial	  
and	  costly	  that	  no	  one	  would	  use	  this	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  no	  following	  proper	  process	  up	  
front	  
3.	  	  	  	  	  	  Could	  also	  be	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  get	  offsets	  considered	  up	  front	  in	  developments	  –	  those	  
developers	  that	  have	  put	  offsets	  in	  place	  could	  have	  a	  “presumption	  of	  negligence”	  
clause	  waived…	  
4.	  	  	  	  	  	  Concur	  with	  the	  criminal	  fine	  approach	  vs.	  an	  administrative	  fine.	  There	  should	  be	  some	  
guidance	  to	  separate	  the	  two	  streams,	  as	  I’m	  sure	  there	  will	  be	  cases	  where	  an	  admin	  
fine	  would	  be	  sufficient	  for	  lesser	  offences.	  
5.	  	  	  	  	  	  S24G	  must	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  punitive	  in	  nature	  for	  the	  bulk	  of	  applicants,	  and	  the	  fines	  
should	  be	  commensurate.	  
Hout	  Bay	  
&Llandudno	  
Environment	  
Conservation	  
Group	  
In	  principle,	  as	  a	  purely	  practical	  expedient,	  there	  is	  nothing	  exceptionable	  about	  a	  
regularisation	  provision.	  	  In	  general	  it	  should	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  ex	  post	  facto	  regularisation	  of	  
any	  development	  or	  land	  use	  that	  would	  not	  have	  been	  authorised	  had	  authorisation	  therefor	  
been	  sought	  before	  commencement	  with	  the	  relevant	  listed	  activities	  entailed	  therein.	  	  Any	  
decision	  purportedly	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  s	  24G(2)(b)	  authorising	  an	  environmentally	  
unsustainable	  development	  or	  land	  use	  would	  be	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  Act	  
and	  liable,	  on	  that	  ground,	  to	  be	  impugned	  and	  set	  aside	  on	  judicial	  review.	  	  
	  	  
The	  obviously	  undesirable	  feature	  of	  the	  provision	  as	  it	  is	  currently	  formulated,	  however,	  is	  
the	  subliminal	  incentive	  it	  provides	  to	  the	  competent	  authority	  -­‐	  whether	  that	  be	  the	  Minister,	  
the	  MEC	  or	  the	  Minister	  of	  Mines	  -­‐to	  trade	  the	  giving	  of	  ex	  post	  facto	  environmental	  
authorisation	  for	  much	  needed	  revenue	  in	  the	  form	  of	  administrative	  fines	  (albeit	  in	  a	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maximum	  amount	  five	  times	  less	  than	  the	  maximum	  fine	  provided	  in	  terms	  of	  s	  24F(4)	  by	  way	  
of	  criminal	  sanction	  for	  commencing	  with	  a	  listed	  activity	  without	  prior	  environmental	  
authorisation).	  	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  an	  administrative	  fine	  goes	  directly	  into	  the	  coffers	  of	  
the	  competent	  authority,	  while	  a	  fine	  paid	  by	  way	  of	  criminal	  sanction	  goes	  into	  the	  National	  
Revenue	  Fund	  to	  be	  disposed	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  national	  budget	  and	  the	  annual	  Division	  of	  
Revenue	  Acts.	  	  
	  	  
The	  provision	  for	  an	  ex	  post	  facto	  regularisation	  of	  a	  listed	  activity	  commenced	  without	  the	  
required	  prior	  environmental	  authorisation	  should	  not	  derogate	  from	  the	  criminal	  liability	  
of	  the	  person	  who	  so	  commenced	  the	  activity	  without	  authorisation.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
competent	  authorities	  should	  not	  be	  constituted	  as	  judge,	  jury	  and	  executioner	  in	  respect	  of	  
criminal	  contraventions	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  and	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	  fulfilling	  their	  
administrative	  function	  of	  ensuring	  that	  development	  and	  land	  use	  is	  environmentally	  
sustainable.	  	  Section	  24G,	  as	  currently	  worded	  creates	  an	  unwholesome	  confusion	  of	  the	  
competent	  authorities'	  functions	  within	  the	  Act's	  statutory	  objectives.	  	  	  
	  	  
Dealing	  with	  the	  punitive	  consequences	  of	  contraventions	  of	  the	  Act	  should	  be	  left	  to	  the	  
independent	  institutions	  constitutionally	  created	  for	  those	  purposes,	  namely	  the	  prosecuting	  
authority	  and	  the	  courts.	  	  Section	  24	  (2A)	  should	  therefore	  be	  repealed	  and	  substituted	  with	  a	  
provision	  something	  like	  this:	  
'Any	  application	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (1)	  and	  any	  environmental	  authorisation	  issued	  in	  
terms	  of	  subsection	  (2)(b)	  shall	  not	  derogate	  from	  the	  applicant's	  liability	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  
24F(4)	  for	  having	  failed	  to	  comply	  with,	  or	  having	  contravened	  section	  24F(1)(a)	  or	  (b).'	  
It	  is	  arguable	  that	  s	  24G(2A),	  as	  currently	  worded,	  offends	  against	  the	  doctrine	  of	  separation	  
of	  powers	  and	  is	  unconstitutional.	  
Nicole	  Barlow,	  
ECA	  
One	  part	  of	  me	  is	  loath	  to	  advocate	  the	  complete	  abolition	  of	  the	  Section	  24G	  process	  
because	  it	  does	  at	  least	  afford	  the	  environment	  some	  justice,	  if	  the	  process	  is	  run	  correctly.	  	  
…The	  Section	  24G	  process	  is	  actually	  a	  tool	  that’s	  used	  by	  the	  developer	  to	  develop	  in	  a	  
sensitive	  area,	  especially	  if	  he	  feels	  he	  won’t	  get	  authorisation	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  Bribes	  are	  
paid	  by	  the	  developers	  to	  the	  officials	  and	  the	  development	  is	  inevitably	  allowed	  to	  continue.	  	  
The	  defence	  of	  the	  developer	  has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  “scrambled	  egg”	  approach,	  they	  state	  
the	  damage	  has	  been	  done	  so	  they	  might	  as	  well	  be	  allowed	  to	  continue	  and	  of	  course	  they	  
quote	  at	  length	  all	  the	  jobs	  that	  will	  be	  lost,	  etc.	  	  The	  fines	  were	  ridiculously	  low	  when	  
compared	  to	  what	  the	  developer	  stood	  to	  gain	  from	  his	  development	  continuing.	  
	  	  
I’d	  like	  to	  see	  certain	  conditions	  placed	  in	  the	  Section	  24G	  regulations	  such	  as	  exclusions,	  if	  
you	  build	  in	  a	  wetland,	  or	  in	  any	  really	  sensitive	  area,	  you	  cannot	  do	  a	  Section	  24G,	  you	  go	  
straight	  to	  illegal,	  demolition	  and	  rehabilitation.	  
	  	  
I’m	  not	  sure	  if	  this	  is	  feasible,	  but	  all	  Section	  24Gs	  should	  be	  handled	  by	  the	  National	  
Department	  of	  Environment,	  not	  that	  I	  think	  they	  are	  any	  better	  if	  you	  look	  at	  the	  RoD	  for	  the	  
Pan	  African	  Parliament,	  but	  they	  might	  be	  a	  little	  more	  immune	  to	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  
corruption	  than	  the	  provincial	  departments.	  
	  	  
Section	  24G	  fines	  should	  not	  be	  negotiable,	  they	  should	  be	  so	  high	  that	  they	  actually	  serve	  as	  
a	  deterrent.	  	  The	  fine	  should	  equate	  to	  50%	  of	  the	  total	  value	  of	  the	  whole	  development,	  
which	  essentially	  means	  that	  the	  development	  will	  have	  NO	  profit	  margin	  and	  the	  fine	  has	  to	  
be	  paid	  upfront	  and	  cannot	  be	  appealed.	  	  My	  only	  problem	  with	  making	  it	  part	  of	  a	  criminal	  
process	  is	  it	  means	  they	  have	  to	  go	  through	  court,	  not	  only	  is	  this	  time	  consuming	  and	  
cumbersome	  due	  to	  the	  extreme	  problems	  at	  all	  courts	  at	  the	  moment,	  but	  then	  the	  decision	  
is	  left	  with	  a	  judge	  who	  has	  no	  understanding	  of	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  
what	  the	  developer	  has	  done.	  	  I’ve	  seen	  shocking	  decisions	  made	  by	  even	  the	  best	  and	  longest	  
standing	  High	  Court	  Judges…	  
	  	  
The	  one	  problem	  is	  that	  many	  developers	  work	  across	  different	  provinces,	  which	  is	  also	  why	  I	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suggested	  the	  National	  department	  take	  over	  Section	  24G’s,	  because	  if	  you	  want	  to	  
implement	  a	  system	  where	  you	  only	  get	  to	  make	  ONE	  mistake,	  and	  that	  if	  you’ve	  already	  had	  
a	  Section	  24G	  you	  can	  never	  submit	  another	  one,	  how	  do	  control	  that	  without	  a	  central	  
system.	  
	  	  
The	  directors	  of	  companies	  should	  also	  be	  held	  personally	  accountable.	  	  They	  need	  submit	  the	  
application	  under	  each	  directors	  Identity	  number,	  because	  the	  directors	  can	  dissolve	  one	  
company,	  start	  another	  company	  and	  keep	  repeating	  these	  mistakes.	  
	  	  
If	  we	  go	  for	  a	  total	  abolition	  of	  the	  Section	  24G	  process	  as	  it	  stands	  at	  the	  moment,	  then	  it	  has	  
to	  be	  replaced	  with	  something	  better	  and	  stronger,	  you	  cannot	  remove	  it	  and	  leave	  this	  
gaping	  hole	  where	  there	  was	  once	  at	  least	  some	  semblance	  of	  repercussion	  for	  a	  developer	  
that	  broke	  the	  law.	  	  But,	  Section	  24G	  as	  its	  currently	  written	  is	  weak,	  open	  to	  enormous	  levels	  
of	  corruption,	  is	  not	  being	  enforced	  properly	  and	  the	  fines	  are	  so	  low	  they	  serve	  as	  no	  
deterrent	  what	  so	  ever.	  
	  	  
I	  hope	  my	  layman’s	  suggestions	  can	  assist.	  
Adv	  Tsheko	  
Ratsheko,	  
Johannesburg	  
Bar	  
I	  have	  not	  been	  following	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  section	  24G	  (and	  have	  not	  seen	  the	  latest	  
proposed	  amendments)	  but	  it	  appears	  that	  it	  remained	  an	  ex	  post	  facto	  authorisation	  -­‐	  which	  
was	  only	  an	  aspect	  of	  its	  purpose.	  All	  section	  24G	  applications	  were	  generally	  approved	  once	  
the	  administrative	  fine	  was	  paid.	  
	  	  
Section	  24G(2)(a)	  authorises	  the	  Minister	  or	  MEC	  (after	  considering	  the	  report	  and	  payment	  
of	  a	  fine)	  to	  direct	  persons	  to	  cease	  the	  activity	  and	  rehabilitate.	  This	  aspect	  of	  the	  section	  is	  
not	  implemented	  	  (at	  least	  to	  my	  knowledge).	  
	  	  
Problems	  with	  this	  section	  is	  that:	  
1.	  	  	  	  	  	  Section	  24G(2)	  is	  couched	  in	  permissive	  language	  –	  where	  it	  matters	  most	  ie	  execution	  of	  
the	  decision:	  ...”upon	  payment	  of	  the	  administration	  fine	  not	  exceeding	  R1m,	  the	  
Minister	  or	  MEC	  must	  consider	  the	  report	  and	  thereafter	  may	  (a)	  direct	  the	  person	  to	  
cease....or	  (b)	  issue	  authorisation..	  (proposal	  is	  to	  change	  it	  as	  
follows...thereafter[may]must..	  
2.	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  should	  then	  add	  a	  section	  which	  requires	  the	  Minister	  or	  MEC	  to	  publish	  reasons	  for	  
either	  decision	  taken	  
3.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  I	  do	  not	  recall	  if	  guideline	  for	  calculating	  an	  administrative	  fine	  was	  ever	  a	  publish	  as	  a	  
regulation.	  The	  calculation	  is	  not	  clear	  and	  the	  administrative	  fine	  must	  also	  be	  increased	  
4.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Avoidance	  (See	  attached	  legal	  opinion)	  Note:	  This	  legal	  opinion	  from	  senior	  counsel	  
concludes	  that	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  applying	  for	  s.24G	  outweighs	  the	  advantages	  of	  
doing	  so.	  
Margie	  Donde	   As	  far	  as	  I	  understand	  it	  24G	  is	  used	  when	  someone	  does	  not	  know	  that	  what	  they	  were	  doing	  
was	  illegal	  –	  i.e	  they	  did	  not	  know	  the	  law.	  
• Section	  24G	  fines	  should	  not	  be	  negotiable,	  they	  should	  be	  so	  high	  that	  they	  actually	  serve	  
as	  a	  deterrent.	  	  The	  fine	  should	  equate	  to	  50%	  of	  the	  total	  value	  of	  the	  whole	  
development.	  	  Developers	  in	  our	  area	  build	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  24G	  if	  they	  get	  caught.	  	  
Therefore	  it	  is	  not	  a	  deterrent	  –	  rather	  they	  use	  it	  as	  a	  way	  to	  do	  what	  they	  want	  and	  if	  
they	  get	  caught	  they	  have	  a	  process	  by	  which	  they	  can	  then	  become	  legal.	  
• The	  directors	  of	  companies	  should	  also	  be	  held	  personally	  accountable	  
• If	  you	  are	  in	  contravention	  once	  you	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  state	  ignorance	  a	  second	  time	  
and	  they	  should	  then	  have	  to	  demolish	  the	  whole	  development	  
• You	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  appeal	  the	  fine	  –	  we	  have	  an	  illegal	  cement	  factory	  in	  our	  area	  
that	  has	  used	  the	  24G	  process	  to	  continue	  their	  cement	  making	  –	  they	  do	  sidings	  for	  
Gautrans-­‐	  while	  they	  appeal	  the	  fine	  –	  this	  has	  now	  been	  going	  on	  for	  3	  years!	  
• The	  development/	  illegal	  activity	  should	  stop	  until	  all	  fines	  are	  paid	  and	  rectification	  is	  
done	  
Aiden	  Beck,	   I	  think	  we	  are	  seeing	  a	  lot	  of	  these	  original	  24G	  obligations	  falling	  by	  the	  wayside	  in	  the	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Oyster	  Bay	  
Reserve	  
Mossel	  Bay	  Desalination	  Plant,	  that	  MEP	  has	  a	  concern	  with.	  
Paul	  Hoffman	  SC	  
Director	  
Institute	  for	  
Accountability	  in	  
Southern	  Africa	  
Surely	  the	  best	  medicine	  for	  the	  “gewraakte”	  section	  24G	  is	  a	  good	  draft	  of	  euthanasia	  
vanishing	  oil,	  administered	  liberally	  to	  its	  entire	  body	  until	  it	  disappears	  completely?	  
Angela	  Andrews,	  
LRC	  
One	  of	  the	  issues	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  fines	  are	  apparently	  not	  very	  high	  and	  are	  determined	  (I	  
hear	  but	  need	  to	  check)	  by	  guidelines	  from	  DEAT	  or	  somewhere	  else	  where	  fines	  are	  worked	  
out.	  	  I	  need	  to	  find	  out	  about	  this.	  	  The	  net	  effect	  is	  that	  provincial	  authorities	  feel	  that	  they	  
don’t	  have	  much	  say	  in	  the	  fines.	  	  In	  some	  of	  the	  more	  remote	  provinces	  I	  hear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
lot	  of	  bullying	  of	  officials	  by	  errant	  developers	  who	  use	  strong	  arm	  tactics	  and	  political	  
pressures.	  	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  in	  some	  provinces	  up	  to	  15%	  of	  developments	  go	  through	  the	  
24G	  route.	  	  So	  NEMA	  is	  being	  completely	  undermined.	  	  Not	  sure	  what	  the	  solution	  is.	  	  Abolish	  
24G!!!	  	  	  	  Or	  make	  24G	  go	  through	  the	  central	  government	  where	  there	  is	  less	  corruption.	  
All	  this	  has	  to	  fit	  in	  to	  the	  NEIAMS	  strategy	  as	  well	  so	  I	  don’t	  know	  why	  it	  is	  being	  dealt	  with	  in	  	  
a	  piecemeal	  process.	  	  
Yolan	  
Friedmann,	  EWT	  
The	  environmental	  legislation	  in	  this	  country	  must	  be	  the	  only	  case	  of	  ‘ignorance	  of	  the	  law	  is	  
not	  only	  a	  good	  excuse	  but	  allows	  you	  to	  be	  forgiven	  with	  the	  right	  paperwork...’	  by	  its	  very	  
track	  record,	  S24g	  can	  be	  called	  a	  failure,	  even	  if	  its	  intentions	  could	  ever	  be	  said	  to	  be	  pure...	  
Rynette	  Coetzee,	  
EWT	  
Indeed	  food	  for	  thought.	  I	  think	  there	  are	  too	  many	  people	  who	  are	  abusing	  the	  S24G	  system,	  
by	  initiating	  development	  or	  any	  listed	  activity	  without	  the	  necessary	  permits,	  as	  they	  know	  
they	  will	  most	  probably	  get	  away	  with	  an	  administrative	  fine.	  However,	  if	  the	  fine	  was	  linked	  
to	  a	  crime	  (admission	  of	  guilt	  with	  a	  criminal	  record)	  they	  may	  think	  twice	  before	  actually	  
embarking	  on	  such	  illegal	  trips.	  I	  am	  just	  thinking	  of	  the	  quarry	  on	  the	  Bronberg	  (where	  the	  
Juliana’s	  Golden	  Mole	  sole	  colony	  exists)	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  still	  doing	  whatever	  they	  
please,	  irrespective	  of	  an	  administrative	  penalty	  and	  a	  mining	  ROD	  that	  was	  apparently	  only	  
valid	  for	  five	  years.	  I	  am	  still	  trying	  to	  get	  to	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  problem.	  In	  the	  mean	  time	  they	  
are	  excavating	  into	  the	  habitat	  of	  these	  moles	  (listed	  as	  Vulnerable	  on	  the	  IUCN	  Red	  Data	  List)	  
and	  no	  government	  authority	  wants	  to	  take	  action.	  
Patrick	  Dowling,	  
WESSA	  
1. Does	  s24G	  fulfill	  some	  function?	  Is	  there	  a	  need	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  authorise	  illegal	  listed	  
activities?	  Or	  should	  it	  just	  be	  abolished	  and	  rehabilitation	  be	  dealt	  with	  under	  a	  s28	  
directive	  (or	  activities	  stopped	  and	  a	  fresh	  EIA	  application	  be	  submitted)?	  	  Though	  there	  
may	  well	  be	  instances	  when	  bona	  fide	  mistakes	  are	  made	  and	  regularization	  would	  be	  apt,	  
the	  presence	  of	  this	  clause	  will	  unfortunately	  be	  exploited	  ito	  of	  easier	  to	  ask	  for	  
forgiveness	  than	  permission.	  Would	  be	  better	  to	  review	  activities	  that	  trigger	  EIAs.	  
2. If	  so,	  in	  what	  circumstances	  should	  a	  violator	  be	  allowed	  to	  submit	  a	  rectification	  
application?	  	  None.	  
3. Should	  a	  violator	  be	  allowed	  to	  submit	  more	  than	  one	  rectification	  application?	  No.	  
4. Should	  an	  authority	  have	  a	  discretion	  to	  accept	  a	  s24G	  application,	  or	  should	  all	  
applications	  at	  least	  be	  processed?	  	  No	  discretion.	  Very	  minimum	  should	  be	  new	  process	  
with	  I&APs	  (perhaps	  a	  shortened	  one)	  
5. What	  about	  that	  administrative	  fine	  –	  should	  this	  perhaps	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  criminal	  fine	  
imposed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  plea	  and	  sentence	  agreement	  in	  a	  guilty	  plea?	  (which	  will	  at	  least	  
give	  the	  applicant	  a	  criminal	  record)?	  Would	  be	  contradictory	  to	  spirit	  of	  amendment	  
Andrew	  Muir,	  
Austen	  Smith	  
1.	  Does	  s24G	  fulfill	  some	  function?	  Is	  there	  a	  need	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  
authorise	  illegal	  listed	  activities?	  Or	  should	  it	  just	  be	  abolished	  and	  
rehabilitation	  be	  dealt	  with	  under	  a	  s28	  directive	  (or	  activities	  stopped	  
and	  a	  fresh	  EIA	  application	  be	  submitted)?	  
I	  BELIEVE	  THAT	  S24G	  IS	  A	  VITAL	  PART	  OF	  THE	  ADMINISTRATIVE	  PROCESS.	  THE	  CRITICAL	  ISSUE	  
IS	  TO	  BRING	  ALL	  POTENTIALLY	  DAMAGING	  DEVELOPMENTS	  /	  ACTIVITIES	  TO	  The	  ATTENTION	  
OF	  THE	  AUTHORITIES.	  THEREFORE	  THE	  PROCESS	  SHOULD	  ENCOURAGE	  A	  GENUINE	  
DEFAULTER	  WHO	  DIDN'T	  KNOW	  BETTER	  TO	  REPORT	  A	  MISTAKE	  TO	  THE	  AUTHORITIES	  AND	  TO	  
HAVE	  THE	  MISTAKE	  ASSESSED.	  I	  DON'T	  THINK	  THE	  CURRENT	  MODEL	  PROVIDES	  ENOUGH	  
ENCOURAGEMENT	  TO	  THE	  ACCIDENTAL	  DEFAULTER.	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2.	  If	  so,	  in	  what	  circumstances	  should	  a	  violator	  be	  allowed	  to	  submit	  a	  
rectification	  application?	  
A	  DEFAULTER	  SHOULD	  BE	  ENCOURAGED	  AND	  ASSISTED	  IN	  REPORTING	  NON	  COMPLIANCE	  
AND	  SHOULD	  AUTOMATICALLY	  BE	  PENALISED,	  OR	  RATHER	  A	  LIGHT	  PENALTY	  FOR	  NON	  
COMPLIANCE,	  IN	  THE	  FORM	  OF	  A	  	  SMALL	  ADMIN	  FINE	  SHOULD	  APPLY	  TO	  A	  FIRST	  TIME	  
DEFAULTER.	  HEAVIER	  FINES	  CAN	  BE	  LEVIED	  AGAINST	  REPEAT	  OFFENDERS	  OR	  IN	  SITUATIONS	  
WHERE	  MORAL	  WRONGDOING	  E.G.	  A	  MAJOR	  DEVELOPMENT	  WHICH	  A	  DEVELOPER	  SHOULD	  
KNOW	  REQUIRES	  AUTHORISATION,	  IS	  APPARENT.	  
3.	  Should	  a	  violator	  be	  allowed	  to	  submit	  more	  than	  one	  rectification	  
application?	  
YES,	  GET	  THEM	  INTO	  THE	  SYSTEM	  WHERE	  THEY	  CAN	  BE	  PROPERLY	  ASSESSED	  AND	  DEALT	  
WITH	  APPROPRIATELY.	  THE	  BALANCE	  NEEDS	  TO	  COME	  INTO	  THE	  MODEL	  TO	  PREVENT	  S24G	  
BEING	  AN	  EASY	  ROUTE	  OUT.	  
4.	  Should	  an	  authority	  have	  a	  discretion	  to	  accept	  a	  s24G	  application,	  or	  
should	  all	  applications	  at	  least	  be	  processed?	  
ALL	  APPLICATIONS	  SHOULD	  BE	  PROCESSED	  BUT,	  THE	  OUTCOME	  MAY	  BE	  NO	  APPROVAL	  WITH	  
AN	  REHABILITATION	  ORDER.	  AUTHORISATION	  MUST	  NOT	  BE	  A	  FAIT	  ACCOMPLI	  AND	  THERE	  
NEEDS	  TO	  BE	  A	  STRENGTHENING	  OF	  THE	  MECHANISM	  TO	  PROVIDE	  FOR	  THE	  REHABILITATION	  
PROCESS.	  
5.	  What	  about	  that	  administrative	  fine	  -­‐	  should	  this	  perhaps	  be	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  a	  criminal	  fine	  imposed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  plea	  and	  sentence	  agreement	  in	  a	  
guilty	  plea?	  (which	  will	  at	  least	  give	  the	  applicant	  a	  criminal	  record)	  
Any	  other	  thoughts	  and	  particularly	  suggestions	  for	  improving	  s24G	  will	  be	  
incorporated	  into	  a	  submission	  to	  DEA.	  
THE	  ADMINISTRATIVE	  FINE	  SHOULD	  BE	  MINOR,	  IT	  SHOULD	  ONLY	  BE	  THERE	  TO	  ENCOURAGE	  
THE	  CORRECT	  PROCEDURE	  AND	  TO	  PUNISH	  NON-­‐COMPLIANCE.	  IF,	  ONCE	  THE	  ASSESSMENT	  
HAS	  OCCURRED	  IT	  APPEARS	  THAT	  HARM	  HAS	  BEEN	  DONE	  THEN	  FURTHER	  PUNISHMENT	  
MUST	  BE	  AVAILABLE	  AND	  MUST	  BE	  USED.	  THEORETICALLY	  THE	  HARM	  COULD	  HAVE	  BEEN	  
AVOIDED	  THROUGH	  THE	  EIA	  PROCESS	  AND	  THE	  FACT	  THAT	  THE	  PROCESS	  WAS	  IGNORED	  
MEANS	  THAT	  THE	  PERSON	  LIABLE	  MUST	  BE	  PUNISHED	  AS	  NECESSARY.	  THIS	  SHOULD	  BE	  IN	  
THE	  FORM	  OF	  A	  PUNITIVE	  REHABILITATION	  ORDER	  WHICH	  SHOULD	  BE	  ADMINISTRATIVE	  AND	  
NOT	  CRIMINAL.	  THUS	  AN	  INNOCENT	  WRONGDOER	  WOULD	  BE	  FACED	  WITH	  A	  LIGHT	  ADMIN	  
FIN	  TO	  PROCESS	  THE	  APPLICATION	  AND,	  IF	  HARM	  HAS	  BEEN	  CAUSED,	  A	  FURTHER	  ADMIN	  
PENALTY	  PROPORTIONAL	  TO	  THE	  HARM	  CAUSED.	  
	  
A	  WILFUL	  WRONGDOER	  WOULD	  AND	  MUST,	  ALSO	  FACE	  CRIMINAL	  PROSECUTION	  WHERE	  
PUNISHMENT	  IS	  CALLED	  FOR	  BY	  THE	  CIRCUMSTANCES.	  
Mercia	  Komen	   In	  a	  nutshell,	  I	  am	  proposing	  that	  transgressors	  be	  severely	  fined;	  that	  rehabilitation	  or	  
remediation	  be	  funded	  by	  the	  transgressor;	  that	  the	  affected	  parties	  (or	  the	  environment	  
where	  no	  one	  cares)	  are	  able	  to	  discern	  where	  the	  fine	  has	  been	  used	  to	  right	  the	  wrong	  in	  
the	  receiving	  environment.	  
	  
The	  latest	  compliance	  and	  enforcement	  report	  indicates	  that	  almost	  every	  province	  deals	  with	  
"illegal	  listed	  activities"	  as	  a	  prevalent	  crime.	  	  I	  surmise	  that	  this	  results	  in	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  unit's	  
time	  being	  spent	  on	  functions	  which	  should	  be	  done	  by	  impact	  assessment	  and	  management.	  	  
Consequently	  we	  create	  massive	  inefficiency.	  	  Suggestion:	  I	  do	  not	  say	  this	  lightly,	  but	  it	  seems	  
more	  pragmatic	  for	  EMI's	  to	  assess	  the	  contravention,	  and	  follow	  the	  prescribed	  process	  for	  
contravention.	  	  This	  should	  be	  a	  discretely	  separate	  process	  from	  the	  attempts	  to	  rectify.	  	  The	  
transgressor	  should	  pay	  the	  penalty	  (and/or	  do	  the	  time)	  and	  then	  be	  required	  to	  place	  before	  
the	  competent	  authority	  two	  separate	  documents	  -­‐	  one	  the	  application	  document	  which	  
would	  have	  been	  required	  for	  the	  development	  which	  now	  exists,	  and	  the	  other	  a	  
rehabilitation	  plan	  for	  the	  development	  which	  exists.	  	  Placing	  both	  these	  documents	  as	  
separate	  proposals	  before	  the	  competent	  authority	  reduce	  the	  tendency	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  
development	  will/should	  be	  left	  intact.	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Suggestion:	  I	  would	  also	  propose	  that	  the	  fine	  should	  be	  correlated	  with	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
development.	  	  It	  is	  no	  deterrent	  to	  ongoing	  crime,	  or	  compensation	  for	  the	  resulting	  
administrative	  burden	  for	  transgressors	  to	  be	  fined	  so	  low	  that	  it	  is	  a	  viable	  financial	  
alternative	  to	  conducting	  the	  required	  process.	  	  	  
I	  am	  saying,	  for	  example,	  that	  if	  the	  development	  is	  valued	  at	  R	  5	  million,	  the	  fine	  should	  be	  
R5	  million	  where	  the	  development	  will	  be	  retained.	  	  	  
The	  State	  should	  then	  deploy	  that	  fine	  specifically	  in	  the	  area	  of	  the	  development	  and	  
specifically	  to	  balance	  the	  negative	  environmental	  impacts	  on	  the	  Interested	  and	  Affected	  
parties.	  	  This	  is	  not	  in	  place	  of	  what	  the	  transgressor	  may	  be	  required	  to	  do,	  but	  in	  addition	  
to.	  	  It	  should	  be	  very	  clear	  to	  the	  I&AP	  how	  and	  where	  the	  penalty	  has	  been	  applied.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  where	  the	  development	  will	  be	  demolished,	  the	  R	  5	  million	  fine	  used	  in	  this	  
example	  may	  be	  used	  to	  offset	  the	  remediation	  costs.	  	  I	  would	  hasten	  to	  add	  that	  the	  service	  
provider	  should	  be	  appointed	  by	  the	  State	  for	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  rehabilitation	  that	  will	  be	  
funded	  by	  the	  fine.	  	  
I	  take	  cognisance	  of	  the	  administrative	  burden	  my	  solution	  is	  placing	  on	  a	  finance	  function.	  	  I	  
feel	  that	  Section	  24	  G	  application	  harm	  the	  I&APs	  twice	  over	  -­‐	  and	  we	  need	  to	  take	  that	  into	  
account,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  I&APs	  who	  need	  to	  KNOW	  that	  things	  have	  been	  set	  right.	  	  
	  
My	  experience	  with	  24G	  has	  the	  following	  frustrations:	  
1. The	  rectification	  option	  is	  generally	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  final	  outcome.	  	  There	  is	  
insufficient	  attention	  on	  the	  transgression,	  and	  the	  option	  to	  rehabilitate.	  
2. The	  process	  is	  often	  hurried,	  inadequately	  dealt	  with	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  impact	  
minimised.	  	  
3. Public	  participation	  is	  poor	  -­‐	  process	  is	  poorly	  communicated,	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  
transgressor	  /consultant	  is	  not	  conducive	  to	  engagement	  (as	  the	  deed	  is	  already	  done)	  
4. The	  authority	  to	  force	  the	  transgressor	  to	  rehabilitate	  must	  be	  clear,	  and	  there	  has	  to	  be	  
willingness	  to	  go	  that	  far	  (and	  then	  be	  widely	  publicised)	  
5. On	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  REAL	  impacts	  are	  available,	  and	  should	  be	  reported	  in	  detail,	  
including	  an	  evaluation	  of	  how	  the	  transgressor	  self-­‐regulated.	  	  This	  will	  attest	  to	  the	  
sense	  of	  accountability	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  transgressor	  and	  should	  be	  factored	  
into	  the	  decision	  making.	  	  Someone	  who	  both	  transgresses	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  compelled	  
to	  be	  environmental	  responsible	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  civic-­‐minded.	  	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  the	  transgressor	  cannot	  fully	  report	  on	  impacts	  because	  some	  of	  the	  impacts	  will	  
have	  irreparably	  destroyed	  environmental	  elements.	  	  The	  assessment	  in	  some	  ways	  
needs	  to	  be	  MORE	  comprehensive,	  looking	  wider	  than	  the	  subject	  property.	  
6. Where	  the	  transgression	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  strategic/	  spatial	  plans	  for	  the	  area	  or	  
precinct,	  the	  focus	  needs	  to	  shift	  to	  cumulative	  impacts	  -­‐	  to	  answer	  the	  question,	  would	  
this	  development	  be	  consider	  "one	  too	  many".	  	  If	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  the	  transgressor	  
should	  be	  fined	  severely,	  and	  as	  discussed	  above,	  the	  fine	  used	  for	  a	  local	  project	  which	  
will	  have	  a	  long-­‐term	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  local	  environment	  (a	  buy-­‐back	  centre	  in	  an	  
industrial	  area,	  a	  park	  for	  workers	  to	  enjoy	  in	  their	  breaks,	  establish	  an	  environmental	  
centre	  in	  the	  nearest	  dormitory,	  etc.	  
There	  is	  the	  case	  of	  the	  [name	  provided]	  Lodge	  in	  the	  [name	  provided]	  Protected	  
Environment.	  	  The	  provincial	  authority	  dropped	  the	  ball,	  but	  were	  reluctant	  to	  deny	  
authorisation	  when	  the	  situation	  was	  forced	  into	  the	  S24G	  process.	  	  The	  consequence	  is	  a	  
travesty	  of	  the	  law	  which	  provides	  for	  formally	  protection	  of	  special	  areas	  (NEM:PA).	  	  The	  
[name	  provided]	  Protection	  Association	  is	  in	  court	  on	  this	  case	  -­‐	  a	  typical	  S24G	  scenario	  of	  
power	  and	  influence	  riding	  roughshod	  over	  the	  law.	  	  This	  is	  the	  example	  we	  need	  to	  prevent	  
while	  still	  allowing	  a	  mechanism	  for	  those	  who	  are	  foolish	  and	  ignorant	  not	  to	  lose	  
developments	  which	  are	  beneficial	  to	  society.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  instance	  the	  developer	  convinced	  province	  that	  too	  much	  money	  had	  already	  been	  
spent	  and	  that	  demolishing	  the	  lodge	  was	  not	  an	  option.	  	  Here	  the	  authority	  did	  not	  
adequately	  evaluate	  the	  precedent	  being	  set,	  and	  how	  it	  was	  failing	  (would	  in	  the	  future	  be	  
compromised...	  )	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  NEM:PA.	  	  Sometimes	  an	  offset	  is	  not	  possible,	  and	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weighed	  against	  the	  long-­‐term	  implications	  and	  trends,	  the	  only	  answer	  is	  severe	  penalties	  
and	  the	  long	  road	  of	  rehabilitation.	  The	  great	  risk	  is	  that	  a	  spat	  of	  "bankruptcies"	  follow.	  	  It	  
should	  then	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  conditions	  apply	  to	  a	  new	  owner,	  even	  where	  the	  owner	  is	  a	  
financial	  institution.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  will	  foster	  more	  attention	  to	  environmental	  law	  by	  all	  
parties	  (including	  financiers),	  and	  need	  but	  a	  few	  costly	  examples	  to	  pave	  the	  way.	  	  
	  
I	  feel	  sure	  I	  have	  added	  nothing	  new.	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  the	  opportunity	  to	  at	  least	  feel	  
empowered	  to	  do	  something	  about	  the	  issue.	  
Cara	  Stokes,	  
consultant	  at	  
CSEnvironmental	  
1. Does	  s24G	  fulfill	  some	  function?	  If	  there	  is	  a	  delay	  from	  the	  department	  side	  and	  the	  
applicant	  had	  begun	  their	  EIA	  application,	  but	  just	  administrative	  action	  was	  not	  followed	  
by	  the	  department	  in	  authorising	  the	  activity,	  	  and/	  or	  if	  	  the	  activity	  had	  other	  major	  
financial	  or	  environmental	  consequences	  if	  the	  project	  was	  not	  to	  go	  ahead	  immediately.	  Is	  
there	  a	  need	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  authorise	  illegal	  listed	  activities,	  if	  the	  activity	  was	  
conducted	  in	  a	  response	  to	  an	  emergency?	  Or	  should	  it	  just	  be	  abolished	  and	  rehabilitation	  
be	  dealt	  with	  under	  a	  s28	  directive	  (or	  activities	  stopped	  and	  a	  fresh	  EIA	  application	  be	  
submitted)?	  Rehab	  should	  still	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  terms	  of	  s	  28	  directive.	  
2. If	  so,	  in	  what	  circumstances	  should	  a	  violator	  be	  allowed	  to	  submit	  a	  rectification	  
application?	  If	  it	  was	  in	  a	  response	  to	  environmental	  emergencies	  or	  public	  interest	  	  (This	  
could	  include	  activities	  such	  as	  upgrading	  roads	  which	  are	  already	  existing	  or	  upgrading	  
sewerage	  farms)	  or	  an	  exemption	  route	  was	  not	  explored/	  or	  the	  EIA	  regulations	  have	  
changed	  and	  limits	  which	  were	  previously	  adopted	  and	  are	  no	  longer	  adopted	  should	  now	  
be	  deemed	  exempt	  from	  any	  24G	  application	  due	  to	  the	  recent	  changes.	  
3. Should	  a	  violator	  be	  allowed	  to	  submit	  more	  than	  one	  rectification	  application?	  Yes,	  but	  
the	  judgement	  of	  each	  24	  g	  should	  be	  based	  on	  its	  response	  to	  environmental	  emergencies	  
or	  public	  interest,	  one	  town	  could	  be	  particularly	  bad	  and	  the	  mayor	  may	  be	  the	  person	  
applying	  for	  the	  section	  24G’s.	  
4. Should	  an	  authority	  have	  a	  discretion	  to	  accept	  a	  s24G	  application,	  or	  should	  all	  
applications	  at	  least	  be	  processed?	  Applications	  should	  be	  processed	  by	  a	  panel	  of	  
respected	  environmental/	  legal	  government	  professionals,	  where	  if	  blatant	  disregard	  for	  
environmental	  matters	  concerning	  a	  particular	  project	  were	  obviously	  exercised	  and	  the	  
violator	  cannot	  prove	  that	  they	  took	  any	  reasonable	  measures	  to	  ensure	  that	  
environmental	  matters	  were	  considered	  the	  violator	  should	  be	  given	  a	  criminal	  record	  
which	  can	  be	  plea	  bargained	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  community	  service	  sentence	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
monetary	  fine	  which	  shall	  be	  partially	  used	  to	  fund	  a	  particular	  community	  project	  that	  the	  
violator	  must	  engage	  in.	  The	  community	  projects	  must	  promote	  the	  interests	  of	  
sustainability	  and	  show	  that	  fines	  are	  being	  used	  to	  promote	  the	  interests	  of	  sustainability	  
and	  not	  otherwise	  used	  to	  promote	  individual	  interest.	  After	  5	  years	  a	  24G	  applications	  
should	  only	  engage	  emergency	  responses.	  If	  a	  violator	  is	  found	  to	  having	  had	  engaged	  in	  an	  
activity	  the	  requires	  an	  EIA	  after	  a	  5	  year	  period	  (No	  emergency	  response	  can	  be	  proven)	  
they	  should	  be	  charged	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  24	  and	  the	  EIA	  regulations	  where	  criminal	  
sentences	  could	  be	  converted	  to	  sustainable	  community	  service	  and	  rehabilitation	  
directives	  are	  issued	  or	  the	  judge	  orders	  the	  violator	  to	  follow	  any	  instructions	  given	  to	  
them	  by	  the	  relative	  department	  involved	  in	  the	  24G	  application.	  
Carolyn	  
Schwegman,	  
WESSA	  
s24G	  does	  not	  in	  any	  way	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  deterrent	  to	  those	  developers	  (including	  municipalities	  
who	  do	  know	  the	  legislated	  EIA	  procedures)	  to	  ‘fast	  track’	  a	  development	  seeking	  to	  legalise	  it	  
once	  begun	  or	  completed.	  Not	  many	  applications	  have	  come	  across	  my	  desk	  but	  in	  almost	  
every	  case	  the	  fine	  has	  been	  reduced	  by	  almost	  50%	  on	  appeal	  by	  the	  applicant.	  This	  seems	  to	  
trivialize	  the	  process.	  
Judith	  Taylor	  
and	  Rachel	  
Adatia,	  ELA	  JHB	  
Does	  s24G	  fulfil	  some	  function?	  Is	  there	  a	  need	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  authorise	  illegal	  listed	  
activities?	  Or	  should	  it	  just	  be	  abolished	  and	  rehabilitation	  be	  dealt	  with	  under	  a	  s28	  directive	  
(or	  activities	  stopped	  and	  a	  fresh	  EIA	  application	  be	  submitted)?	  –	  I	  propose	  the	  latter	  
If	  so,	  in	  what	  circumstances	  should	  a	  violator	  be	  allowed	  to	  submit	  a	  rectification	  
application?	  –	  Dependant	  on	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  violation,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  blatant	  violations,	  the	  
violator	  must	  pay	  all	  rectification	  costs	  and	  be	  disbarred	  from	  continuing	  
Should	  a	  violator	  be	  allowed	  to	  submit	  more	  than	  one	  rectification	  application?	  -­‐	  NO	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Should	  an	  authority	  have	  a	  discretion	  to	  accept	  a	  s24G	  application,	  or	  should	  all	  applications	  
at	  least	  be	  processed?	  –	  They	  be	  processed	  
What	  about	  that	  administrative	  fine	  –	  should	  this	  perhaps	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  criminal	  fine	  
imposed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  plea	  and	  sentence	  agreement	  in	  a	  guilty	  plea?	  (which	  will	  at	  least	  give	  
the	  applicant	  a	  criminal	  record)	  –	  Yes	  
Regarding	  the	  fine	  -­‐	  definitely	  should	  be	  a	  criminal	  fine,	  and	  I	  think	  it	  says	  a	  max	  of	  R1	  million	  
in	  the	  act	  -­‐	  which	  seems	  very	  low	  to	  me!	  Should	  they	  not	  be	  fined	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  
the	  development	  -­‐	  a	  %	  of	  cost/expected	  profit?	  
Chrissie	  Cloete	  
Obo	  Plettenberg	  
Bay	  Community	  
Environment	  
Forum	  
Our	   experience	   of	   this	   has	   not	   been	   a	   positive	   one,	   particularly	   with	   the	   current	   drought	  
situation	  and	  following	  the	  floods	  that	  we	  experienced	  in	  the	  Southern	  Cape	  in	  2007/08.	  
	  	  
We	  believe	   that	   the	  S24G	  process	   is	  being	  abused	  by	  developers	  and	   some	  authorities	  as	  a	  
loop	   hole	   to	   fast	   track	   their	   agendas	   and	   to	   avoid	   the	   delays	   associated	  with	   following	   the	  
normally	  required	  processes.	  	  
	  	  
The	  Bitou	  area	  is	  currently	  faced	  with	  what	  we	  believe	  to	  be	  badly	  managed	  water	  resources	  
and	   associated	   infrastructure	   which	   is	   impacting	   severely	   on	   our	   rivers,	   wetlands	   and	  
estuaries.	  	   Much	   of	   this	   can	   be	   associated	   with	   fast	   tracked	   developments,	   including	   the	  
installation	   of	   a	   desalination	   plant	   without	   proper	   studies	   being	   implemented	   and	   the	  
abstraction	  of	  water	   in	   dry	  periods	  when	   rivers	   are	   running	  below	   the	   required	   reserve.	  	   In	  
addition	  to	  this,	  bank	  stabilisation	  is	  taking	  place	  without	  a	  holistic	  approach,	  rocks	  are	  being	  
dumped	   into	   the	   sea	   and	   estuary	   to	   prevent	   erosion	   and	   sea	   walls	   and	   gabions	   are	   being	  
installed.	  	  When	  queries	  are	  made	  about	   these	  activities,	  we	  are	   told	   that	   the	  constructions	  
are	  being	  done	  during/in	  response	  to	  "emergency"	  situations	  and	  following	  a	  S24G	  process.	  
	  	  
We	  believe	   that	   there	   should	  be	  appropriate	   financial	  penalties	   involved	  with	   following	   this	  
process	   and	   that	   it	   should	   only	   be	   utilized	   during	   legitimate	   emergencies	   -­‐	   this	   to	   be	  
determined	   by	   a	   special	   committee/authority.	  	   Stricter	   penalties	   for	   unauthorised	  
developments,	  such	  as	  having	  to	  demolish	  the	  building	  site	  and	  enforcing	  rehabilitation	  of	  said	  
area,	  would	  discourage	  developers	  to	  abuse	  the	  S24G	  process.	  
	  	  
We	  hope	  that	  this	  situation	  can	  be	  remedied	  and	  that	  stricter	  controls	  will	  be	  put	  in	  place.	  
Chris	   Galliers,	  
WESSA	  
Section	  24G	  of	  NEMA	  has	  long	  been	  an	  issue	  of	  contention	  where	  there	  is	  potential	  for	  abuse	  
by	  proponents.	  The	  major	  challenge	  that	  is	  needed,	  is	  where	  a	  reasoned	  and	  fair	  process	  is	  
implemented	  that	  will	  deter	  developers	  from	  a	  “develop	  now	  and	  seek	  forgiveness	  later”	  
attitude,	  rather	  than	  get	  authorisation	  through	  a	  legal	  process.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  there	  is	  merit	  
in	  having	  a	  process	  that	  also	  employs	  discretionary	  input.	  
Concerns:	  
1.	  Having	  a	  fixed	  limit	  on	  the	  payable	  fine,	  needs	  to	  be	  changed.	  The	  fine	  needs	  to	  take	  into	  
account	  the	  financial	  scale	  of	  the	  development.	  Developers	  should	  not	  see	  S24G	  as	  a	  process	  
from	  which	  they	  are	  able	  to	  benefit.	  WESSA	  has	  witnessed	  numerous	  examples	  where	  the	  
fines	  given	  for	  a	  transgression	  have	  been	  almost	  welcomed	  by	  the	  proponent.	  What	  may	  have	  
looked	  like	  a	  substantial	  fine	  is	  rendered	  insignificant	  once	  one	  analyses	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  
development	  and	  the	  financial	  benefits	  accruing	  in	  both	  the	  short	  and	  long-­‐term.	  The	  solution	  
is	  to	  have	  realistic	  fines	  that	  are	  relative	  to	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  entire	  development	  and	  the	  
formula	  used	  to	  get	  to	  the	  fine	  amount	  is	  one	  of	  transparency.	  
2.	  As	  S24G	  applications	  are	  often	  made	  as	  a	  result	  of	  not	  having	  attempted	  an	  EIA.	  This	  can	  be	  
beneficial	  to	  the	  applicant	  who	  uses	  this	  avenue	  as	  a	  way	  of	  avoiding	  public	  involvement.	  
There	  is	  no	  I&AP	  involvement	  in	  the	  S24G	  process.	  Public	  participation	  may	  well	  be	  able	  to	  
add	  value,	  especially	  if	  an	  external	  review	  panel	  for	  S24G	  applications	  was	  constituted.	  In	  
addition,	  such	  a	  review	  panel	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  monitoring	  committee	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  
terms	  of	  reference	  from	  the	  final	  decision	  has	  been	  complied	  with.	  
3.	  A	  significant	  failing	  is	  that	  alternatives	  are	  never	  considered	  in	  this	  process.	  
4.	  It	  is	  also	  hard	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  project	  if	  you	  don’t	  have	  the	  background	  
information,	  so	  what	  scale	  will	  be	  used	  by	  the	  developer	  in	  measuring	  damage?	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So,	  the	  following	  needs	  to	  be	  assessed	  by	  the	  specialist:	  
• The	  scale	  and	  magnitude	  of	  the	  impact?	  	  
• Whether	  the	  transgression	  was	  a	  bona	  fide	  mistake?	  
• Was	  irreparable	  damage	  been	  done	  to	  the	  environment?	  	  
• What	  is	  the	  loss	  in	  terms	  of	  ecosystem	  goods	  and	  services?	  	  
• What	  is	  the	  loss	  to	  heritage,	  sense	  of	  place,	  cultural	  or	  pure	  existence	  values?	  
• The	  pre-­‐impacted	  area	  must	  be	  described	  
• A	  full	  evaluation	  must	  be	  done	  of	  the	  site	  suitability	  and	  alternatives	  had	  no	  
development	  occurred.	  	  
• Develop	  a	  public	  participation	  and	  input	  and	  social	  context	  of	  the	  development	  
• Alternatives	  for	  existing	  illegal	  infrastructure	  
• Environmental	  impacts	  of	  illegal	  structure	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  	  
• Consider	  secondary	  impacts	  	  
• Detail	  the	  impact	  and	  potential	  for	  rehabilitation.	  	  
• Provide	  scenario	  based	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action	  with	  recommendations.	  
5.	  Is	  there	  a	  register	  of	  offenders	  kept	  by	  authorities	  so	  that	  if	  a	  second	  application	  is	  
submitted	  by	  the	  same	  developer,	  then	  it	  is	  taken	  into	  account?	  
6.	  Another	  concern	  is	  that	  S24G	  can	  also	  be	  misused	  by	  the	  authorities.	  It	  can	  be	  a	  tool	  that	  
looks	  to	  rectify	  errors	  that	  they	  did	  not	  identify	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  means	  that	  although	  
there	  are	  numerous	  concerns	  with	  regard	  to	  S24G,	  there	  are	  many	  linked	  issues	  that	  need	  to	  
be	  addressed	  (such	  as	  having	  sufficient	  compliance	  and	  monitoring	  capacity)	  in	  order	  to	  
prevent	  the	  need	  for	  S24G	  application	  submissions.	  
7.	  The	  S24G	  process	  involves	  the	  appointment	  by	  the	  developer	  (or	  perpetrator),	  of	  an	  EAP,	  to	  
produce	  a	  report	  containing	  mitigation	  measures.	  The	  issue	  of	  independence	  is	  raised	  and	  
thus	  the	  need	  for	  some	  level	  of	  public	  participation	  involvement	  and	  independent	  review	  
panel	  is	  needed	  to	  add	  balance	  to	  the	  process.	  This	  is	  definitely	  a	  case	  whereby	  the	  
competent	  authority	  could	  appoint	  an	  independent	  consultant	  rather	  than	  the	  developer.	  
8.	  In	  serious	  cases	  (a	  list	  of	  criteria	  that	  determines	  what	  constitutes	  being	  serious	  needs	  to	  be	  
established)	  there	  should	  be	  little	  room	  for	  negotiations	  and	  no	  attempt	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  
validate	  any	  illegal	  development	  or	  part	  thereof.	  The	  developer	  should	  start	  with	  rectification	  
and	  rehabilitation	  and	  only	  then	  once	  complete,	  could	  the	  developer	  apply	  to	  start	  an	  EIA.	  
What	   is	   needed	   is	   a	   process	   that	   reflects	   genuine	   independence	   (without	   fear	   or	   favour),	  
accountability,	   sound	   agreed	   methodologies	   and	   stiff	   penalties	   which	   includes	   full	  
rectification/rehabilitation.	  At	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  we	  are	  experiencing	  land	  transformation,	  we	  
cannot	  afford	  an	  almost	  impunitive	  process.	  
Prof.Tumai	  
Murombo,	  
University	  of	  the	  
Witwatersrand	  	  
My	  2	  cents	   is	   that	  only	  person	  who	  violate	   the	  EIA	   laws	  without	  knowledge	  of	   the	  EIA	   laws	  
should	   be	   entitled	   to	   S24	   G	   rectification	   (i.e.	   Applicants	   who	   did	   not	   know	   and	   could	   not	  
reasonably	   have	   known	   that	   the	   activity	   concerned	   required	   an	   EIA).	   Otherwise	   applicants	  
who	   knew	   and	   should	   have	   reasonably	   known	   of	   the	   legal	   requirements	   must	   simply	   be	  
penalised	   through	   s	   28,	   24F	   and	   be	   asked	   to	   stop	   and	   rehabilitate	  without	   the	   option	   of	   a	  
rectification	  procedure.	  And	  remember	  everyone	  is	  presumed	  to	  know	  the	  law!	  It	  follows	  that	  
a	  person,	  company	  or	  connected	  other	  cannot	  submit	  this	  application	  more	  than	  once,	  as	  by	  
then	  they	  develop	  the	  necessary	  knowledge	  of	   the	   legal	   requirements	   for	  activities	   they	  are	  
likely	  to	  engage	  in.	  
Lea	  September,	  
consultant	  at	  
ILISO	  (and	  doing	  
Masters	  in	  Env	  
Management	  on	  
this	  topic)	  
If	   S24G	   is	   to	   serve	   its	   purpose	   and	   make	   a	   positive	   contribution	   to	   environmental	  
management	   and	   governance,	   it	   is	   absolutely	   necessary	   that	   it	   be	   supported	   by	   effective	  
enforcement.	  Otherwise,	  it	  is	  simply	  handled	  as	  a	  formality/rubber	  stamping	  exercise,	  adds	  no	  
value,	  and	  encourages	  abuse	  (both	  by	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector).	  
Deliberately	  bypassing	  a	   lengthy	  and	  costly	  EIA	  process	  can	  as	  a	  result	  become	  an	  attractive	  
option	  because	  the	  possible	  fine	  incurred	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  prosecution	  is	  relatively	  low,	  and	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  receiving	  an	  environmental	  authorisation	  is	  relatively	  high.	  
The	  fine	  system	  contains	  potential	  for	  corruption,	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  how	  that	  can	  be	  addressed.	  
The	   fines	   applied	   in	   terms	   of	   S24G	   are	   hardly	   a	   deterrent	   for	   corporate	   offenders	   to	  
deliberately	  bypass	  the	  EIA	  process	  and	  accordingly	  do	  not	  prevent	  repeat	  offenders.	  
The	   issue	   of	   fines	   should	   be	   envisaged	   together	   with	   that	   of	   enforcement	   to	   avoid	   repeat	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offenders.	  
EAPs	  also	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  informing	  proponents	  of	  the	  proper	  process	  for	  obtaining	  
environmental	  authorisation;	  some	  EAPs	  have	  recommended	  that	  proponents	  commence	  
activities	  before	  the	  EA	  is	  issued,	  resulting	  in	  unnecessary	  S24G	  applications.	  
John	  Wesson,	  
National	  
Association	  of	  
Conservancies	  of	  
South	  Africa	  
• The	  process	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  transparent	  especially	  the	  determining	  of	  the	  fine	  on	  their	  
scale.	  	   One	   or	   two	   stakeholder	  NGO	   representatives	   should	   be	   party	   to	   the	   allocation	   of	  
points	  by	  a	  senior	  official.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  criteria	  of	  the	  scale	  it	  is	  a	  joke	  as	  one	  will	  find	  the	  
person	  allocating	  the	  points	  has	  never	  been	  on	  site.	  
• There	   should	   be	   a	  min	   of	   say	   10%	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   development	   as	   the	   baseline	   for	  
determining	  the	  fine	  
• The	   six	  month	   amnesty	   period	   ended	   in	   2005.	  	   Anyone	  breaking	   the	   law	  now	   	  should	   be	  
charged	  in	  court	  and	  have	  a	  criminal	  record	  if	  found	  guilty	  by	  a	  judge	  
• Open	  to	  corrupt	  practices	  	  “easier	  to	  plead	  for	  forgiveness	  than	  follow	  the	  law”	  
• Illegal	  developments	  in	  protected	  areas	  should	  be	  equal	  to	  poaching	  in	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  
punishment	  
• The	  establishment	  of	  No	  Go	  areas	  as	  proposed	  to	  the	  ministers	  will	   remove	  the	  “	  did	  not	  
know”	  aspect	  
• Ignorance	  of	   the	   law	  cannot	  continue	   to	  be	  used	  as	  an	  excuse	  and	   that	   is	  what	  24G	   is	   in	  
effect	  
• The	  judge	  should	  decide	  on	  	  demolition	  and	  rehabilitation	  as	  part	  of	  the	  sentence	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